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Featuring sexually attractive women as the central action figure, contemporary 
action heroine cinema has brought opposing interpretations from the feminists and 
postfeminists. To disentangle the root of their bifurcation, this dissertation intends to 
look at the extra-textual cultural logic that forms and transforms the way audiences 
are engaged with the action heroine films now. Navigated by Jean Baudrillard’s 
theories of postmodernism, particularly of semiurgy, sign value, simulation, 
implosion, and consumer culture, I argue that watching these films is purely a 
consumptive process, and a multiple process in which the action heroine cinema is 
consumed as the composite commodity, as the spectacles of technology, as the 
spectacles of the heroines’ bodies, and as the idea of feminism. In a cultural logic 
where representations become free-floating media simulacra, any political 
engagement with the image is thus diluted and invalidated – a situation that puts 
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Chapter 1 The Rise of Action Heroine Cinema 
 
Introduction: The Action Heroine Phenomenon  
Ever since the advent of Hollywood blockbuster in the late 1970s, action cinema 
has been the staple production representing the “blockbuster-ing” effect. With its wide 
commercial appeal, this movie genre mainly served as a strategic move to wrestle off 
the pressuring competition from television and other home entertainment
1
, such as 
cable TV, VCR, or DVD. As computer and Internet, which is capable of rendering 
almost everything in downloadable digits, enters the household, this competition 
becomes even more imminent and intense. However, the film industry has 
appropriated its own blessing from this digital revolution. Ensured by the speedy 
development of computer-supported filmmaking technology, action cinema, 
increasingly incorporated with science-fiction and fantasy elements, has carried the 
blockbuster tradition forward quite well to recent decades. “Traded in the fare of 
contemporary ‘high concept’ cinema – elevated ‘B’ movie genre materials, episodic 
plots, breathtaking visual spectacle of the post-Matrix combat stunts, amazing digital 
effects and computer generated imagery variety and tie-in friendly musical 
soundtracks” (O’Day 201) – such action-sci-fi-fantasy films have shown a 
                                                          
1 This is to state that this thesis will employ several parts of my previous publication “Just Look at it: 
The Cultural Logic of Contemporary Action Heroine Cinema” in Nov. 2010, gnovis, (listed in 
Bibliography). This publication is a paper based on the research proposal designed for this thesis, but 
the arguments in this thesis are much more developed than those in the paper. And only bits and pieces 
of this 3000-word paper will be re-used in the thesis across several sections and chapters (mainly 
Chapter 1, 2, 4) in a quite dispersive way. So I will not cite each of the quotation one by one. 
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bombarding upswing in the number of production and gained remarkable popularity 
in this new millennium. 
From the 20
th
-century series of James Bond, Indiana Jones, Lethal Weapon, 
Rambo, Terminator, and Die Hard and the 21
st
-century productions of Spider-Man, 
The Mummy, X-Men and Transformers saga etc., a number of obvious common 
characteristics can be pinpointed to these films: “a propensity for spectacular physical 
action, a narrative structure involving fights, chases and explosions, and in addition to 
the deployment of state-of-the-art special effects, an emphasis in performance on 
athletic feats and stunts” (Neale 52). These “hyperbolic” features have often been 
“accompanied by an emphasis on the ‘hyperbolic bodies’” (Neale 52) which are 
predominantly embodied by male stars, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Sylvester Stallone, 
Bruce Willis, and Hugh Jackman, to name only a few, who confront the evil, push the 
narrative, and finally save the world. 
Although there were occasions where women were the action heroes in 
mainstream Hollywood, as in the Alien series (1979-1997) or Terminator II (1991)
2
, 
these occasions were still rare before 2000. However, in the short period of the recent 
decade, the incarnation of action heroines becomes increasingly prominent. Especially 
after the “most iconic” (O’Day 201) figure of Lara Croft (Angelina Jolie) in a two-
episode movie series (2001 and 2003), a proliferating number of Hollywood films put 
                                                          
2  In the four episodes of Alien films, Ripley (Sigourney Weaver), a female warrant officer on a 
spaceship, survives the attacks from extraterrestrial creatures and manages to defeat them every time. 
In Terminator II, Sarah Connor (Linda Hamilton), the mother of the future Savior, fights together with 
T-800 Terminator to protect her son from being killed by a more sophisticated Terminator, T-1000. 
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female leads in action pursuing the evil-fighting, world-saving cause once 
accomplished by male characters, such as Alice played by Milla Jovovitch in Resident 
Evil saga (2002, 2004, 20007, 2009, 2012), Selene played by Kate Beckinsale in 
Underworld series (2003, 2006, 2012), Elektra played by Jennifer Garner in Elektra 
(2005), Aeon played by Charles Theron in Aeon Flux (2005), and so on. Meanwhile, 
the blockbuster strategy applies consistently: the female superstars’ personal charisma, 
the promise of the fancy experience into a fantastic world of special effects, the never-
ending expectation brought by the prospect of sequels and adaptations, and the 
ancillary market’s even more far-flung and deep-seated influence among fans (for 
example, the video games of Tomb Raider and Resident Evil). All these work together 
to push the female super-heroes onto a quite salient agenda in the world of Hollywood. 
These new-century female superheroes share two common qualities which seem 
contradictory to each other but nevertheless coexist. First, as the main characters who 
command the narrative, they are physically strong and agile, as exemplified by their 
maneuver over vehicles, their abilities to wield multiple firearms, and their prowess in 
hand-to-hand fight. They are intellectually outstanding as well, as demonstrated by 
their meticulous reasoning, ingenious tactics, and unique insight that no male 
characters appearing in the same movie can match. Second, despite these 
conventionally masculine qualities, they maintain their femininity with overtly 
sexualized bodies that most heterosexual men would find desirable, as highlighted by 
their particular costumes (tight, scanty) and figures (curve, breasts) in the films, as 
well as the actresses’ own star image as pretty and attractive. 
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Through such contrarious combinations of masculine power and feminine body 
in one central character, this unique image has been variously termed as “action babe” 
(O’Day 202), “warrior woman” (Waites 205), or “bit girl” (Rehak 159), as indicating 
both the transgressive and the conventional characteristics these female heroes thus 
carry. And this oxymoronic representation of action heroine constitutes the object and 
the starting point of this research in its further enquiry of the reasons for the 
emergence of such representations, as well as the cultural implication from this image. 
 
Past Images: A Change of Rules 
Such a representation of women forms a fissure, if not a total gap, that breaks 
away from the past female characters on Hollywood screen in an unprecedented way. 
The traditional roles for women, though occasionally allowing for certain complexity 
and intensity, used to be confined to a small number of stereotypical images. From the 
simplistic bifurcation of virgin/whore in the early Hollywood, to the fallen woman, 
sex goddess, dumb blonde, and the domestic trinity of wife, mother, and daughter in 
the classical Hollywood era, women were characterized by passivity and negativity, 
occupying the sideline position that serves to set off the centrality of male characters 
or act as the sex object of male heroes. These stereotypes, if not unchanged at all, are 
presented, then undermined, then reinforced in Hollywood history across various 
genres, most typically, comedies, gangsters, Westerns in early ages and action, 
science fiction in more recent decades.  
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In a broader generic account, there is certain group of movies categorized as 
woman’s film, which is defined as “a movie that places at the center of its universe of 
a female who is trying to deal with emotional, social, and psychological problems 
connected to the fact that she is a woman” (Basinger 20). Although under such a term 
that seems to specifically speak for women, these films are generally marked by 
domestic settings, by romance and/or by pathos and sentiment. The female 
protagonist is often depicted as sentimental, torn between romance, career and family. 
The audience is often “characterized as composed of frustrated housewives, oppressed 
by the duties of motherhood and marriage, by sexual frustration and lost fantasies of 
romantic love” (Gledhill 324). This genre is also termed as “weepie” or “chick flick” 
with a derogatory tone implying a “sappy” movie with dramatized sentiment but 
trivial subject. And finally, however much is it about women and appealing to women, 
the narrative resolution often leans toward patriarchal ends –woman will be happy 
only when she marries the right man—while looking satisfying to women. 
When speaking of the particular genre of action and adventure, it used to be 
overwhelmed by male dominance, as showcased by the series of James Bond, Indiana 
Jones, Batman, Die Hard, Rambo, to name only a few. Women characters in these 
films were mainly portrayed as passive foil to men’s execution of heroism, abject 




When women characters did take the active role in action-involved films, they 
embodied a force that entailed investigation, recuperation, punishment, or even 
destruction. This was epitomized by the notorious archetype of Femme Fatale in the 
film noir of the 1940s and neo film noir in the 1980s. She did pick up pistols with no 
shaking hands, but she was, nevertheless, seductive, scheming, mysterious and 
dangerous. She was a criminal using her sexuality as a lethal weapon to achieve her 
own wicked purpose (Haskell; Kuhn, and Radstone; Waites). 
Another type of active female characters would be what Carol Clover identified 
as the “Final Girl” in the circular low-budgeted horror-slasher films in the 1980s and 
1990s. This type of female image represented an involuntary transformation from 
passive to active under the circumstance of threat and persecution. After enough 
torture and horror, she was forced to stand up against the psychic killer and finally 
destroyed the villain. If slasher movies “deal with genital behavior only indirectly, 
through the metaphor of violence,” the rape-revenge narratives used a real penis as the 
aggression against women (Clover 157), which led to another category of “toughened-
up” women derivative from the final girl: “Avengers” (Clover). They took karate or 
bought a gun because they were revenging rape previously inflicted on them, 
oppression that smolders for so long, or domestic violence that can only be rid of by 
violence. They represented the abused “woman-turned-warrior” (Waites 207) as 
illustrated by many of the revenge films in the 1980s (I Spit on Your Grave, Lipstick, 
Ms 45, and Savage Streets) or more recent incarnation like Thelma and Louise (1991) 
(Kuhn, and Radstone; Read). 
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Framed as domestic and sexual victims, avengers were implementing the radical 
feminism’s assertion of “sexual oppression as the or at the very least a fundamental 
form of oppression for women” (Beasley 55). And in portraying their rage against 
men, these movies constituted a “male-bashing” piece of radical feminist propaganda 
(Walters 6), stating that men as a group are the “main enemy” (Beasley 55). Worthy 
as these movies might be – and “who can blame Thelma or Louise for wanting a self-
actualized life free from abusive and exploitative relationships with men?” –such 
action heroines could not be constructed as equal counterpart to the patriarchal 
incarnation, because in this specific genre of action, “hero” or “warrior” in traditional 
sense customarily acts out of a “higher purpose” that enables them to “look beyond 
the immediate… battle… and see the larger implications of struggle” (Waites 207). 
Be it Spiderman or Superman, “the stakes are high and represent the age-old battle for 
justice” or humanitarian cause that, typically, involves the good warrior versus the 
evil villain, or the single hero saving the whole human race, which, as cliché or 
simplistic as it may be, “is the bread and butter of the high-grossing, ever popular 
action film genre that is constantly dominated by male heroes” (Waites 207). 
In light of this historical review of past female characterization, the 
contemporary action heroines differ in a lot of ways. First, they are the active agent 
who push the narrative forward, disentangle the enigma and finally resolve the state of 
disequilibrium. They are hence no longer in the peripheral role defined in relation to 
male characters as lovers, mothers, or sisters. Second, their motivation for action 
marks a very significant break from the past representations of active women. When 
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they are active, they are motivated neither by any dark or selfish purpose like the 
femme fatale, nor by any explosive fury against previous inflictor like the avenger, 
but by their moral imperative to uphold the righteous, to guard humanity from disaster, 
and to keep the world in order. For instance, Lara Croft’s treasure-seeking endeavors 
are aimed at preventing the evil force from abusing the mystic power of the treasures, 
such as time-reversing Magic Triangle in Episode 1, and the Pandora’s Box in 
Episode2. Alice, in Resident Evil series, is constantly trying to exposing Umbrella 
Corporation’s research on viral weapon and to find the cure for the already infected 
victims. Their powers are not involuntarily forced out of any extreme circumstance 
(like final girl in face of violence), but seem like a “given”, a natural-born gift that can 
be brought into play at any necessary moment. 
While the female characters with all these exceptional qualities look new and 
exciting, the question remains whether such distinctive representation necessarily 
equals better representation for women, or even further, whether such representation 
is a reflection that women are actually more and more empowered. If so, is it the 
reason why action heroine movies are so popular these years? Because they “better” 
represent women and they “empower” women? If not so, what meaning can we imply 
from these images and the act of representing the images in such particular way? In 
this thesis, I will argue that instead of empowering or “better” representing women, 
these action heroine films, due to a new cultural-economic logic prevailing in 
Hollywood film industry, have come to entail a viewing process of total 
objectification and multiple consumption. 
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In Chapter Two, I will review the existent scholarly writings about the 
representation of woman as action heroine and the relevant theories. In Chapter Three, 
I will elaborate on the theoretical framework of this thesis – the cultural-economic 
logic that will navigate the analysis of the action heroine cinema in Chapter Four, and 
then the thesis will come to the conclusion in Chapter Five.  
In order to make the argumentation of this thesis a precise and powerful one, I 
need to acknowledge at this very beginning that, firstly, the focus of this study is 
genre specific – Hollywood action cinema with its spectacular images and its 
derivative media production (which, inevitably, is mixed with genres like science-
fiction, fantasy and thriller), and thus the discussion and argument made is applied to 
the cinema of the spectacular form  (action genre or genre mixtures) without any 
intention to generalize to all movies; secondly, the audience I will talk about in the 
following discussion also refers to a particular demographic – people living in late 
capitalist society with easy access to all kinds of media tools like cinema, computer 
and the internet; thirdly, since this thesis focuses on exploring the gender politics in 
contemporary film representation, the other concerns like race, class, age, will not be 
addressed; and fourthly, in the following chapters, I am not presenting any in-depth 
analyses of each and every film, but are instead using the action heroine genre as 
exemplary of how the cultural-economic logic operates. 
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Chapter 2 Action or Heroine? 
 
Woman’s image on screen has been a heated subject for feminists’ endeavor to 
get rid of oppression. When female characters step on the mainstream Hollywood 
stage with such a high profile as the action heroine, feminist readings of them are 
indispensable to uncovering the politics hidden in that image—what this could mean 
for woman. However, feminism has never been a static or simplistic entity. It is more 
than just the suffrage movement of its initial stage, for it has entered all kinds of fields 
of political, social, and cultural life. In the more than one hundred years since the late 
19
th
 century, we cannot say that the movement is necessarily always going for better 
or improving women’s life for sure, but it is certain that the meanings, goals, forms, 
and struggles of feminism have undergone various changes, and meanwhile among 
each different field of feminist engagement, the changes are always vigorous. And 
film is such a typical field. Feminists begin to explore films in its later stage of 
development, when film theory itself gradually matures around the 1970s. Because 
seeing is so crucial to knowledge in western culture, cinema has been, in Laura 
Mulvey’s words, “the crucial terrain on which feminist debates about culture, 
representation and identity have been fought out” (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 
77). Feminists’ engagement with film theory is also by no means monotonous or 
stagnant. There have been countless and ongoing disputes over the issues of gender, 
femininity, sexual difference in films, over the interpretation of a certain film or a 
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certain character, and most importantly, over the question of what theoretical tools are 
best for analyzing films from a feminist point of view. It is during this continual 
process of debating and complicating that feminist film theory begins to take shape 
and gradually stand on its own. In light of the vigorous dynamics of feminist film 
theory, it is, therefore, necessary to look back historically for a background 
knowledge how woman in film is read and theorized in feminist writings before 
getting down to the how feminist film theories could work in discussing the image of 
action heroine. 
 
Feminist Film Theory 
In 1972, the first issue of an ephemeral American journal, Women and Film, was 
published, declaring itself to be part of feminism’s “second wave.” The term “second 
wave” was coined to refer to the increase in feminist activity occurring in America, 
Britain, and Europe since the late 1960s. In America, the second wave of feminism 
arose as a response to the women’s experiences after World War II. It was an era of 
remarkable “economic growth, a baby boom, suburban expansion, and the triumph of 
capitalism, which encouraged a patriarchal family life”, where women were restricted 
to the roles of housewives and mothers. “Disillusioned with their second-class status, 
women began to band together to contend against discrimination” (Thornham, 
“Second Wave” 30). The movement is usually believed to have begun in 1963, when 
the “Mother of the Movement,” Betty Friedan published her famous book, The 
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Feminine Mystique. In this book, Betty Friedan explicitly opposed the mainstream 
media portrayal of women, arguing that placing women at home limited their 
possibilities, and wasted their talent and potential, and that the perfect nuclear family 
image strongly marketed at the time, did not reflect happiness and was rather 
degrading for women.
3
 The tactics employed by second wave feminists ranged from 
highly-publicized activism, such as the protest against the Miss American beauty 
contest in 1968, to the establishment of small consciousness-raising groups 
(Thornham, “Second Wave” 30-31). The movement grew with legal victories, which 
addressed a wide range of issues: work, education, family, health, and marriage. The 
slogan “the personal is political” sums up the way in which “second wave feminism 
did not just strive to extend the range of social opportunities open to women, but also, 
through intervention within the spheres of reproduction, sexuality and cultural 
representation, to change their domestic and private lives” (qtd. in Thornham, 
“Second Wave” 37). 
In the spirit of this movement, the journal, Women and Film, stated in its first 
editorial, “the women in this magazine, as part of the women’s movement, are aware 
of the political, psychological, social and economic oppression of women. The 
struggle begins on all fronts and we are taking up the struggle with women’s image in 
film and women’s roles in the film industry – the ways in which we are exploited and 
the ways to transform the derogatory and immoral attitudes the ruling class and their 
male lackys [sic] have towards women and other oppressed peoples” (qtd. in 
                                                          
3 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second-wave_feminism 
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Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 93). The editors’ goal is threefold: “a 
transformation in film-making practice, and end to oppressive ideology and 
stereotyping, and the creation of a feminist critical aesthetics” (Thornham, “Feminism 
and Film” 93). It is in this climate that the feminism’s engagement with film begins – 
as an urgent political act. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argues that it is 
through the myths found in religions, traditions, language, tales, songs, movies that 
we not only interpret but also experience our material existences as men or women, 
and feminists since Beauvoir had seen cinema as a key carrier of contemporary 
cultural myths. Though “representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work 
of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with 
absolute truth,” women, too, must inevitably see themselves through these 
representations (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 93-94). 
The first editorial of Women and Film also raised some crucial questions:  
 Which analytical tools will best serve the political goals the editors outline? 
What is the relationship between the different types of oppression which they 
describe, and between the different forms of transformation they envisage? In 
particular, what is the precise relationship between oppressive images, 
representations, or structures of looking, and the material inequalities which 
women – and “other oppressed people” – experience as social beings? What, 
finally, has looking to do with sexuality, with power and with 
14 
 
masculinity/femininity? Why is it that the circulation of images of women’s 
bodies can in itself seem an act of oppression?  
                                                                   (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 94) 
These questions have not been answered straightforwardly after over thirty-five 
years, and as I will show, they are still relevant questions today. But the point is that 
we can never envisage a utopian moment when “images of women” will “reflect” the 
realities of women’s lives, because cinematic representations have proved to be far 
more complex than this.  
In the initial stages, American feminism focused on film representations as false 
images of women. Several works, such as “The Image of Women in Film: Some 
Suggestions for Future Research” by Sharon Smith in 1972, Popcorn Venus by 
Marjorie Rosen in 1973, and From Reverence to Rape by Molly Haskell in 1974 all 
employ a survey methodology, and concentrate on criticizing the issue of “sex-role 
stereotyping.” Their concern is to reveal how both false and oppressive the limited 
types of women representations are. These accounts adopted a reflectionist approach, 
believing that “films both reflect social structures and changes, and misrepresent them 
according to the fantasies and fears of their male creators”. These writers focus on 
linking “the power of cinematic representations to the social context that produces and 
receives them, and insisting on women’s collective power to instigate change” 
(Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 95). However, what is missing in these accounts, 
according to Thornhan, is “a theoretical framework capable of both explaining the 
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persistence and power of these representations in structuring women’s sense of 
identity and seeing them as culturally constructed and thus open to change” (95). As 
limited this framework might be, the development of reflectionist approach pushed 
the focus away from the misrepresentation via “oppressive images,” and “towards a 
consideration of how cinema structures meaning and pleasure in such a way as to 
reinforce, or help to construct, our gendered identities” (95).  
Then, Claire Johnson, a British feminist film theorist, with her “Notes on 
Women’s Cinema” in 1973, was the first to take a theoretical turn by inputting 
cultural theory and the ongoing debates within European film, which includes 
structuralism, semiotics, Marxist theories of ideology, and psychoanalytic theory. 
According to these approaches, “film representations should not be viewed, as in the 
American “sociological” approach, as reflections of reality, whether ‘true’ or 
‘distorted’.” Instead, “films are bearers of ideology, which can be defined as that 
representational system, or ‘way of seeing’ the world which appears to us to be 
‘universal’ or ‘natural’ but which is in fact the product of the specific power structures 
which constitute our society” (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 96). It is thus 
ineffectual to do the matching game between the stereotypes of women in films and 
the reality women live, as the two live within the same ideological structure.  What 
needs to be examined is how woman as a sign functions in specific film texts, not just 
in terms of what role she plays, but more of the “meanings it (woman as a sign) is 
made to bear and what desires and fantasies it carries” (96). 
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Also in the 1970s, a number of French film theorists shared the same interest in 
Marxist film theory, semiotics, psychoanalysis, and ideology critique, and developed 
what is called the “apparatus theory.” It shed light on how the mechanics of 
representation construct spectatorship, and laid the theoretical foundation for most of 
the later feminist film criticisms. 
The “apparatus” in film theory refers to the interaction between spectators, texts, 
and technology (Miller 403). Apparatus theory investigates how the technical and 
physical specificity of watching films influences the viewers’ processing methods. 
This goes beyond issues of technological innovation to concentrate on cinema as a 
“social machine” (403). This machine is not just the obvious mechanisms of the 
cinema – film, lighting, sound recording systems, camera, make-up, costume, editing 
devices, and projector, but delves into the realm of “demands, desires, fantasies, 
speculations (in the two senses of commerce and the imaginary)” (Comolli 122). The 
conflation of “narrativity, continuity, point of view, and identification” makes 
spectators part of the apparatus designed right for them (Flitterman-Lewis 3, 12). The 
apparatus takes the spectator’s illusion of experiencing the film as “real life,” and 
combines power with relaxation, engagement with leisure: a “technique of the 
imaginary” that combines the realism of capitalist fiction with the “primary imaginary” 
of recorded sound and image (Metz 15).  
The emphasis of apparatus theory is on the occasion of consumption, which 
means the material circumstances of spectatorship, and the dialectic between subject 
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and film when the viewer is engaged in the act of perception in the cinema (Miller 
404). This emphasis is one of the most important distinguishing factors between film 
theory and literary criticism which “fetishizes the text as a stable object that is always 
the same wherever and whenever it is read” (404). However, the focus on the material 
conditions does not inspire extensive empirical studies. Apparatus theory operates 
basically at the level of speculation (despite occasional writing on technological 
history and meaning). This is because the principal interest of apparatus theory 
revolves around “how subjectivity is constituted via the imaginary and the symbolic 
and their dance around the real. The interest in the specific technical apparatus of 
cinema is inextricably intertwined with an interest in Marxist theorization of 
prevailing ideological norms plus psychoanalytic theorization of fantasies and 
complexes” (Miller 404). 
The foundational social assumptions of apparatus theory are raised by the French 
philosopher and Marxist, Louis Althusser. In his influential essay, “Ideology and the 
ideological state apparatuses,” Althusser argues that the social relations necessary to 
uphold capitalist production are maintained by what he calls ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs). These consist of the family, the judiciary, schools, the church, the 
political system, culture and media, and are supported by repressive state apparatuses 
– the military, the police, the courts, the bureaucracy, and the prisons – which involve 
the use of force and its threat as a means of eliciting obedience. Althusser explicates 
ideology as “a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their 
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Real Conditions of Existence” (152). Ideology in fact plays a part in people’s 
everyday perceptions of the world and structures people’s lived experience. 
Althusser argues that one of the chief ways in which ideological state 
apparatuses position individuals is by the process of interpellation or hailing. The 
cultural texts, for example, “hail” or “call up” readers, and position them in relation to 
what they are consuming in the process. As a result of interpellation, the individual 
sees him or herself as a sovereign, autonomous individual and recognizes him or 
herself as the subject of ideology, but at the same time, in Althusser’s terms, the 
individual also misrecognizes him or herself. This is because “these positions are not 
normal and inherent to individuals, but individuals ‘misrecognize’ or mistake these 
positions as being natural and inherent in themselves” (Jancovich 132). As a result of 
misrecognition, individuals become the active agents of ideology, empowering and 
sustaining the very ideologies that work to exploit them. 
About the knowing and doing individual subject, it suggests that ideas are 
material practices or rituals, such as the act of paying a social debt (material faith in 
justice). When these practices are carried out by the subject, they define that subject at 
the same time. For the subject hailing and being hailed through this set of practices 
(Althusser), the “experience of watching film would best be understood as a set of 
objects (the technology of the cinema and the techniques of narrative), plus relations 
to those objects (credulity, identification, and fantasy)” (Miller 405). 
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The logic of ISAs elicited what Jean-Louis Baudry has theorized as film’s 
capacity to be both an “impression of the real” and “more-than-the-real” (299). The 
ostensible ontological control of the real offered by cinema is in accordance with 
Althusser’s understanding of ideology. The subject is presented with what seems like 
unveiled, transparent truth. Eyes were substituted by the camera. Spectatorship is like 
“being there,” present in a whole bunch of absent images, but the time and perspective 
is radically transformed in a bewitching way: the distant draws near, the past turns 
into present, the points of view vary. The spectator’s lack of mobility is “compensated 
by this promiscuous look, which traveled everywhere, to the most dangerous or 
painful as well as exhilarating places…as classical narrative ensured the ultimate 
restoration of equilibrium through perfect knowledge” (Miller 405). This is how Metz 
calls the cinema “a veritable psychic substitute, a prosthesis for our primally 
dislocated limbs” (15). Just as social subjects represent their living condition back to 
them in everyday life by means of ideology that masquerades as a plain, transcendent 
truth, “so film was a key mechanism for encapsulating such cultural messages” 
(Miller 405).  
In the same vein, Christian Metz and Jean-Louis Baudry both compared the 
operation of the “cinematic apparatus” on the spectator to that of the dream. Baudry 
argues in “The Apparatus” that “taking into account the darkness of the movie theater, 
the relative passivity of the situation, the forced immobility of the cine-subject, and 
the effects which result from the projection of images, moving images,” the process of 
viewing film offers remarkable parallels to the state of dreaming (305). Like dreams 
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and hallucinations, cinema provide us with strong but illusory perceptions through 
sound, images, and movement, which embrace unconscious desires and fantasies, 
putting aside the “reality principle” that would repress them. Metz argues in “The 
Imaginary Signifier,” the spectator enters this realm of desire and fantasy through 
identification – an instance that is necessarily involved when watching a film, because, 
as argued by Metz, the spectator “continues to depend in the cinema on that 
permanent play of identification without which there would be no social life” (21). 
The identification can be with a character in the film, the protagonist in most cases. 
But not all films, as Metz points out, contain characters. Even when characters are 
indeed present, identification cannot be total, because the screen is a mirror but not in 
a literal sense. That is to say, the spectator must identify with the cinematic apparatus 
itself, with the all-powerful gaze of the camera that re-creates the act of looking: 
The spectator identifies with himself, with himself as pure act of perception…as 
condition of possibility of the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental 
subject…At the cinema, it is always the other who is on the screen; as for me, I 
am there to look at him. I take no part in the perceived, on the contrary, I am all-
perceiving.                                                                                                          (25) 
Even today, after cinema mechanism and film theories has undergone so many 
changes, this all-perceiving-ness of the apparatus theory is still very relevant, when it 
comes to how film naturalizes its consumption. But it is relevant in quite different 
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ways, as the perception itself has changed, as theorized by Jean Baudrillard, and the 
all-perceiving-ness becomes only an illusion, which I will come back to later.  
Such theorization of identification becomes the meeting-point of apparatus 
theory and psychoanalytic theorization of Lacan via the notion of the mirror phase. 
The process of viewing is equated to the illusion of a strong ego of the mirror phase
4
. 
“Taken together, these qualities of ideology, lens, and subjectivity blind spectators to 
the fact that they, like the films they watch, are thick with discourse, unknowable by 
themselves or others without this encrustation of meaning and interpretation, as are all 
social phenomena in a world of ideology” (Miller 406). 
What apparatus theory dealt with opened up a theoretical route for feminist 
interrogation to move beyond the reflectionist way of looking at female representation, 
and delve into the textual depth for a better knowledge of how the sign of woman 
operates in the cinematic structures and how female spectators are positioned in such 
occasion of consumption. 
After “Notes on Women’s Cinema,” Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema” has become the most anthologized article in feminist film theory. 
Mulvey thus changed the analytic focus away from a purely textual analysis but 
towards a concern with the structures of identification and visual pleasure in cinema – 
the spectator-screen relationship. According to Mulvey, there are two patterns of 
                                                          
4 For Lacan, the mirror stage, beginning in the sixth month of infancy, refers to a development period 
when an infant first begins to develop a sense of its own identity as a being that is separate from its 
parents. Through the recognition of its own image in a mirror, the infant begins to formulate a 
conception of its identity, despite the fact that the infant still lacks mastery over its motor skills or 
bodily coordination. It is also during this stage when the infant’s ego begins to develop (Miller 407). 
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pleasure in film viewing, one is scopophilic which comes from sexual instinct, and the 
other is narcissistic identification which comes from ego libido. What is more 
important is the dichotomy between active/male and passive/female that in 
Hollywood classical cinema, man, as the one with power to forward story, is the 
bearer of the look at woman, who is displayed as a sexual object and erotic spectacle 
for men on screen and men as spectators. She also elaborates on the two mechanisms 
that help allay the castration threat signified by women: voyeurism (by investigation, 
punishment, and devaluation) and fetishizing (by objectifying her and hiding her lack 
with glamorous images). 
However, in putting sexual difference at the analytic center, and arguing women 
are objects, not subjects of the gaze, Mulvey said nothing about the female spectator.  
And most following theorizations of the relationship between spectator and film 
labeled the gaze as male, expelling the possibility of identification by female spectator. 
With regard to films texts, women were found to function primarily as objects of 
desire for the male gaze. Therefore, the basic problem for feminist film theory at this 
stage became whether woman, either as spectator or character, can be conceptualized 
outside the dominant hegemony. In the 1980s, Mary Ann Doane carried on Mulvey’s 
use of psychoanalytic theory and sought to take into account this shadowy figure by 
analyzing the viewing pleasure offered by the “woman’s film” of the 1940s. Doane 
argued that films which address the female spectator cannot count on the same 
psychic mechanisms – voyeurism, fetishism and narcissistic identification – that 
address her male counterpart, since these mechanisms protect the masculine psyche, 
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according to Freud, from the knowledge of woman’s difference (her “castration”). 
Instead of the all-powerful and eroticized distance characteristic of the masculine 
viewing position, what these films offer their female spectator is a “masochistic over-
identification with the cinematic image” (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 98). The 
distinction between the spectator and the object of her gaze is then crumbled: she is 
not offered – like the male spectator – an eroticized image for her gaze, but instead an 
identification with herself as image, as an object of desire or of suffering. The female 
protagonist of these films may appear as active agent at start only to end up as passive 
object; the movies may begin with her voice-over only to erase it; they offer the 
female spectator identification with the female protagonist’s gaze only to invest it 
with anxiety and fear but not desire (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 98). Take 
Hitchcock’s Rebecca (1940) for example, in the sequence of the masquerade ball, its 
central but nameless character seeks to assert her identity, she can do so only through 
assuming her predecessor’s identity, Rebecca, and by presenting herself as object of 
her husband’s – and male spectators’ – gaze. When she comes down the staircase 
wearing an identical dress to that of Rebecca, she becomes the object of spectacle, as 
in so many similar scenes. And female spectators are invited to identify with that 
objectification, and with the following humiliation (98). 
These explanations indeed provide powerful theorizations of how film influences 
unconscious mechanisms of identification in order to confirm gendered identities, 
according to which, however, women have no presence, no specific experience, and 
no possibility of active intervention at all. In this account, then, the problem is how 
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such an analysis of unconscious structures for identifications could help women affect 
any change? Moreover, as “a vital part of feminism’s project has been to transform 
women’s position from that of object of knowledge into that of subject capable of 
producing and transforming knowledge” (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 94), if 
there is no sense of “activity,” but only the passive objects (as female characters) and 
identification with the objects (on part of the female spectators), there is no, 
consequently, possibility of constituting the female subjectivity. Thus, Ruby Rich and 
others argue, in “A Discussion of Feminist Aesthetics” (Citron et al.), that the female 
viewer is a social being as well as cinematically constructed spectator, who cannot be 
reduced to a position that slips passively into acceptance of the ideological structures 
of the text. She, on the contrary, actively engages with these structures, constructing 
her own readings, often “against the grain.” She is, moreover, no single identity just 
along the single divide of sexual difference, but along lines of multiple differences – 
of race, class, sexuality, nationality, for example. What is needed, then, is a theoretical 
language that can comprehend these contradictions, and not get entrapped by some 
simplistic conclusions solely based on gender difference (Thornham, “Feminism and 
Film” 99). 
As feminist film theory’s use of psychoanalytic concepts seemed to have led into 
an impasse, there were quite a number of responses to it in the 1980s. While 
remaining within a psychoanalytic framework, some began to rethink its terms. 
Freud’s theories on dream and fantasy, then, underwent reinterpretation. While his 
theories had been the foundation for fixing cinema spectators within the structures of 
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sexual difference, they became extended to embrace the quite opposite – that the 
spectators were offered multiple and fluctuating positions in their viewing process. 
For instance, by studying genres of pornography, horror and melodrama – or “body 
genres” – Linda Williams’ argues that despite the fact that it is the female bodies that 
have “functioned traditionally as the primary embodiments of pleasure, fear, and pain” 
(5), the viewing positions in these films are not necessarily bound by the demarcation 
between genders. The viewing experience for both female and male spectators is 
marked by a combination of passivity and activity, sadism and masochism, 
powerlessness and power, and an oscillatory identification along the spectrum.  That 
is to say, female spectators are not necessarily cooped in a masochistic loop, nor male 
spectators always occupying the powerful male gaze (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 
99-100). 
Further moving away from psychoanalysis, there were responses that were 
closely involved with the perspectives emerging from British Cultural Studies. 
According to Stuart Hall, one of the most influential scholars, to understand the how 
film or television texts produce meaning, we need  to build a model that will explain 
the whole process of the communication, not just the meanings inscribed in texts, or 
their ideological or behavioral “effects.” In Hall’s model, this process is operated 
through three connected but distinctive “moments” – the “moment” of production, of 
the text, and of viewing. Each moment is conceived of as the locus for struggle or 
negotiation over meaning, so there are, respectively, the meanings “encoded” by the 
text’s creators, the meanings incarnated in the text, and the meanings “decoded” by 
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the viewers. This model of analysis was then appropriated for a feminist engagement. 
This model suggests that the textual meanings never remain uncontested, and neither 
do the ideological structures which they refer to (in Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 
100). The position popular texts offer for their spectator to occupy is nor singular or 
fixed. Film representations may derive their meaning from the textual and ideological 
structures in which they are embedded, “but they refer outwards too, to a social reality 
in which power – whether socio-political or ideological – is not simply imposed but 
contested”. If the text does allow multiple positions rather than a single one “from 
which it must be understood and enjoyed, it might be appropriated for new readings, 
for the production of new, perhaps more contingent, partial and fragmented identities, 
or for a feminist politics of reading” (Thornham, “Feminism and Film” 100). 
Therefore, according to Thornham, this point has led a number of feminist 
writers to go beyond the textual analysis of film and to explore women as film 
spectators “who are historically situated – that is, of women as cinema audiences 
rather than – or as well as – textual spectators” (101). For example, Miriam Hansen 
examines how the “textually constructed spectator” (the female spectator in Mulvey’s 
terms) differs from the “actual” movie-goer (the one who buys the ticket), and the 
“social, collective, experiential dimension of cinematic reception” from the 
exclusively psychoanalytic accounts (169). Jackie Stacey has investigated how the 
film star functions for female fans by conducting an ethnographic study of British 
women’s relationship with Hollywood film stars of the 1940s and the 1950s through 
their recollections. Stacey’s research thus “takes her beyond the moment of reception 
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examined in theories of the female gaze (that is, when we actually watch the film), 
and towards a fuller understanding of the more pervasive, and positive, role popular 
cinema plays within women’s everyday lives” (Turner 158). Therefore, for theorists 
like Hansen and Stacey, “film does not only happen in the cinema; it is a social 
practice that affects everyday lives through fandom, gossip, fashion, and the whole 
range of activities through which cultural identities are formed” (Turner 159).  
There has been now a lengthening line of feminist critiques of psychoanalytic 
film theory. Such critiques insist on the need for seeing a greater degree of social, 
historical and cultural specificity, for recognizing the diversity in watching the same 
text, and for acknowledging the multitude of extra-textual factors that might affect 
audience responses to popular films, such as fan activities or other ancillary cultural 
contexts (Turner 152). Not only in the realm of feminist film studies, but also in the 
area of film studies as a whole, the psychoanalytic approach is no longer as powerful 
an influence today as it once was. Over the 1990s in particular, “the psychoanalytic 
tradition attracted criticism for its totalizing tendencies and for its displacement of 
other, alternative, modes of analysis” (qtd. in Turner 152). According to Judith Mayne, 
the problem with many contemporary applications of psychoanalysis to film texts is 
that it almost becomes a formula: 
How many times does one need to be told that individual film x, or film genre y, 
articulates the law of the father, assigns the spectator a position of male oedipal 
desire, marshals castration anxiety in the form of voyeurism and fetishism, before 
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psychoanalysis begins to sound less like the exploration of the unconscious, and 
more like a master plot?                                                                                     (69) 
And also as Bordwell and Carroll have argued, any strong sense of the differences 
between films, let alone between spectators, tends to disappear before this kind of 
psychoanalytic theory. 
This research will join the move away from the psychoanalytic entrenchment, 
not because, however, this approach is not “popular” any more, or because it is under 
criticism. After all, psychoanalytic theories of identification still contend most of the 
territory of popular cinema, and many of the readings these enquiries have produced 
have remained rich and useful, such as Babara Creed’s work on the “monstrous-
feminine” in the Aliens trilogy. As filmmaking becomes more an industry not only 
about the film text, but also about technology, marketing strategy, consumption, and 
one of the knots among an even bigger and longer industrial chain, to examine the 
behind-the-screen cultural-economic logic will be more pertinent to the question of 
why there is such female representation. Just as Toby Miller puts it, the analysis of the 
text or the audience must today be “supplemented by an account of occasionality that 
details the conditions under which a text is made, circulated, received, interpreted, and 
criticized, taking seriously the conditions of existence of cultural production” (qtd. in 
Turner 61). In particular, with the advent of twenty-first century when capitalist 
economies and thus the homologous cultural production are increasingly marked and 
changed by the new age’s ways of operation, as most saliently characterized by, for 
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instance, multinational corporations and the wide use of ever-sophisticated media 
technologies, the consumption of a Hollywood movie cannot be only restricted to the 
two-hour-long textual duration in a dark theater, but should be contextualized in a 
larger cultural, social, economic background working under a new set of rules and 
meanings. The psychoanalytical approaches and the apparatus theory will not be 
dismissed simply as “outdated” but will be re-examined for what changes have 
occurred to them under such a larger context. Therefore, this research intends to 
inquire into film as a cultural product and as a social practice, and as a specific means 
of producing and reproducing cultural significance, valuable both for itself and for 
what it could tell about the systems and processes of culture. The interest in the 
context of consumption will be a primary focus for this research.  
 
Feminism vs. Postfeminism 
As the figure of action heroine steps on the stage of popular films with a rather 
glamorous and highlighted profile in the new millennium, it both reflects and furthers 
the discursive transformation within feminist theorization as well as the interaction 
between feminism as politics and its connection to popular culture. It is thus 
becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the various readings of this image along 
feminist line of thinking, as feminism, rather than a singular and universalized 
construct, can take different forms and bear diversified connotations and propositions. 
Especially after the second wave, the field has been fraught with vigorous debates and 
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reconfigurations like the ones I just outlined. However, among the existent 
interpretations of contemporary action heroines, there seems to be a tendency towards 
“taking a stand” through labeling the textual image as having produced either a 
progressive or a regressive discourse for women.  
For those who tag the representation of action heroine as regressive, such an 
image reinforces the sexist practice of objectifying female characters by featuring the 
heroines in highly sexualized bodies and outfits. For example, Angelina Jolie’s Lara 
Croft outfit comprises a close-fitting black vest and shorts which highlight her rangy 
form and stacked breasts, black boots with combat lace-ups, straps, and her trademark 
pistols attached to each thigh. Similarly, Selene (in Underworld series) always wears 
shiny one-piece leather tight that highlights her body shape, though she dislikes the 
very feminine evening gown even for special occasion. Elektra (in Elektra) is dressed 
in a red corselet-like “armor” when she is on mission, and Aeon Flux (in Aeon Flux) 
in skin-tight black or white suit, or occasionally just two slice of cloth scarcely 
covering her chest. Therefore, even though the action heroine figure “appears to be 
the equal of men as she brandishes swords and engages in martial arts combat to 
overcome villainy,” she is actually “constructed more to appeal to young male 
audiences than to young women looking for female models of heroism,” (Ferriss, and 
Young 20) if her image could ever be sought as an identificatible model in the first 
place, because “the physical beauty and alluring sexuality of the female stars and the 
characters they play embody traditional, patriarchally defined qualities of femininity” 
(O’Day 205). Despite the transgressive acts and characteristics she may show to the 
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audience, she is still subject to the male gaze. In Mulvey’s terms, male spectators look 
at her in a fetishistic way to play down the “threat of castration” denoted by women. 
The claiming of her equal-to-men power cannot legitimate the sexual display of her 
body, for she is degraded to the status of purely erotic object for pleasure, and the 
long-term effort by the second wavers to reject male objectification and to form a 
female subjectivity will be totally reverted and wasted. 
In contrast, there are views that treat the image of action heroine as progressive. 
With its growing popularity, it is significant in advancing the cause of equality by 
granting women more central roles in film, who, at the same time, upset the 
“traditional gender conventions” (Waites 204). These defenders of the super-heroine 
phenomenon argues that the powerful agency of the leading female provide a strong 
active womanhood that has never been seen before. Intelligent, resourceful, tough, 
and competent, she “wields amazing physical prowess and multiple firearms, and 
capable of any physical activity demanded by various incredible situations” (Rehak 
161), such as Lara Croft back-flipping in an ancient cave, or punching a shark 
underwater. The heroine, in her function as central protagonist in the action narrative, 
can clearly be seen to constitute the figure in the landscape, the position traditionally 
occupied by the male hero in classical cinema. Together with her undeniable feminine 
traits, the action heroine is, as O’Day says, “simultaneously and, brazenly, both the 
erotic object of visual spectacle and the action subject of narrative spectacle” (205). 
32 
 
While still being the erotic object, with which feminist reading is critically 
engaged, the heroine is read as being granted the power to enjoy her sexual body and 
being in a controlling position in romantic relationships, if any. This discursive 
construction of women being both strong and sexy runs parallel to a narrative called 
postfeminism that is extensively circulated in popular culture and media. The term 
“postfeminism” itself “originated from within the media in the early 1980s, and has 
always tended to be used in this context as indicative of joyous liberation from the 
ideological shackles of a hopelessly outdated feminist movement” (Gamble 36). It is 
“a dominating discursive system that assumes a ‘pastness’ for feminism, arguing that 
feminism’s purported success in the past allows, even necessitates, that it be 
superseded in the present” (Gamble 38). The most influential definition of 
postfeminism through reference to a rhetoric of relapse is Susan Faludi’s backlash 
trope. A group of women predominantly identified with postfeminism decry second 
wave feminism for “fostering an inappropriate image of female victimization,” what 
Naomi Wolf calls “victim feminism” (in Gamble 37). Postfeminists use this label as 
“shorthand for the claim that feminism has focused almost exclusively on – and 
overstated—the victimization that women face in their personal, professional, and 
political lives.” Rather than being victims, they claim, “women as a group hold 
significant social power, in part because of the stereotypes of women as gentler, fairer, 
more believable, less violent, more victimized, etc., than men” (Showden 170). As a 
result, according to the postfeminists, there is “exaggerated feminist 
propaganda…responsible for the oppression of women in contemporary society” 
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(Projansky 71). Another form of postfeminism, which is, though less antithetic, still 
based on a discourse that feminism is redundant and unnecessary, suggests that the 
second-wave feminism’s agenda has been achieved already. While enjoying the 
equality and all the rights brought by the success, women are entitled to have more 
choices in life concerning sexuality, family, career and body, and to invest in the 
“personal empowerment” and in “increasing their self-esteem without ‘sacrificing’ 
preoccupations with beauty, man and consumerism” (qtd. in Helford 59). 
Up until now, there have been a long line of conceptualizations and 
categorizations of postfeminism, each of which could be quite different from the other. 
For instance, according to Sarah Projansky, there are five categories of postfeminism, 
which are the “linear postfeminism,” the “backlash postfeminism,” the “equality and 
choice postfeminism,” the “(hetero)sex-positive postfeminism,” and the “men can be 
feminists too.” According to Rosalind Gill, there are three dominant accounts of 
postfeminism: an epistemological shift within feminism (which is similar to 
Projansky’s “linear postfeminism”), a political position in the wake of feminism’s 
encounter with “difference,” and a backlash against feminism (which is the same as 
Projansky’s “backlash postfeminism”), but she herself consider postfeminism as a 
sensibility. Besides, some scholars consider postfeminism in two kinds, one is the 
culture postfeminism generated by popular culture and media, and the other the 
academic postfeminism, which incorporates theories of postmodernism and post-
structuralism and sometimes is used interchangeably with Third Wave feminism, and 
this conceptualization of postfeminism is also similar to what Gill summarizes as the 
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political position in the wake of feminism’s encounter with “difference,” such as race, 
ethnicity, nationality, region, class, sexuality or cultural background.  
I will not elaborate on what all these different conceptualizations and 
categorizations are, because that is not the focus of this study. But what I want to 
point out is that among the wide range of conceptualizations of postfeminism, what is 
particularly important that makes postfeminism a relevant and an appropriate 
discursive terrain into which the incarnation of action heroine is closely entwined is 
its reclaim of both traditional femininity and heterosexuality. And such relevance and 
reclaim is located within the type of postfeminism termed by Projansky as the 
“(hetero)sex-positive postfeminism” and also “the culture postfeminism generated by 
popular culture and media.” In this postfeminist view, second-wave feminists are 
“dowdy, anti-sexual prudes who fail to account for women’s need to feel desirable” 
(Showden 175), and they need to “loosen up” (171). Young women today (but maybe 
only young women who live in urban area of capitalist society and enjoy higher social 
class, better education and economic advantages), they claim, simply want “equal 
access to employment without having to worry about how they are dressed or having 
sex”. Women today are confident in their body and with their sexuality and “do not 
need a political movement to tell them what is demeaning and what is liberating” 
(172). Postfeminism includes women’s “choice” to engage in heterosexually attractive 
bodily behavior. Helford argues that postfeminists who “choose” sexuality “find their 
individual ‘activism’ primarily in battle against what they must first establish to be a 
legacy of feminist anti-sexuality” (qtd. in Projansky 79). This celebration of 
35 
 
(hetero)sexuality is in tension with representations of women who, having supposedly 
achieved professional success, now realize that “having it all” often means give up a 
boyfriend/husband and a family (Projansky 79). Thus, along with challenging an 
assumed “sex-negative” feminist legacy, these discourses construct sexual interaction 
with men as a core desire for women. In other words, these discourses suggest, “if 
feminism means not sacrificing personal desires and aspirations, why should women 
have to give up (hetero)sexuality in order to have a professional career” (Projansky 
80)? As Robert Goldman and others put it, “meanings of choice and individual 
freedom become wed to images of sexuality in which women apparently choose to be 
seen as sexual objects because it suits their liberated interests” (338). This celebration 
of women’s play with the heterosexual male gaze –their invitation of the gaze, their 
own fascination with and attention to the object of that gaze (i.e. their own bodies) – 
not only intensifies heterosexuality within the postfeminism depicted in the popular 
media, but also ensures the importance of femininity in postfeminism (Projansky 80). 
Advertising, particularly, contributes to this version of postfeminism, celebrating 
women’s “equality” and their access to “choice” (feminism), “while marketing 
commodities that call for and support constant body maintenance (femininity)” (80).  
In this vein, the action babe who simultaneously represents the “action” and 
“babe” serves as a fit embodiment of equality and choice. She is doing what men used 
to do in the film, and she wields her prowess right at the start of the film instead of 
after a long torturing process that forces her to toughen up, indicating that she is 
enjoying the inheritance already passed down from the previous generation. At the 
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same time she “chooses” to keep her body in perfectly desirable shape that suits to the 
traditional feminine beauty. This inclusion of femininity also differentiates the 21
st
-
century action heroines from their precursors in the 80s and 90s like Ripley 
(Sigourney Weaver) in Alien series, and Sarah Connor (Linda Hamilton) in 
Terminator II. They, although marked by female body, are not sexualized as are 
contemporary heroines, because rather than exhibit a more typically femininized 
curving body and revealing outfit, they are usually in astronaut uniform (Ripley) or 
prison clothes (Sarah Connor) and showing their muscles more than their breasts or 
bottom. There is one specific scene featuring Sarah exercising her biceps with 
dumbbell in the jail, and multiple scenes of her firing heavy arms quite proficiently. 
And Ripley is clearly more perceptive as the first one to discover the corporate 
scheme and more capable of maneuvering weapons against the alien invasion; in the 
sequels she even stands up against numerous monstrous alien creatures alone and kills 
them all. All of these exhibit what Tasker calls “musculinity”, a female body 
overwhelmingly marked by masculinity, which can be seen as “an erasure of the 
female body rather than a redesigning of its potential for power” (3), because it is not 
femininity empowered and becoming equal to the masculine, but femininity totally 
replaced by masculinity, which actually points to an even more patriarchal standard 
that masculinity is the final goal of women’s equality.  
In response to the fervent rise of postfeminism that seems to submerge the 
second wave, the feminists who identify feminism ultimately as a “political 
movement” raise their criticisms of the postfeminist discourse. Many feminists argue 
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strongly that postfeminism constitutes precisely that – a betrayal of a history of 
feminist struggle, and rejection of all it has gained. Tania Modleski’s dismissal of 
postfeminist texts as “texts that, in proclaiming or assuming the advent of 
postfeminism, are actually engaged in negating the critiques and undermining the 
goals of feminism – in effect delivering us back to a prefeminist world” (3) is typical 
of such attacks. The claim of victimization of women as an “exaggerated feminist 
propaganda” is nothing but postfeminists’ own exaggeration and negation of 
feminism. For Faludi, postfeminism is only pseudo-intellectual, and it defines itself 
through media-inspired images, thus not worthy of serious consideration (in Gamble 
38). On one hand, the inscription of feminism as “being strident and lesbian, a state of 
‘being’ that is implicitly undesirable” (Jones 316) is a highly charged stereotype and 
“a media-orchestrated misunderstanding” that exists “in the popular imagination” 
(Gamble 39). On the other, postfeminism is denounced as a depoliticizing practice, 
that “takes the sting out of feminism, confusing lifestyle, attitudinal feminism with the 
hard political and intellectual work that feminists have done and continue to do” (qtd. 
in Genz 336). It abandons the structural analysis of patriarchal power, and “masks the 
larger forces that continue to oppress many women’s lives and re-inscribes their 
marginality by undercutting the possible strategic weight of politicized feminist 
collectivities.” Postfeminism is condemned “not just for being apolitical but for 
producing, through its lack of an organized politics, a retrogressive and reactionary 
conservatism” (Genz 336). Second wave feminist critics unanimously take a negative 
view of postfeminism’s individualistic stance, arguing that “the distinction between 
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feminist politics and feminist identity is in danger of completely disappearing” (qtd. 
in Genz 343). “The resort to individualism is said to negate feminism, removing the 
basis for women’s collective self-understanding and action.” Furthermore, according 
to the critiques of second wavers, “the danger lies not in postfeminism’s celebration 
of the personal struggles and triumphs of women, but rather in mistaking these often 
satisfying images for something more than they are: a rhetoric of tokenism that 
redefines oppression and structural disadvantage as personal suffering while 
reframing success as an individual accomplishment” (Genz 344). This tokenism 
obscures that collective nature of oppression and the need for organized action to 
remedy social injustice. As to the film text of Tomb Raider, there is no other woman 
whose power equals Lara’s. In fact, there are no notable women at all. Consequently, 
postfeminism is identified as “a privileged, distinctly middle-class perspective 
appealing to young women professionals imbued with confidence, an ethic of self-
reliance and the headstart of a good education” (Kaminer 23) while the propaganda 
seems to direct at all young women. At its best, postfeminism’s individualist 
discourse is “a luxury the majority of women can’t afford” while at its worst “the 
conflation of the personal and the political…enables backlash politics” (Lee 172). For 
example, the reason why Lara Croft can afford to play the role of a superhero, driving 
fancy vehicle and using top technologies to fight villains, is that she is born in a 
family of status and wealth.  
However, feminists themselves are faced with the accusation of being essentialist, 
as the subjectivity of women in their terms are on the same exclusive track of being 
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white, middle-class, and heterosexual. After all, as Showden asks, “How can a 
movement allow all women to dance (to their own beat)?” (169) For sure, any 
criticism advanced and directed towards each other cannot be treated as a stigma that 
marks any of them a “worse” or “less worthy” form of feminism. If feminists and 
postfeminists are stuck in such a dialectical opposition, with both parties attempting to 
lay claim to some kind of “pure” or “correct” version of feminism, the debate will be 
forever locked within their own circle of accusing each other. As Genz says, “the 
inevitable uncertainties and turmoil attendant upon the postfeminist age should not be 
interpreted solely and hastily in terms of a depoliticized backlash that denies any 
constructive political potential while employing an overly simplistic rhetoric of 
opposition to dichotomize the feminist/postfeminist coupling” (338).  
The way to walk out of the circle might be, I would argue, rather than pick what 
each other got wrong, to first settle the question of what is the root of such opposition 
of feminists and postfeminists, and also what this opposition is symptomatic of. The 
reason for this is that if the postfeminist discourse is, in most cases, generated by 
popular culture and media, the forces influencing the representation and interpretation 
of postfeminism could be multi-polar coming from the larger picture of cultural, 
social and economic contexts that not only directly affect women per se, but also 
indirectly affects the ways of looking at representations of women. Rather than saying 
that postfeminism is not worthy of serious consideration because it is media image 
(Faludi), it is actually important to examine postfeminism just because it comes from 
media. And meanwhile, since feminist engagement has been already expanded to 
40 
 
many spheres such as films, the feminist movement, though remaining a political 
movement in essence, should also take into consideration how their political ideals 
could be influenced by the cultural and techno-economic content.  
By adopting a more subtle and self-conscious approach, some postfeminists (e.g. 
Naomi Wolf) evade the stark opposition between “good” and “bad” feminism, “as 
‘bad’ feminism does not really exist in the sense that it is not an ideology being 
promoted by any particular individual or group” (Gamble 39). “Instead, it is a media-
orchestrated misunderstanding which women must surmount in order to embrace 
‘power feminism,’ the aims of which are equality, economic empowerment, and the 
confidence to act both collectively and individually to achieve such goals” (Gamble 
39). Then, why is there such a media orchestration that makes all these 
misunderstandings or misrepresentations come into being in the first place? What is it 
that impels films, television programs, or advertising to play such an “orchestrating” 
role? As for the action heroine films, what is the background mechanism that makes 
these films possible and popular? Moreover, if postfeminism is dismissed by 
feminism, which assumes to occupy the height of academia and the intellectual, as 
merely media hype or belonging to the “lower” terrain of cultural field, there are the 
“risks recreating the artificial separation between the academic ivory tower and 
popular culture that has hampered critical analysis” (Genz 337). It is thereby of great 
importance to examine the both the cultural and academic aspects that help bridge this 
ostensible fissure. In particular, since the starting point of this research – action 
heroine cinema—that pulls out the dispute between feminism and postfeminism is a 
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synthesized form of contemporary popular culture and media, it is of more urgent 
significance to move beyond the dispute itself so as to look into the root of this 
dispute from a distance where a clearer vision of the that culture and media can be 
found.   
Back to the opposing interpretations of the action babe figure, it seems that the 
bifurcation of feminism and postfeminism runs parallel to a similarly bifurcated 
“navigation system” for the opponent and defender of such an image. Therefore, those 
endorsing the representation of women as both strong and sexy tend to appropriate the 
optimistic version of postfeminism while inevitably adopting backlash’s (stereotypical) 
views of feminism. And those condemning such representation are more adhering to 
feminist ideals. On one hand, they frown on the erotic objectification of female body. 
On the other, they question the overall media agenda of producing the comforting 
illusions that equality has been achieved.  
However, these two opposing readings as progressive versus regressive follow 
the same path that feminism/postfeminism antithesis has taken, which will inevitably 
wind up in a dead end. For one thing, the opposing readings do locate the theoretical 
support from the feminism/postfeminism antithesis as the progressive reading 
appropriates the postfeminist discourse while the regressive reading the feminist 
discourse, but the theoretical antithesis now remains an unsolved entanglement. For 
another, the different interpretations of action babe phenomenon focus too much on 
the textual details that defend their respective stand, but fail to consider how such 
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textual details work under the image apparatus that has also changed due to the 
transformations in cultural, social and economic circumstances. That is to say, their 
interpretations will ultimately render the contention within a stagnant circle, while the 
larger locus where this “circle” is formed and operated remains unexamined. They 
insist on asking the question of what kind of discourse is produced from the 
representation in film texts, while failing to inquiry why there is such disputable and 
oxymoronic representation of women, and where is exactly the source of their own 
oppositional debate. The key to these questions does not lie in the fact that there is 
irresolvable conflict between feminism and postfeminism. Neither question can be 
answered simply from the perspective of feminist/postfeminist discourses, but need to 
be interrogated from both within and outside the text, especially in association with 
the larger cultural and social background and the function of technological image. 
As Tasker has pointed, “ideological readings based solely on an analysis of (the 
films’) plots may be reductive, misleading, or both,” because “an experience of 
cinema is not limited to the duration, or content of a particular film, since texts are 
contextualized in a variety of different ways by the other mass media, and by the more 
immediate and diverse ways in which different groups appropriate images from those 
media” (30). Such an understanding has been crucial to a variety of critical 
discussions of popular pleasure and how the image apparatus works. Therefore, 
besides examining the critique of sexism and patriarchy, the potential to look through 
the phenomenon and nail down the real cause of the debate and conflict lies in our 
initiative to examine the cultural-economic logic behind all the texts, of which all the 
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representations and receptions are only symptomatic, and to ask how the film medium 
is already not neutral and embedded in the particular political economy that make this 
representation possible. 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the cultural-economic logic that operates 
behind contemporary action heroine cinema, and the relevant theories that provide the 
critical axis of this thesis. I argue that, subject to such cultural-economic logic, the 
watching of these action heroine films is a multiple process of consumption: the films 
are consumed simultaneously as composite commodities, as spectacles of technology, 




Chapter 3 The Cultural-Economic Logic 
 
Action, adventure, horror, thriller, fantasy, science-fiction. These are the 
common generic terms used to tag the action heroine films in question. All of them 
involve high intensity of action, as the focus of this study is on the “action” heroine. 
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider and its sequel (also with a third to be expected in 2013) 
unfold around Lara Croft’s treasure-hunting adventures full of supernatural 
encumbrances. Resident Evil series, which use an Alice-in-Wonderland metaphor for 
the protagonist named Alice in “Zombieland,” embrace a survival-mode of adventures 
through horror and thrill caused by science-fictional catastrophe. Underworld saga, as 
well as Elektra and Aeon Flux, feature the heroines in fabricated fantasy worlds, 
facing with all kinds of horrendous enemies or obstacles, be it ferocious werewolves, 
top assassins, or governmental conspiracy (see Table 1 in Appendices). 
It looks familiar if we also check the generic categories which the highest-
grossing films in recent years, or even in the whole history of Hollywood, fall under 
(see Table 2a and Table 2b I in Appendices). From the Star Wars saga, to the ten-
year-old Harry Potter movies, and to the recent rise of Transformers, myriad magical 
and exquisite scenes have been presented to the audience by means of special-effects 
created spectacles to support the idea of action, science-fiction, fantasy, horror, and 
thrill: the moving photos, gigantic firing dragons, flying wizards shuttling around 
Quidditch in Harry Potter movies; the roaring billows, walking skeletons with rolling 
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eyeballs, and pirates whipping through the high-rising masts while engaged in fierce 
fighting in Pirates of the Caribbean; the highway explosion, mechanical octopus 
fleeting out from underground, and the moment of Optimus Prime transforming with 
every single twirling part incredibly visible in Transformers. 
These spectacles do not exist only on screen. They are everywhere, reproduced 
through technological means. They traverse time and media, to sequels or prequels, to 
comic books or video games. Cinema now is not only a scene of representation, but of 
production and reproduction. Although this research is not going to base its argument 
on concrete data, yet, Table 2a and 2b actually tell a lot about the enquiry of the larger 
industrial and cultural background in which contemporary Hollywood plays a 
dominant role. The next sections will explain this further.  
 
Reproduction of Technological Images: 
First, a few big titles appear on the list in a recurring pattern, like Harry Potter, 
The Lord of the Rings, and Pirates of the Caribbean, only with different subheadings 
to indicate different episodes under the same franchise. Once in a few years, or even 
once a year, these titles would appear and reappear to claim the top in box office. 
With a closer look, it is neither hard nor surprising to find out that those which only 
appear once on the list are not produced alone, either – they do have sequels or 
prequels, too, such as Mission Impossible, and Shrek. While it is startling to see the 
unbelievable multibillion dollar revenue one single movie can make, it is no less 
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astonishing to look at the enormous investment to pulling out such an economic hit. 
For instance, The Matrix Reloaded (2003) took over 100 million dollars on the 
complete graphics of the movie which included a 17 minute battle scene where Neo 
alone fight against hundreds of Smith clones simultaneously, and this scene cost over 
40 million dollars
5
. This has become a common practice in Hollywood for the past 
decade. 
In response to the highly competitive marketplace of audio-visual content, 
Hollywood has adopted a new set of strategies by concentrating its resources on the 
“blockbuster.” Blockbuster strategy was originally employed to counteract the crisis 
of the major studios in the postwar period. Being deprived of their exhibition 
monopoly due to Paramount Decree
6
, the major players had to reduce their output, 
and began to focus on fewer but more expensive and extravagant pictures, which 
finally culminated in today’s aggressively promoted big-budget movie with high 
production values, big stars, massive simultaneous release patterns and, increasingly, 
expensive special effects. Due to the massive investment in such a movie, Hollywood 
is thus increasingly cautious about which films to make and tends to base a film on a 
presold or pre-established successful property that is already present all over the 
world, such as best-selling novels (as in the case of Harry Potter and The Lord of the 
Rings), comics, or computer games. Thus, the blockbusters today are more often than 
                                                          
5 From http://www.whattheffacts.com/most-expensive-hollywood-fight-scene/ 
6  Paramount Decree (1948), also known as the Hollywood Antitrust Case of 1948, the Paramount 
Case,  was a landmark United States Supreme Court anti-trust case that decided the fate of movie 




not narratively conservative text open to a world audience (Jöckel, and Döbler 85), 
which allows several (sub)cultures to generate meaning from it (Fiske)
7. What’s more 
important, the blockbuster-ing effect is not supposed to be over in just one production. 
Usually, the billion-dollar investment is intended neither for a one-time flash that 
disappears immediately the movie theater is lit, nor for an artifact for the future 
generation to excavate its aesthetic value like what we did with Van Gogh’s painting 
long after his miserable death. The blockbuster needs to exhaust all the opportunities 
to make profit. It is to be continued and to be reproduced in a second, a third, or an 
even longer series. Is it simply because the Harry Potter books just happen to be such 
a long series? Not so much. The seven books of Harry Potter provide a convenient 
and lucrative undertaking for the film industry to engage in their prolonged practices 
of making one after another blockbuster, thus making huge amounts of money once 
and once again. Not only Harry Potter per se, but also for all serial movies, like 
Transformers, it is actually a process of reproducing economic value through a 
recirculation of near-identical images (except that the casting ages across years) under 
the name of narrating different stories, and through a re-appropriation of 
audiences/fans’ fascination and loyalty either to the original text or to the 
kaleidoscopic screen. 
Second, each title on the list is by no means contained within the sphere of film. 
It can be a myriad display of related products. What were ancillary markets for film – 
                                                          
7 While there would be quite diversified interpretation and reception of Hollywood films in different 
countries, regions and cultures, this study’s focus is on the audience that has its cultural background 
embedded in society of late capitalism. 
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home video, DVDs, and computer games – have in some cases become more 
important than cinema exhibition.  And to satisfy the range of desires that comes from 
the watching a popular film – the desires for fashion, for the new, for the possession 
of icons or signs that are highly valued by one’s peers, there is a massive increase in 
merchandising – in the amount of products now licensed to individual films, such as 
soundtrack album, T-shirts, books, action figures, posters and so on (Turner 7).  In 
this view, today’s Hollywood film can rarely be presented to its public as a single 
product, event, or commodity. Rather, according to Graeme Turner, it is a kind of 
“composite commodity,” linked to “the making of DVD, the computer or video game, 
the range of action figures, or the theme park ride – all aimed at extending the 
purchase of film beyond the cinema walls” (8). More fundamentally, the change in the 
nature of film as a cultural commodity reflects the hard industrial fact that film is no 
longer the product of a self-contained industry; today, it is “most often merely one of 
a range of cultural commodities produced by large multinational conglomerates 
whose main interest is more likely to be electronics or petroleum or theme parks than 
the construction of magical narratives for audiences to enjoy on the screen” (8). 
Therefore, now, audiences can see the movie in the cinema, or rather the 
Cineplex, at home on DVD, on computer, on smart phone. They can see the face of 
Jack Sparrow (the protagonist of Pirates of the Caribbean played by Johnny Depp), 
for instance, smirking from the movie posters or LED trailers in cinema, in diners, or 
in subway stations. Every other year, they anticipate a new episode to be “coming 
soon” – a sequel or prequel, or maybe an updated version of director’s cut or Blu-ray. 
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If they like the soundtrack of Pirates of the Caribbean, they may see Jack Sparrow 
again on the cover of the OST album in music store. Thanks to the development of 
computer and internet technologies, they can go manipulating their favorite characters 
in simulated adventures if they purchase the video games of Pirates of the Caribbean. 
When they open a webpage, Jack Sparrow’s face could pop up in sidebar commercials, 
maybe for movie, for game, or for a new brand of soda drink. Or even better, he may 
stare at a Facebook-er with his heavy eyeliner in anyone’s news sharing section. The 
image is everywhere, reproducing and reproduced in every corner, every media, every 
breath. In this sense, the audiences have undergone a similar reproducing process by 
adopting multiplied identities, not only as spectators who watch the movie in the 
theater, but also as music lovers, game players, or frenzy fans who would buy 
anything to fulfill their fantasies. In whichever way, however, they are ultimately 
labeled under the same general term – consumers. As a result of the endless 
reproduction, the consumers never have the finished product. There is always one way 
or another to make the consumption possible or possible-r. 
Take the horror film series The Final Destination
8
 as a metaphorical example. 
The audiences know that all characters in each episode will die eventually, but they 
are still consuming the images of different ways of dying again and again, and 
expecting the next Final Destination, which actually will never be the Final one. So if 
there is never a final destination for producing and reproducing images, as the “re-” 
                                                          
8 Final Destination is a series of horror films centered on the themes of fatalism, predestination and 
precognition. Each film features a group of people who escape their fate of dying in an accident at the 
beginning (because one of them has a warning premonition), but later die in series of elaborate and 
often gory scenarios. 
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process can go on endlessly in circular manner, then what can be the consequences for 
all these images? 
This question could go back to the critique of mechanical reproduction of images 
by Walter Benjamin. As early as the beginning of 20
th
 century, photography and film 
making technologies had already been capable of capturing the reality and reproduce 
it in images for the masses. In his famous 1936 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction”, Walter Benjamin raised his reflection on the effects of 
modernity on the work of art, and referred to the manner in which modern modes of 
technological production and reproduction have shattered previous ideas concerning 
the aesthetic value of the work of art. He pointed out that the mechanical reproduction 
of art had led to the loss of “aura.” The aura, for Benjamin, represents the originality 
and authenticity of a work of art that has not been reproduced, which includes the 
atmosphere of detached and transcendent beauty and power supporting cultic societies. 
It also refers the legitimacy conferred to the object through a lengthy historical 
existence. Benjamin wrote: “the authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is 
transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony 
to the history which it has experienced” (107). Thus, a painting has an aura while a 
photograph does not, for the photograph is an image of an image while the painting 
remains utterly original. The sky-high prices for original classic paintings also 
manifest a residual attachment to the aura of the original artwork in contemporary 
society. However, the growth of the mass media in the twentieth century with the 
proliferation of images, which appears in its most radical forms in film and 
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photography, heightened the tendencies of which Benjamin talks. In contemporary 
society our experience of arts is generally of their technological reproductions. The 
new forms of artistic media in the twentieth and twenty-first century, such as film, 
video and television, are, indeed, based on technological methods of reproduction, 
and the aura which surrounds The Mona Lisa, for instance, is unavailable to, and 
indeed irrelevant for, these kinds of art forms. For the new kinds of art forms, millions 
of images of an original are circulated, all of which lack the “authentic” aura of their 
source. The increasing “desire of contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ 
spatially and humanly,” and to “get hold of an object at very close range by way of its 
likeness, its reproduction” impels the consumption of reproduced images (108). The 
beauty supposed to be appreciated from a distance has been eroded as it gradually 
travels to its mass consumers. No matter it is a picture magazine full of close-ups of a 
glamorous star like Angelina Jolie, or a super-high-resolution Blu-Ray DVD showing 
every single pore and every moving hair of that star, it “preserves not the unique aura 
of the person, but the spell of the personality, the phony spell of a commodity” (113). 
At the same time people mass consume the image, the mass consumption revels in the 
consequence of the loss of aura. 
Indeed the impact of Benjamin’s theory on technological reproduction of images 
can be detected in some of the theorizations of postmodernism several decades later. 
For many theorists and critics, the postmodern era is when reproduction takes over 
from authentic production. The term postmodernism is contextualized in the post-
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world war II era where advances in science and technology paved the way for newer 
forms of analysis (Mendoza 43). 
Postmodernism, as the prefix “post” implies, can mean “after” modernism, “not” 
modernism, or “going beyond” modernism according to different theorists (Berger 7). 
In one way, postmodernism can be described as “a wide-ranging cultural movement 
which adopts a skeptical attitude to many of the principles and assumptions that have 
underpinned Western thought and social life for the last few centuries” (Sim 289). 
These assumptions are based on the core ideas of what is called modernism, which is 
characterized by a belief in human progress and a dedication to originality in thinking 
and art. Modernism roots from the Enlightenment period of eighteenth century with 
an overwhelming belief in the power of human reasoning to understand the world 
through scientific thought and natural philosophy, which were man’s tools to initiate 
change and progress. Modernism assumes that, in the extent of knowledge and the 
sophistication of techniques, there is an inevitable superiority of present civilization to 
that of the past. As an aesthetic, modernism advocates the view that “originality is the 
highest state of artistic endeavor, and that this can best be achieved by 
experimentation with form” (Sim 289). 
Postmodernism, on the contrary, calls into question modernism’s commitment to 
progress, as well as the ideology underpinning it. Postmodernism encourages a 
dialogue between past and present in thought and the arts, and thus partly rejects the 
modernist commitment to experiment and originality by embracing a return to the use 
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of past styles or artistic methods (Sim 289). As summarized by Berger, the differences 
between modernism and postmodernism include: First, if modernism involves 
differentiation (between the elite arts and popular culture), postmodernism involves 
what can be described as dedifferentiation, breaking down the barriers between the 
elite arts and popular culture and reveling joyfully in mass culture. Second, if 
modernism involves a “high seriousness” toward life, postmodernism involves an 
element of game playing (playfulness), an ironic stance, and the celebration of the 
surface “depthlessness” of culture. Third, if modernism involves stylistic purity, as 
reflected visually in modernist architecture, postmodernism involves stylistic 
eclecticism, fragmentation, and variety, with the pastiche as the governing metaphor. 
But, due to the difficulty in defining postmodernism in the first place, this comparison 
cannot be exhausted or definite (9-10). 
In a sense, “postmodernism can be regarded as part of a longer-running 
philosophical tradition of skepticism, which is intrinsically anti-authoritarian in 
outlook and negative in tone: more concerned with undermining the pretensions of 
other theories than putting anything positive in their place” (Sim 289). Thus, 
according to Jean Francois Lyotard, postmodernism seeks to reject the “grand narrative” 
– the universal theories that claim to be able to explain everything – and nurtures the 
cause of the “little narrative” instead (60). Little narratives are put together tactically 
by small groups of individuals to achieve some particular objective but do not intend 
to answer all society’s problems. In Lyotard’s view, little narratives are the most 
inventive way of creating and disseminating knowledge, which help to crush the 
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monopoly constructed by grand narratives (Sim 8-9). This line of conceptualizing 
postmodernism is rather a positive reading of the postmodern, in that it sees 
postmodernism as a deconstructive challenge to the authoritarian narrative structured 
by dichotomies and universal truth, thus making spaces for the minority discourses 
that used to be tyrannically excluded in modernist outlook, to which, for instance, 
feminism adheres for its critique of patriarchy. However, postmodernism could be 
seen, on the other hand, as characterized by an “anything goes” pluralism (Hayward 
275). It then renders a culture that is fragmented, schizophrenic, promoting “hedonism 
and anarchy” (Hayward 282), and finally leading to the loss of the human subject. For 
elaboration, a comparison between the effects of the industrial machine on the 
individual (the subject) and those of the post-industrial one would be useful. While 
the industrial machine was one of production, the post-industrial one is of 
reproduction (Bruno 69). In the former case, the industrial machine results in the 
alienation of the subject, which means the subject no longer commands the modes of 
production. In the latter, the post-industrial machine leads to the fragmentation of the 
subject, to its dispersal in representation (Bruno 69). Stuck in the ever-present, the 
subject thus has no history and no memory. According to Jacques Lacan, language 
forms the experience of temporality and its representation. If, in this light, the subject 
has no experience of temporality, no link with the past or the future, it is then without 
language – there is no way to represent the “I.” This leads to a schizophrenic situation 
where the subject cannot assert its subjectivity (in Hayward 281-82). 
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The conceptualization of postmodernism is surely not limited to such 
positive/negative categorization, for postmodernism has long been considered as an 
evasive term that is beyond definition. For one thing, any attempt to valorize it would 
run counter to its own anti-authoritarian nature, for another, different theorists of 
postmodernism would have different concerns and understanding about it. And 
therefore, it is not the purpose of this study to align with any side of the reading of 
postmodernism. What is needed then is, first, to locate the characteristics of 
postmodernism pertinent to explaining the cultural landscape of Hollywood 
production and reproduction, which, in turn, decides the contextual reading of the 
action heroine films in concern, and second, to see how those characteristics condition 
and are conditioned by the studied films. 
Among the many theorists of postmodernism, the most prominent one that delves 
into issues of media, image (re)production and consumption is developed by the 
French sociologist, philosopher, and cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard. He shared 
similar thinking with Benjamin on the issue of image reproduction. Although he did 
not state specifically what is the consequence of reproduction of images, his “explicit 
expression of the reality problematic” (Mendoza 45) and his works on political 
economy of sign and the consumer culture, provided radical insights into the power of 
reproduction and consumption and how it was playing a crucial role in organizing 
contemporary societies around objects, images and commodities. Baudrillard sees the 
post-industrial society as the society of spectacle dominated by electronic mass media. 
Such society is one of reproduction and simulation, which, instead of producing the 
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real, reproduces the hyper-real (Hayward 279). In his view, the real is what is always 
already reproduced, a simulacrum of the real – thereby no original serves as a point of 
comparison and no distinction remains between the real and the copy—and that is, 
briefly speaking, the reality problematic. In the following paragraphs of this section, I 
will elaborate on Baudrillard’s theories of the issues stated above. 
Baudrillard’s early works are built on Marxist theories on capitalism 9 . His 
analysis still holds the central problem of commodity as “the structural problem of all 
societies” (A Critique 5), but it previses the importance of the role of communication 
in analyzing the commodity by supplementing Marxist analysis of society with de 
Saussure and Barthes’ semiology (Mendoza 47). In Baudrillard’s perspective, the 
commodity is “not merely as a material object, but as a vehicle of communication, a 
sign” (47). Baudrillard abandons Marxist privileging of production and position the 
importance to the opposite pole of the spectrum on consumption. According to 
Baudrillard, “consumption is not merely the passive recipient of production through 
satiation of needs but rather it is an active endeavor in ‘the manipulation of signs’ 
towards the creation of the ‘person’ and its integration within the system” (Mendoza 
48). It is a process in which the subject is undergoing an objectification while the 
object a subjectification through consumption. In a capitalist society, “consumption 
acquires for the person signs in the object being consumed which in turn determines 
his status” (48) and identity. Such relationship between the consuming subject and the 
                                                          
9  Marx’s general thesis in “Capital” argues that the underlying logic of capitalist societies is the 
accumulation of wealth through “immense collection of commodities” in which “the individual 
commodity appears as its elementary form” (125) 
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object consumed is what Baudrillard calls “personalization” (System of Objects 5). 
This line of theorization partly agrees with Althusser’ apparatus theory in that the 
subjectivity seems to be formed by consuming the sign. But in his later works, he 
gradually sees such creation of “person” is overwhelmed by the endless reproduction, 
absence of signified and the third-order simulacra – that is, the manipulation of signs 
is only a false one (or a simulated one), which I will show later. 
Baudrillard further argues that the consumption of a commodity has entered a 
second stage. The historical form of consumption in its early phase is relatively 
primitive, which is based on the binary opposition of use-value versus exchange value. 
But the second stage of political economy – late capitalist consumer society – is the 
“generalization and complexification of the sign form, which extends throughout the 
entire culture and environment and mutates into sign-value” (Best 52). In this stage, 
use and exchange value does not disappear, but the commodity is “produced, 
distributed, reproduced, and consumed for its conspicuous social meaning” (Best 52). 
The object is transformed into a mere sign of its use, abstract and detached from any 
physical needs. In this case, consumption, like that of a car décor, is not based on a 
need – or the use-value according to Marxism. “It is a consumption of what it 
signifies and how the consumer consuming the sign is integrated within the system” 
(Mendoza 49). “In this society, advertising, packaging, display, fashion, ‘emancipated’ 
sexuality, mass media and culture, and the proliferation of commodities multiplied the 
quantities of signs and spectacles, and produced a proliferation of sign-value” 
(Kellner, Beyond 4). 
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Therefore, Baudrillard argues, commodities are not only comprised of use-value 
and exchange-value as in Marx’s theory, but also sign-value –“the expression and 
mark of style, prestige, luxury, power, and so on” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”) – 
which becomes an increasingly important part of the commodity and consumption. 
The commodity form has developed to such an extent that “there is actually no more 
‘objective’ value of a commodity because the exchange-value only uses the use-value 
as a mere alibi for its existence” (Mendoza 50), and that “use and exchange value 
have been superseded by sign-value that redefines the commodity primarily as a 
symbol to be consumed and displayed” (Best 41). The current form of capitalism is 
thus structured around configurations of sign-value, from which “people attain status 
and prestige according to which products they consume and display in a differential 
logic of consumption, in which some products have more prestige than others, 
according to current tastes and fashion” (Kellner, A Critical Reader). In this logic, the 
Hollywood blockbuster, with its far-ranging marketing and pervasive presence in 
every commercial form, keeps bombarding people with spectacles boasting of highly 
expensive special effects and celebrity casting. Consuming such commodity becomes 
the fashion, the mark, and the prestige that constitutes the consumer’s identity as a 
must-see blockbuster viewer that walks the trend. At the same time, he/she might also 
be a fan who desires to possess action figures or movie posters to add on to his/her 
collection of various sign-values. 
With the mass communication, mass production and mass consumption, signs 
and codes proliferate and reproduce, and other signs and new sign machines are 
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produced in astonishing speed and ever-expanding cycles. As the political economy 
enters the second stage in which the commodity’s sign-value serves as the analytical 
basis, “signs and images slowly reduce reality into appearance” (Mendoza 52). This is 
what is called The Society of the Spectacle (first published in 1967) by the 
Situationists. In this highly influential theoretical work of Situationism, the author 
Guy Debord writes by paraphrasing Marx, “In societies where modern conditions of 
production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. 
Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation” (thesis 1). 
The word “spectacle” here is more than its dictionary meaning (a very impressive 
show or scene); it is a complex term which “unifies and explains a great diversity of 
apparent phenomena” (thesis 10). In one sense, it refers to mass media society. But 
more generally, it “refers to the vast institutional and technical apparatus of late-
capitalism, to all the means and methods power employs, outside of direct force, to 
relegate subjects to the critical and creative margins of society and to obscure the 
nature and effects of its distorting power” (Best 47). And Steven Best further explains,  
Thus, the spectacle is a tool of pacification and depoliticization; it is a 
“permanent opium war” which stupefies social subjects and distracts them from 
the most urgent task of real life – recovering the concrete totality of human 
activity through social transformation. The spectacular society spreads its 
narcotics mainly through the cultural mechanisms of leisure and consumption, 
services and entertainment.                                                                                (48)  
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Cinema would be one of the most important and powerful mechanisms involving a 
“commodification of previously non-colonized sectors of social life and the extension 
of bureaucratic control to the realms of leisure and everyday life” (Best 47). Through 
its concentration on non-reality-based genres and endless spectacles to please the eye 
but not nourish the mind, contemporary Hollywood does well in convincing people 
that they enjoy their life very much. 
“The advanced abstraction of the spectacle brings in its wake a new stage of 
deprivation” (Best 48), in that history of social life can be understood as “the decline 
of being into having, and having into merely appearing.” (thesis 17). The spectacle 
epitomizes how postmodern society operates – the relations between commodities 
have supplanted relations between people, in which “passive identification with the 
spectacle supplants genuine activity” (thesis 4). Debord also writes, “the spectacle is 
not a collection of images…; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images” (thesis 4). “Political economy now revolves around images as 
the form of exchange in commodities – the relationship between consumer and 
commodity is mediated with the image or spectacle” (Mendoza 53). Therefore, the 
mode of production and the social consciousness bombarded with images, amplified 
by mass media, particularly intensified by film industry, becomes a relationship of 
spectacle. “Society has transformed the relationships of subjects to objects, and 
subjects to other subjects, into a relationship based on what can be shown – 
appearances, between brand names and labels” (Mendoza 54). “What appears is good; 
what is good appears” (Debord thesis12). 
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In these aspects, there is a remarkable congruence between Debord and 
Baudrillard’s key themes. But according to Best, Debord was more of a Hegelian-
Marxist than a proto-Baudrillardian (50), particularly when Baudrillard’s theorization 
later took a postmodern and post-Marxist turn. Although both of them emphasized the 
artificiality of the spectacle, Debord never stopped trying to interpret and change 
social reality. Best described their incongruence as follows, 
Debord peered into the abyss of a reified unreality but drew back to report and 
critique what he had seen; there is an ‘implosion’ of opposites (Baudrillard), but 
the separate poles retain their contradictory identity; illusion overtakes reality, 
but reality resurfaces precisely where it is most absent; alienation has divided the 
essential unity of the social and the individual, but the whole can be regained at a 
higher level if the historical subject – the proletariat—becomes conscious and 
realizes its revolutionary objectivity.                                                         (Best 50) 
This is the point from which Baudrillard departs. Later becoming a post-Marxist, 
he declares this neo-Marxist framework of Debord’s is a fiction. He believes in the 
obliteration of the subject, embrace of object, and the loss of identity for binary 
opposites. In this process, there is no more truth or reality, no more politics or social. 
This is the threshold point where modernity transits to postmodernity (Best 50). 
For Baudrillard, postmodernity consists in his categories of simulation, implosion, 
and hyperreality. Modernity, Baudrillard claims, is structured by a mode of 
representation in which ideas represent reality and truth, and with a subject-object 
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dialectic in which the subject was supposed to represent and control the object. 
According to modern philosophy, “the philosophic subject attempts to discern the 
nature of reality, to secure grounded knowledge, and to apply this knowledge to 
control and dominate the object” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). Whereas, a 
postmodern society pulls down this epistemology by creating a situation in which 
fragmented subjects lose contact with the real, and “thought and discourse could no 
longer be securely anchored in a priori or privileged structures of ‘the real’” (Kellner, 
“Jean Baudrillard”). Baudrillard follows his semiological analysis of sign to explain 
this process of loss of reality in the postmodern world. 
In his later work, Baudrillard claims that the semiotic system inscribed at the 
heart of the entire system of commodities took on an autonomy of its own. As the era 
of production is finished, a new, dematerialized society of signs, images, and codes 
emerges, which is governed by a process of “radical semiurgy.” In this phase of 
political economy, according to Baudrillard, the relative unity and stability of the 
industrial world/sign breaks apart. No longer restrained by an objective reality, or tied 
to some signified in a simple binary relation, the signifier becomes a free-floating one 
that establishes its meanings through its manipulation in coded differences and 
associative chains. Disassociated from any stable relationship with a signified, where 
a distinct referent is assigned according to the sign structure, the signifier then 
becomes its own referent – this autonomization becomes the basis of semiological 
domination and the structural prerequisite of sign-value. The “sign-form” 
overshadows the commodity-form which subsequently “bears no relation to any 
63 
 
reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 173). 
Signification is radically relativized and anything can pass for “meaning” or “reality”, 
which actually point to the fact that there is reality no more. 
This process is further elucidated by Baudrillard in “Simulacra and Simulation.” 
According to him, simulation is a process where representations of things come to 
take the place of the things being represented, during which the representations 
become even more important and more real than the “real thing.” There are four 
successive phases of the image. In the first stage, the image is “the reflection of a 
basic reality,” thus “a good appearance: the representation is of the order of 
sacrament”; in the second phase, the image “masks and perverts a basic reality,” “an 
evil appearance,” where the first-order simulacrum comes into being; in the third, the 
image “masks the absence of a basic reality,” playing at being an appearance, a 
second-order simulacrum; in the fourth stage, the image “bear no relation to any 
reality whatever; it is its own pure simulacrum,” which is “no longer in the order of 
appearance at all, but of simulation,” and this is the third-order simulacrum (173). 
And Baudrillard also points out the crucial distinction between dissimulation and 
simulation. Both concepts include a feigning and a faking. However, dissimulation 
covers or masks reality, which means it ultimately reaffirms the presence of reality, 
but simulation devours the real – the representational structure and space it depends 
on – and there is nothing left behind except commutating signs and self-referring 
simulacra, feigning a relation to an absent real (170). 
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The concept of simulation and simulacra marks the fundamental rupture between 
modern and postmodern societies. According to Baudrillard’s theory, “modern 
societies are organized around the production and consumption of commodities, while 
postmodern societies are organized around simulation and the play of images and 
signs, denoting a situation in which codes, models, and signs are the organizing forms 
of a new social order where simulation rules” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). In a 
society that revolves around consumerism and media images, people are trapped in 
the endless play of images, spectacles, and simulacra, whose relationship to an 
external or objective “reality” becomes increasingly loose until the very ideas of the 
social, political, and “reality” are devoid of any meaning. “The media-saturated 
consciousness is in such a state of fascination with image and spectacle that the 
concept of meaning itself, which depends on stable boundaries, fixed structures, and 
shared consensus, dissolves” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). 
And this dissolving of boundaries consists of the second category of 
Baudrillardian postmodernity – implosion. With the disappearance of the referent, 
depth, essence, and reality, the possibility of all potential oppositions, dichotomies, 
and boundaries vanishes as well. Thus in postmodern world, for Baudrillard, the once 
important boundaries and distinctions, which modernist analysis depends on, have lost 
power. If modern societies, for classical social theory, were characterized by 
differentiation, originality, growth and explosion, postmodernity are characterized by 
dedifferentiation, or the “collapse” of distinctions, such as those between subject and 
object, between social classes, genders, and once independent spheres of society and 
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culture (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). Postmodernity marks the horizon where such 
modern dynamics have reached their limits and begun to draw inward and absorb 
themselves, resulting in an implosive process devouring all relational poles, structural 
differences, conflicts and contradictions, and referential finalities. In Baudrillard’s 
society of simulation, “the realms of economics, politics, culture, sexuality, and the 
social all implode into each other. In this implosive mix, economics is fundamentally 
shaped by culture, politics, and other spheres, while art, once a sphere of potential 
difference and opposition, is absorbed into the economics and political, and sexuality 
is everywhere” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). This is also what happens to feminism 
and anti-feminism. Their opposition implodes into media images travelling to 
multiple spheres, and characterized by what is called “postfeminism”, a term of no 
less uncertainties. In this situation, differences between individuals and groups 
implode while the previous boundaries and structures upon which feminist theory had 
once focused is taken in a rapidly mutating dissolution. 
The third category of postmodernity for Baudrillard is hyperreality. It happens 
when simulations proliferate and come to refer only to themselves. It is like “a 
carnival of mirrors reflecting images projected from other mirrors onto the 
omnipresent television and computer screen and the screen of consciousness, which in 
turn refers the image to its previous storehouse of images also produced by simulatory 
mirrors” (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). In such an endless play of self-referentiality, 
the lost reality is superseded by what Baudrillard calls “hyperreality.” The hyperreal 
comes into being as a result of a historical process of simulation, in which technology 
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made images and self-referential signs gradually replace the natural world and all its 
referents. Best further explains, 
This is not to say that “representation” has simply become more indirect or 
oblique, but that – where the subject/object distance is erased, where language no 
longer coheres in stable meanings, and where signs no longer refer beyond 
themselves to an existing, knowable world—representation has been surpassed. 
The real, for all intents and purposes, is vanquished when an independent object 
world is assimilated to and defined by artificial codes and simulation models. (53) 
The “precession of the model” is what “puts an end to the real” (Baudrillard, 
“Simulacra” 167). For Baudrillard, in this universe of hyperreality, entertainment 
(such as the all-pervasive Hollywood movies), information, and communication 
technologies (such as all popular social network websites, instant messengers, and 
bulletin board systems) manage to offer experiences that are more intense and 
engaging than what people have with their banal everyday life. It can even be said that 
the space of the hyperreal is more real than real, “whereby the models, images, and 
codes of the hyperreal come to control thought and behavior” (Kellner, “Jean 
Baudrillard”).  
While Baudrillard describes postmodernity in terms of these three categories, he 
also makes emphasis on the new technologies – media, cybernetic models and 
systems, computers, information processing, digital and virtual technologies, 
entertainment and knowledge industries and so on –without which, all of the 
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reproduction and consumption of images and spectacles in contemporary society and 
what he states as the postmodern turn would not be possible. Technology plays a 
decisive role in creating and pushing the shift from real to hyperreal. And as a kind of 
media technology and image mechanism, cinema is a typical manifestation and 
catalyst of this technology indispensability.  
 
Blockbuster, Special Effects and Technology 
Besides the endlessness and ubiquity of images that marks Hollywood 
blockbuster films, the spectacularization of cinematic images, enhanced by the 
development of special effects, is another great marker of the films of contemporary 
cinema. The overarching quality of what is presented to the audience as a blockbuster 
and an attractive consumer product is its intensive presentation of the spectacular, in 
particular, the dazzling special effects achieved by today’s sophisticated computer 
technology. Looking back again at the generic convergence of those high-grossing 
blockbuster productions in recent decade and the films that score the highest box 
office in history (see Table 2b in Appendices), we can find that an overwhelming 
number of them mix two or more genres from action, adventure, science-fiction, 
fantasy, and horror. Why particularly these genres? And why all generic mixtures? 
For the first question, one of the most conspicuous reasons is that there is a 
strong tendency among these genres to put on the pedestal the unique sensual 
enjoyment of visual spectacles, which are blissfully guaranteed by the remarkable 
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advancement in filmmaking technologies, and which, in turn, provide a highly 
effective and lucrative locus for displaying such technological miracles as well as the 
“miracle” of technology, creating of which has already become a privilege for 
Hollywood studios. And by combining many such genres, Hollywood build up a more 
centralized mechanism where all generic conventions are distilled and intensified to 
produce a commodity that contains all of the pleasure, all of the pain, and all of the 
opportunities to further display and sell its technological images. 
In the process of creating various spectacularized images that are built up by the 
fantastic, awe-inspiring, and extravagant special effects, Hollywood is actually 
producing signifiers of difference intended to inspire no more than a “wow” effect. 
When watching genre films, the audience is on one hand, expecting what is already 
known as the routine about the genre, and on the other hand, looking forward to 
something extraordinary, something that transgress what is familiar (Altman). That is 
to say, when they are watching an action movie, for instance, he/she knows that there 
is going to be gun shooting, weapon wielding, hand-to-hand combating, and car 
racing on highway followed by clashing or explosion, etc. Based on this knowingness, 
the audience also awaits to be surprised, amazed, or shocked by a reworking of the 
earlier cinema, by what deviate from the conventional in an upgraded manner, such as 
an explosion no longer on the highway, but up in the air as the car is falling from 
Golden Gate Bridge (and a female hero would also be an example in contrast to the 
conventional male hero). Therefore, in order to keep providing such surprise, 
amazement, and shock that keeps the audience coming back and thus keeps their 
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competitive edge, the filmmakers are obliged to generate more special, more splendid, 
and more visually pleasurable spectacles through what is offered by the rapidly 
growing digital technology. And this endeavor to give ever more and fresher images 
by exploiting hi-tech special effect goes on and on in such a contagious and ever-
escalating manner that the whole film industry just cannot stop its obsession with 
technology to produce and reproduce images, spectacles, and signs that actually pile 
up to celebrate the “triumph of the signifying culture” (Featherstone 15). 
Hollywood’s obsession with, or dependence on technology to gain and regain its 
marketplace is not a recent practice. Hollywood does have a long history and tradition 
of exploiting technological advances to bring back lost audiences to the cinema 
theatre. Actually there were different reasons for pushing the adoption of new film 
technologies: it could be the tactic to obviate threat from a new medium, the urge to 
gain a more powerful position within the circle of filmmaking, or the intention to 
rekindle a stagnant film industry with the potential of computer-made images. But for 
whatever reason, there has been a keen desire to stand out, and thus to keep alive the 
film industry by making good use of the most advanced visual/audio technologies 
only those major studios and individuals possess. 
The first major technology that establishes the feature film as the main attraction 
in the cinema is the introduction of sound. There has been a great deal of argument 
over the industrial reasons for introducing sound. One view tells that the major studios 
in Hollywood were in financial trouble, as audiences were declining and the 
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expansion into the extravagant “picture palaces” in mid-1920s had concentrated the 
benefits on a limited number of the most popular movies. As the first one to use 
optical sound in a string of shorts and then the famous musical The Jazz Singer, 
Warner Bros was even claimed to have been on the verge of bankruptcy, and clinging 
to the hope of the talking picture like a drowning man (Sklar 75). But Douglas 
Gomery argues differently that the studio was not bankrupt at all and he sees Warner 
Bros’ achievement in the introduction of sound as a prescient business decision. As a 
company much smaller than the majors then, it needed a new product that none of the 
others had. Sound was that product (43). 
No matter what is the true condition of the industrial history, however, “there 
were some aesthetic and ideological conditions supporting the introduction of sound 
which deserve consideration” (Turner 14). For a technological change to be widely 
accepted, there has to be a specific need, and according to Buscombe, with the 
coming of sound on film, this is the need for the narrative feature film to become 
more realistic (83). “The development of the moving picture from the still camera was 
a movement towards realism, towards the apparent replication of the experience of 
viewing life” (Turner 14). In resonance with the apparatus theory, the camera acts as 
an apparatus that embodies the reality by seeing the world as the object of the 
spectator’s point of view. The introduction of sound thus further facilitates the 
complication of realistic narrative by incorporating the audio aspect that is also 
indispensable to human senses in daily life. Turner points out that the realism here is 
“not just an ideological position, but an explicit aesthetic – a set of principles of 
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selection and combination employed in composing the film as a work of art” (15). 
The presentation of dialogue in synchronous lines pronounced by characters instead 
of body language or silent subtitle reconnects the motion picture with real life of 
verbal language. To this end, the industry rapidly designed a set of techniques for 
shooting and cutting dialogue which later become conventions. For instance, the 
technique of shot reverse shot over a continuous soundtrack was used to embody a 
conversation such that the spectator perceives a linear and logical action. These 
systems work in a similar way to that in the nineteenth-century novel which 
epitomizes realistic art. In this sense, “the feature film, like the realist novel, sets out 
to construct a realistic world, to provide psychological depth for its characters, and to 
place itself within notions of real life. This series of objectives dominates the 
development of the narrative feature after the advent of sound” (Turner 15). 
In view of these ideological and aesthetic considerations, a more convincing 
explanation for the introduction of sound is its effectiveness as an economic strategy 
in re-attracting a disinterested audience. As the German and Russian cinema stood out 
in terms of aesthetical and cultural quality in the late 1920s, which rose as strong 
rivals against Hollywood then, the introduction of sound into great quantity of films 
won Hollywood remarkable edge and helped American industry reclaim the 
hegemony over global market. It is especially so as Hollywood developed a new 
genre combining the pleasure of film and vaudeville simultaneously – the musical – 
which none of the foreign industries were capable of competing due to the lack of 
sound technology (Turner 16).  
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However, film audiences have been dwindling for most of the last fifty years in 
the 20
th
 century. According to Turner, in most Western capitalist countries the figures 
for cinema attendances reached a prime in 1946 and the overall trend has been 
downward until the end of the 1990s (23). By 1953, when almost 50 percent of 
American household had a TV set, the “US attendance levels had sunk to half the 
1946 figures” (23). There has not been satisfactory explanation for such slump in 
attendance, “but it is clear that film was already losing its cultural pre-eminence by 
the beginning of the 1950s and that television merely exacerbated this decline” (24). It 
is then that the second major technology – color – came in to help rewind the decline 
with success, but not without difficulty. 
Colored movie was in existence as early as 1900, as much silent film was 
actually tinted then. Technicolor, the processer of color motion pictures, was invented 
in 1915, but it did not become dominant until the 1930s and 1940s. But it was not 
more widely used before the 1960s because of the high cost and Technicolor’s 
irritating monopoly. It became more widely in use after sound and Technicolor’s 
introduction of a new three-color subtractive process in 1932 (Turner 26). But still, it 
was as not much of a dramatic breakthrough as that sound had been, and it was not 
until TV’s conversion to color in the 1960s that color film finally became the 
conventional production for feature film (27). At first, color was widely used in 
cartoons, musicals, westerns, and comedies where spectacles, epics set in the past, or 
special effects in fantasies were presented. So color’s function was “not to create the 
illusion of the real, but to signify artifice, decoration, the cinema as storyteller” (27). 
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Only when color became part of current affairs programs and news reporting on 
television did it lose its association with fantasy and spectacle (28). 
Concurrently, in other attempts to make movies better than ever brining unique 
experience that a television screen can never provide, Hollywood produced some 
“well-calculated, and some bizarre, innovations” (Turner 25). Experiments with 
widescreen formats became prevalent in the early 1950s – Cinerama was introduced 
in 1952, Cinemascope in 1953. “Cinerama used three projectors to screen images 
from three cameras on a curved screen in a specially equipped theatre. Cinemascope 
projected its image onto an elongated screen, its dimensions not the prevailing 1.33:1, 
but 2.35:1” (25). Both these screen formats have survived, and due to the success of 
these wide-screen innovations, the normal size for projection screens is now wider 
than it was in the 1950s. In the mid-1970s “it was the new super-formats of the 
widescreen (70 mm film), use of front projections and motion-control systems for 
special effects and new sound technology” (Hayward 57), George Lucas’s Star Wars 
(1977) being an outstanding example. 
In the 1990s and the past decade, it is the digital technology that creates so much 
more potential for camera work and special effects, which continues to be exploited 
extensively over a broad set of genres. During the 1990s, a great number of movies 
that featured spectacular special effects, particularly made by computer generated 
images, achieved huge success in box office, such as Terminator 2 (1991) and 
Jurassic Park (1993). This “encouraged a trend for movies which were marketed for 
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their appeal as spectacle rather than as narrative” (28). More examples include 
disaster movies such as Dante’s Peak (1997) and Twister (1996), comedy science-
fiction such as Men in Black (1997, and sequels in 2002 and 2012) and Mars Attacks! 
(1996), and apocalypse epics such as Deep Impact (1998) and Armageddon (1998). 
And this trend has been carried forward not only well, but better, into the new 
millennium with all those serial blockbusters such as The Lord of the Rings, Pirates of 
the Caribbean, Harry Potter, Spider Man, Transformers and so on. For a large part of 
these two decades, the blockbuster is almost synonymous to the special-effects movie. 
Even the success of Titanic (1997), said by Turner, “seems to have been tied, in large 
part, to director James Cameron’s use of computer-generated images to create the 
illusion of the sinking liner” (29). In such films, it is the creation of the illusion that 
attracts audiences’ attention and wins their admiration. And industrially speaking,  the 
spectacular and visceral nature of the experience of watching blockbusters act, at the 
same time, as the most convincing advertisement that highlights the pleasures of the 
cinema over those of television, home video, or other forms of entertainment. 
This is especially so for these four years, during which period, 3-D and I-Max 
format of movies is revived by James Cameron by his 2009 hit, Avatar (shot and 
projected in 3-D technology). A 3-D film is a motion picture that enhances the 
illusion of depth perception. It is derived from stereoscopic photography, and made by 
using a regular motion picture camera system to record the images as seen from two 
perspectives by using computer-generated imagery to generate the two perspectives 
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in post-production. When viewing the film, special projection hardware and/or 
eyewear are used to provide the illusion of depth (Wikipedia footnote 9). 
3-D technology is not a recent invention. It has been adopted by film industry 
intermittently ever since 1915
10
. 3-D films had been largely put under a niche market 
in motion picture industry because of the high cost in hardware and in the processes 
required to produce and display a 3-D film, and the lack of a standardized format for 
all segments of the entertainment business. Nonetheless, 3D films were prominently 
featured in the 1950s in American cinema, and later experienced a worldwide 
resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s driven by I-MAX high-end theaters 
and Disney theme parks (Wikipedia footnote 9). 3-D films flourished throughout the 
2000s, culminating in the unprecedented successful 3-D presentations of Avatar in 
December, 2009 and January, 2010. Following the huge success of Avatar, almost 
every single blockbuster production that involves spectacular scenes or intense actions 
embarks on this three-dimensional undertaking to catch up with the “trend,” and to 
coax audiences from the TV screen into movie theater while making them believe that 
the extra money per ticket costs is a wise investment in 3-D experience. From Tim 
Burton’s Alice in Wonderland (2010) immediately after Avatar, animation How to 
Train Your Dragon (2010), to numerous sequel movies whose previous episodes were 
actually made in 2-D format, such as Resident Evil: Afterlife (2010), Transformers: 
Dark of the Moon (2011), Saw VII (2010), The Final Destination V (2011), and once 
again Harry Potter, the second part of the seventh episode, Harry Potter and the 
                                                          
10 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3D_film 
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Deathly Hallows II (2011), and even to the “3-D-ilzed” Titanic in 2012, a wrapping of 
the old sweet memory in a brand-new shell, it is expected that the audiences would 
feel more shocked, more viscerally pleasurable, and more enchanted with this illusive 
images that seem so real, so concrete, and so close that they cannot help reaching out 
their hands to get hold physically of that hallucination. 
From sound, color, wide screen to digitalization of filmmaking, the history of 
Hollywood film can be written as a history of technological development. And it is in 
this history that Hollywood keeps thematizing the technological superiority – higher 
and more technologies seem to bring the audience a better experience of the cinematic 
magic – and thus it is the same history in which Hollywood keeps selling their 
commanding of such superior technology. In particular, the digital technologies 
precipitate the changes in American films for the past few decades as the cultural-
economic logic takes a, as Baudrillard conceptualized, postmodern turn. All these 
technological advances made by Hollywood studios to pull back audiences to movie 
theater seem to pull them further closer to “reality” with each technique invented, 
because real-life interaction occurs with audible conversation of daily verbal language 
instead of Chaplin-style gestural expression or inter-titles; because trees are green, sky 
is blue, each visible component of world is reflected in our eyes as colorful (although 
color was once considered as unreal effect in cinema for a while); because space and 
objects are perceived to have different depths and three dimensions. If a tornado really 
attacked, it would look exactly like what the computer generated imagery brings on 
screen and it would be seriously convincing that those people are running in panic for 
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a real reason. If there were zombies coming into “life” someday in future, they would 
look exactly as shown in Resident Evil, the specially made decay skin, rotten flesh, 
and rolled-over eyes. However, I argue, if movies before the 1980s blockbuster era 
produced an illusion of reality, there was still some trace of “the real.” These new 
technologies, however, represented by digital technology, virtual reality and 
cybernetic technologies push the illusion of reality to a completely new level, or, over 
a certain boundary that marks the real, which is hyperreal, characteristic of 
simulacrum and losing contact with the previous orders of replica. If the classical 
Hollywood cinema
11
 is the second order of simulacra, then the new Hollywood 
blockbuster cinema is the third order which has no relationship whatsoever to reality, 
not even illusion of reality, but hyperreality that completely overturns the existence of 
reality, and instead produces “the real” and “the social” for us to consume as such. Let 
me explain this through another recourse to Baudrillard’s theories. 
For Baudrillard, the relationship between simulacra and “the real” is formed by 
the “orders of simulacra,” and thus takes different stages of “orders of appearance.” 
He also gives an analysis of about how simulacra came to dominate social life in 
different stages across time. By making a historical sketch of the orders of simulacra, 
Baudrillard claims that modernity introduced an artificial democratized world of signs 
(such as stucco, theater, fashion, baroque art, or political democracy) that valorized 
                                                          
11  Classic Hollywood cinema, also called classical narrative cinema, is a cinema tradition which 
designates both a visual and sound style for making motion pictures and a mode of production used in 
the American film industry from the 1930s to the 1960s. Classical style is fundamentally built on the 
principle of continuity editing or “invisible” style.  The classic Hollywood narrative is structured with 
an unmistakable beginning, middle and end, and generally there is a distinct resolution at the end 
(Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson). 
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artifice over natural signs, thereby breaking down the established medieval 
hierarchies and orders, and departing from the fixed structures of signs and social 
positions (in Kellner, Beyond 78).  
According to Baudrillard, the feudal era was marked by a fixed social order and 
an established hierarchy of signs, based on which the class, rank and social position is 
determined. Signs at this stage were stable, restricted and perfectly clear and 
transparent – in a word, “obligatory.” So an individual’s social rank and status could 
be readily told from his or her clothes and appearance. However, in the modern age 
that follows, the order became that the “counterfeit” is the paradigmatic mode of 
representation, and this is when the first order of simulacra begins (Kellner, Beyond 
78). Class mobility disturbs the traditional reference systems, and in the consequent 
chaos, the original references dissipate. The definitions and categories that used to be 
natural and apparent, such as the specific attire appropriate for status, are pushed aside, 
and counterfeit comes in their place. But at this stage, the counterfeit requires an 
original for its meaning. This is the first order of simulacra, because representation is 
clearly an artificial place-marker for the real item, and the concept of artificiality still 
requires some sense of reality against which to recognize the artifice (Baudrillard, 
“Simulacra” 170). 
In Baudrillard’s terminology, this stage of early modernity was dominated by a 
“natural law of value”, where simulacra, be it art or political representation, were 
meant to represent and reflect nature or to embody “natural” rights or laws (in Kellner, 
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Beyond 78). “Simulacra are not only a game played with signs; they imply social 
relations and social power” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 168). He thus suggests that the 
“inherent goal of the order of simulacra is to produce a flexible and controllable 
universal system of order and power” (qtd. in Kellner, Beyond 78). In this historical 
stage, Baudrillard observes that signs have not yet floated independently of social 
relations – they are in fact entirely wrapped up in social relations of power: “The 
counterfeit is working, so far, only on substance and form, not yet on relations and 
structures…But it is aiming already, on this level, at the control of a pacified society, 
ground up into a synthetic deathless substance: an indestructible artifact that will 
guarantee an eternity of power… It is a project of political and cultural hegemony”                       
(Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 170). 
Then the “second order” of simulacra came into being during the industrial 
revolution, an age of infinite reproducibility in the form of the industrial mass 
production. “Production then became mechanized, and turned out series of mass 
objects: exact replicas, infinitely produced and reproduced by assembly-line processes 
and eventually automation” (Kellner, Beyond 79). In this order of simulacra, there is 
no more nostalgia for a natural order, because nature becomes the object of 
domination, and reproduction becomes a dominant social principle regulated by the 
laws of the market (79). The industrial order, as seen by Baudrillard, is ruled by the 
“commercial law of value,” and equivalent exchange, rather than by the “natural law 
of value” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 172). This is where and when feminists of film 
critiques began to examine what illusion the film apparatus is creating to naturalize 
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certain ideologies that are actually demeaning to women after their reflectionist 
attempt to look at how cinematic representations offer the false images of women in 
real life, which could be relegated to the stage of first-order simulacra. 
With the introduction of photography and film, as Walter Benjamin argues, 
“even art was taken over by mechanical reproduction, losing its aura and thus being 
forced to relinquish its claims to represent a higher dimension offering alternative and 
allegedly superior values and representations” (qtd. in Kellner, Beyond 79). Due to 
mass production and proliferation of copies, the distinctions between the image and 
the representation begin to disintegrate. “Such production misrepresents and masks an 
underlying reality by imitating it so well, thus threatening to replace it, for instance, in 
photography or ideology” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 172). This is especially true with 
classical Hollywood cinema, where its narrative mechanism and its accessorizing with 
sound and color is a typical second-order simulacra attempting to render certain 
“realism” through ideological means. Classic Hollywood cinema (or classic 
Hollywood narrative) is what David Bordwell and others call an “excessively obvious 
cinema” in which cinematic style serves to explain, and not obscure, the narrative (1). 
It is based on a neatly organized pattern that is almost beyond any doubt. 
This cinema, then, is one that is made up of motivated signs that lead the 
spectator through the story to it inevitable conclusion. The name of the game is 
verisimilitude, “reality.” However, an examination of what gets put up on screen 
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in the name of reality makes clear how contrived and limited it is and yet how 
ideologically useful that reality none the less remains.                    (Hayward 64) 
Classic Hollywood narrative, whatever the genre is, must have closure – the 
narrative must come to a completion, be it a happy ending or not. No matter what 
forms the closure takes, it will, almost without exception, deliver or enunciate a 
message that is central to dominant ideology, for instance, criminals finally facing 
legal sanctions, good triumph evil, or true love uniting distressed couple. The most 
taught discourse by the dominant cinema as myth-maker is its naturalization of 
heterosexual coupledom and family, and the point that all else must potentially read as 
deviancy (Hayward 65-66). This is also called seamless realism, whose ideological 
function is to disguise the illusion of realism. Film technique – supported by narrative 
structures – erases the idea of illusion, creates the “reality effect” (Hayward 311).  
It hides its mythical and naturalizing function and does not question itself – 
obviously, because to do so would be to destroy the authenticity of its realism. 
Nothing in the camera-work, the use of lighting, color, sound or editing draws 
attention to the illusionist nature of the reality effect. The whole purpose is to 
stitch the spectator into the illusion – keeping reality safe.              (Hayward 312) 
When there is illusion, there is a potential for reality. That is how the feminists since 
the 1970s have been engaged with the issues of women in films – to disentangle the 




However, as of today, Baudrillard claims, “we are in the third-order simulacra; 
no longer that of the counterfeit of an original as in the first-order, nor that of the pure 
series as in the second” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 179). This stage is the end result of 
a long historical process of simulation, where simulation models come to constitute 
the world, overtaking and finally “devouring” representation (Kellner, Beyond 79). 
Now “the structural law of value” reigns, and models take precedence over things, 
while “serial production yields to generation by means of models…Digitality is its 
metaphysical principle…and DNA its prophet. It is in effect in the generic code that 
the ‘genesis of simulacra’ today finds its most accomplished form” (Baudrillard, 
“Simulacra” 180-81). Society thus moves from “a capitalist-productivist society to a 
neo-capitalist cybernetic order that aims now at total control” (qtd. in Kellner, Beyond 
80). 
Baudrillard draws analogies between language, genetics and social organization 
to explain how third order simulacra becomes the order of the day. Language 
structures our communications through codes and models (like words and grammar); 
Genetics decide our body features, and some abilities or tendencies through 
permutation and combination of DNA codes; so in a similar manner, society forms the 
environment and human life also through certain codes and modes of social 
organization and regulation. More specifically, architectural and transportation 
models in cities structure, in some way, how urban areas, houses and transportation 
systems are organized and used, which are in turn governed by the logic of the 
simulation model or code. For instance, interior design manuals, exercise videos, 
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child-care books, sexual manuals, cookbooks, magazines, newspapers and broadcast 
media all provide models that structure various activities within everyday life (in 
Kellner, Beyond 80).  
Cinema in this era is one of most important providers of these models, and also 
absorbs all the other codes and models, infiltrates into every aspects of social life, 
proliferates across all possible industrial outlets and terminals, and makes its high-
profile but hollow appearance. So where is the reality of today’s blockbusters? It is, 
oddly enough, simultaneously in multiple places, texts, occasions, and commodities: 
in the production studios backstage of evaluating whether the huge investment could 
be recovered and deciding pouring how many images into how many channels; in the 
pre-view media conference where the cast are featured in another set of glamorous 
dresses and suits for photo-shooting and fans-screaming; in the movie theater of 
“connoisseur-ing” a popcorn and a drink with a visual extravagancy; in the interview 
feature on magazine adding some “personal flavor” to the celebrity image; in the 
movie trailer introducing the major spectacular stunt pieces you cannot miss rather 
than briefing the storyline; in the plot of, again simultaneously, the game version, the 
film version, and the book version that are inter-adapted and inter-textualized. If 
solely talking the films, we are, at once, repeating consuming the STORY of the super 
hero defeating the villain again and again, and consuming the SPECTACLE of that 
story and of the machinery behind. This is the reality the omnipresent media build for 
us – the hyperreal. This stage is, then, also when the postfeminist discourse comes 
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into being, which is based on the media images – the third-order simulacra, but not 
representations – for its epistemological existence, just like the cinema. 
More often than not, as “the opportunity to make a sequel became a standard 
consideration for many successful films” (McClean 171), the story structure changes 
in that the serial mode of production tends to leave the narrative of each episode open, 
which runs contrary to the classical narrative structure that always put a definite end 
to a diegesis. As usual, there is never an end story, or an end product. Images and 
spectacles spill over to other spaces, to other media, floating everywhere, fragmented 
and with no fixed meaning. But with fancy appearances, or, in Baudrillard’s term, 
sign value, they are so good at creating desires among us – the movies are must-see, 
the movie poster makes your room look cool, the action figure allows you to possess 
the character – that we are made to approach each other and the world through the 
mediation of these images. We therefore no longer acquire goods out of real needs but 
out of desires that are increasingly defined by the amazing trailers or the computer 
generated images, which keep us at one step removed from the reality of our bodies or 
of the world around us and relocate us to a technological environment that is our new 
reality. We are so well tamed under these flashy images that if they were not 
consumed, we would starve of failing to upgrade our aesthetic tastes. In the end, we 
will be confused if this is the taste of our own, or the simulated taste that belongs to 




According to Baudrillard, we do not know the “real” but merely the appearances 
behind which the real is supposed to hide (Perfect Crime 2). As simulation enters the 
third stage, an image, especially like a cinematic image made of CGI, is “bound 
neither to truth nor reality; it is appearance and bound to appearance” (Lucidity Pact 
91). As such, for Baudrillard, “we disappear behind our images” (Lucidity Pact 85). 
“The closer we supposedly approach the real, or truth, the further we draw away from 
them” (Gulf War 49), because what we are getting close to are always the layers of 
images. With the case of contemporary media – the virtual technology, the spectacular 
cinema, and their ubiquity and proliferation – the referent disappears into the virtual, 
vanishing “into the technical programming of the image” (Lucidity Pact 96). We do 
not, as said by Baudrillard, get closer to the reality of a thing or an event by burying it 
under layer upon layer of images. Indeed, images only take us further away from the 
real, as reality today is reaching a point where any firm distinction between reality 
and representation tumbles over the abyss of hyper-simulation (in Coulter 12). 
Whatever relationship the image and reality may have been said to share in historical 
time is now stretched beyond credulity in the age of real time media (Baudrillard, 
“Simulacra” 168).  
Baudrillard further points out that the process of disappearance and replacement 
is one of duality. “Not only do we face the problem of the image replacing reality but 
the real (our obsession with realism, especially in cinema), is making the image 
disappear” (Coulter 11). As Baudrillard writes, “we deplore the disappearance of the 
real, arguing that everything is now mediated by the image. But we forget that the 
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image, too, disappears, overcome by reality, what is sacrificed in this operation is not 
so much the real as the image” (Impossible Exchange 145). Indeed, “cinema is at risk 
of disappearing at the hands of reality” while at the same time, “reality is [also] 
disappearing at the hands of cinema” (Lucidity Pact 125). On one hand, the more 
realistic the technological image looks, the more the image, as the third-order 
simulacrum, is replacing the reality and becoming the hyperreal, in which the cinema 
is nothing more than another simulacrum, thus already disappeared. On the other, 
contemporary cinema is one of the main loci for disseminating and reproducing the 
endless images, which, therefore, leads to the disappearance of reality in the myriad 
simulacra – the hyperreal world. As such, the simulacra in films move toward the 
force of reality, though not based on any counterpart in the real world, and this 
disappeared reality is experienced as being more real than any reality. 
There is even not the illusion of reality. The traditional seamless narrative, 
generally speaking, based the plot on social issues. No matter how easy the solution a 
“happy ending” can provide to disguise the sad reality, to naturalize social problems 
and divisions, and thus to reinforce a certain ideology, there is at least an illusion that 
problems can be solved, and there is still a possibility of accessing the hidden fact of 
the real through critique. Whereas, for blockbusters to open up to as many audience 
groups as possible and thus allow them to generate meaning and enjoyment, a central 
instrument for bring such “polysemic appeal is a rejection of reality-based genres.” 
Instead, these movies “take on fantastic or futuristic themes. Conjuring up exotic 
worlds and plots that take place in the future or in a past that never existed, these 
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blockbuster movies do not represent reality but rather construct it, a simulacrum that 
precedes anything real, and that does not exist at all” (Jöckel, and Döbler 87). This is 
also the case for the “reality” in films about action heroine – a non-reality but full of 
spectacles to look at. The world fabricated in the film replaces the real world to 
generate desire and pleasure that has never been experienced before, while forming a 
hyperreal universe that is also “seamless,” in the way that there is no possibility to 
find any referent for luciditification, because even the illusion has already gone, 
anything meaningful is lost in this fantastic or futuristic world that, at the same time, 
overwhelmed by endless spectacles. The blurring of the real and the virtual is the 
“obsession of our age” (Baudrillard, Cool Memories V 92). 
For Baudrillard himself, he understands cinema, in the first place, to be (at its 
best) a degraded form of photography. He believes that, rather than making images 
stronger, as the popular view sees it, sound and movement represented dilutions of the 
purity of the image (Cool Memories II 44). This view is resonant to Walter 
Benjamin’s idea about loss of aura, except that for Benjamin, photography is already 
a pollution of the original image. In Baudrillard’s opinion, technology and an 
obsession with “realism” are in many ways decreasing the quality of the cinematic 
image. For Baudrillard, “cinema has been on a downward trajectory over the past 
century from fantastic and mythical, to realistic and hyperrealistic” (qtd. in Coulter 8). 
By pursuing virtual technologies – huge amounts of postproduction and the addition 
of CGI– some cinema, considered by Baudrillard, is “abolishing itself” with 
“hyperreal” technology (“Simulacra” 167). As cinema’s relation to technology has 
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long been one of an “illusion of progress”, the use of virtual technologies today thus 
represents a further degradation of the image as did the addition of sound and color in 
earlier times (Gulf War 49). And this is especially so in recent years, argues 
Baudrillard, as films are increasingly “stuffed with special effects” and cinematic 
edge has been lost with the proliferation of high-tech machinery (Lucidity Pact 80). 
As Baudrillard told an interviewer, “Cinema has become hyperrealist, technically 
sophisticated, effective (performant). The films… fail to incorporate any element of 
make believe (l’imaginaire).” In his view, it is as if the cinema were regressing 
towards infinity, towards some indefinable perfection, a formal “empty perfection” 
however (Interviews 31). This is because when the image “approaches an absolute 
correspondence” this is “the very definition of the hyperreal” (“Simulacra” 168). And 
“the closer we come to the absolutely real, to veracity – as in digitalization and 
computer generated effects – the closer we move towards banality and boredom” (qtd. 
in Coulter 10). Efforts to achieve perfect definition only move us further away from 
the power of illusion which is so vital to good cinema (Perfect Crime 30). The result 
is then, wrote Baudrillard, a “pornography of the image, technical processes of 
illusion which remove the possibility for illusion in the radical sense” (Artefact 8). 
Hence, Baudrillard strongly opposes the embrace of technology in cinema and its 
links to so-called cinematic realism in recent years. This analysis and stand of his fits 
well within his overall suspicion of technology and his ability to make us rethink our 
sense of “technological prowess” which is in fact, he argues, only a disempowering 
aspect of our contemporary lives, for such prowess is only a false one (in Coulter 9). 
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It is also an analysis that fits well with the overall tone of this thesis, which will come 
later in the third chapter.  
While technology and image work together to transform the real into the 
hyperreal, the remaining question is, what happens to the other aspect of cinema – 
narrative – if it is (or was?) the reason that all the images are produced in the first 
place? As narrative is an important locus where the active agency of action heroines is 
embodied, the next section will tackle this question. 
 
Spectacle versus Narrative 
The film-viewing experience composes of two dimensions that coexist in 
cooperative way, or competitive way, narrative and spectacle. Narrative is understood 
primarily “in terms of the telling of a coherent and carefully developed character-
based story throughout the course of the film” (King, New Hollywood 179). Spectacle 
is seen as sequences that employ a heightened degree of spectacle or spectacular 
action, a source of distraction or interruption: the “big” chase sequence, the “big” 
explosion, or the “big” presentation or outburst of special effects. As a quality 
provided by Hollywood to maintain the distinctive appeal of cinema – the big-screen 
event, spectacle is crucial to the industry’s broader commercial interests. “Spectacular 
imagery, of various kinds, sells. It is an intrinsic part of many of the properties on 
which the studios draw for their big franchise products. It also plays an important role 
in the aesthetics of spin-off products like computer games or theme-park rides” (King, 
New Hollywood 179). 
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There have been vigorous debates over Hollywood’s use of special effects. It is 
argued that “the marketing of Hollywood cinema has been dominated by the 
presentation of the spectacular rather than the meaningful: by the promotion of the 
visual effects available in the film concerned rather than the narrative concept which 
structures it or, even, the stars who appear in it” (Turner 36). Many voices, be it from 
popular platform (like movie magazines or websites, IMDB and Rotten Tomatoes 
being the most influential sites), or from scholarly writings, have expressed their 
concern with this extensive adoption of special effects, considering it unfortunate for 
film industry, because as such, films are more treated as marketable projects than their 
unique qualities as narrative or as popular art. It now becomes total commonplace to 
encounter movie reviews (sometimes even in the form of newspaper headline) which 
describe the latest blockbuster as a special effects extravaganza that is insufficient in 
plot development. For instance, many of the reviewers of the first two Matrix films 
found the plot difficult to follow. The focus upon what illusions or fantasies could be 
created through new technologies certainly provides us with plenty of opportunities to 
marvel at what is on the screen, but, “it is said, the capacity to develop strong and 
resonant stories may have atrophied as a result…Therefore, concerns have been raised 
about contemporary cinema losing its soul, its human referent, and thus eventually its 
audiences” (Turner 35).  
For one thing, our focus on development of plot is “halted while we sit back to 
contemplate with amazement/pleasure/horror (or whatever particular reaction) the 
sheer sensory richness of the audio-visual experience” (King, New Hollywood 179): 
the gigantic Titanic cracking and sinking in the sea (Titanic, 1997), the computer 
generated dinosaurs in Jurassic Park (1993) which revived the species never seen by 
human eyes before, the liquid metal T-1000 Terminator transforming into totally 
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another person (Terminator 2: Judgment Day, 1991), the various ferocious monsters 
and bizarre creatures appearing across the eight episodes of Harry Potter (2001-2011), 
and all other equally amazing spectacles in those less successful blockbusters such as 
The Chronicles of Narnia series (2005-2010), The Brothers Grimm (2005), and The 
Golden Compass (2007), Clash of the Titans (2010), Prince of Persia (2010), John 
Carter (2012). For another, the presence of stars is also a routine “disruption” of the 
internal narrative coherence in certain way. The star-as-persona might be consumed as 
a form of spectacle, a disruptive audio-visual presence which is to be enjoyed in its 
own right – it thus cannot be entirely integrated into the fictional world of narrative 
driven by character. Films featuring favorite stars might be experienced in terms of 
the star presence as much as (or even more than) their place within a developing 
narrative which they are supposed to help shape (King, New Hollywood 181). The 
overwhelming priority of contemporary blockbuster to offer a spectacular big-screen 
experience with special effects and to generate profitable spin-offs in other media has 
heralded the demise of coherent narrative, which used to be at least an equally 
important component of classical Hollywood cinema. 
Conversely, some such as Geoff King take issue with this criticism of spectacles, 
arguing that the critics themselves underestimate how tightly the special effects are 
tied to the movie’s narrative structure (Spectacular Narrative). In his discussion of 
Jurassic Park, for instance, King argues that even the most spectacular of specially 
effects are still contained within “the arc” of the narrative. According to him, one 
tendency in debates about the relationship between narrative and spectacle in the 





 in the studio era, at the expense of other appeals. Another has been to 
underestimate the importance of narrative – “classical” and otherwise –today, as 
narrative construction remains an important ingredient even in those most spectacular 
and special-effects-laden blockbuster productions (New Hollywood 182). King first 
elaborate on the two senses in which the term “narrative” can be used. The first refers 
to “plot” or “story”: the on-going events of a film, both as depicted on screen and as 
the viewer is invited to recreate them. The second refers to thematic structures such as 
the patterns of oppositions, negotiations and in some cases imaginary reconciliations 
that can be found in – or read into – Hollywood narrative structures (183). King 
admits that the corporate blockbuster is very often a noisy, action-packed and 
spectacular affair, that much of its investment goes into these dimensions, and that it 
is not a format noted for the finer nuances of narrative structure. But, he argues it is 
easy to get carried away, or so it seems for some come commentators: although the 
pleasures of narrative might not always be the main or most obvious appeal of such 
films, narrative structures remain important, however, in terms of both story/lot and 
thematic issues, often working in combination with the delivery of spectacle (184). 
Narrative structures might be sometimes found to have changed from those employed 
in many Hollywood films. However,  
Too many products of the studio era veer away from an exclusive reliance on 
what are described as “classical” norms. And too many blockbuster products of 
recent decades have a continued investment in quite carefully honed narrative 
structure, including elements consistent with Bordwell’s version of “classical” 
                                                          
12 A particular form of narrative, the dominant component of classical Hollywood cinema, which is a 
form based on clear and “unambiguous patterns of cause-and-effect in which events are justified and 
motivated rather than arbitrary or coincidental, and organized around the actions” of goal-driven 
characters seeking to overcome a variety of obstacles (Bordwell, 12-3). 
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narrative. Elements of spectacle and narrative co-exist across the history of 
Hollywood cinema, in varying combinations.          (King, New Hollywood 184)  
It is, therefore, according to King, an “exercise of sweeping and over-stated 
generalizations” to say that contemporary blockbusters have no narratives (New 
Hollywood 39). 
However, the argument King made about the importance of narrative even in today’s 
spectacular movies fails to recognize how the “blockbuster culture” may affect 
people’s recognition of the narrative-spectacle proportion. That is to say, the 
reproduction of cinematic images into many other spheres has located people not only 
in the movie theater dwelling solely on the film itself, but also many other loci that 
are equally or even more appealing while having nothing to do with the “narrative”. 
And as the images takes on a technological track that goes right into people’s 
fascination with and imagination about technology – that insurance for a better 
enjoyment of life—narrative becomes wedged away. According to King, narrative 
does matter and there is a narrative that strings together and thus justifies all the 
spectacles. But the point is not whether narrative exist on its own or not, but whether 
narrative matters to an audience whose major experience with blockbusters is 
preoccupied by spectacles. On one hand, spectacles have become the central quality in 
contemporary blockbusters. Such centrality has stolen the importance of narrative. 
The ever more intensified presentation of spectacles marginalizes the significance of 
narrative, and eventually makes it matter less. On the other hand, the overall cultural 
and industrial background has nurtured a type of audience (or rather consumers), 
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whose engagement with film has been transformed to a large extent. This, of course, 
does not mean all audiences are homogenously only paying attention to spectacles. 
There are exceptions who, for instance, choose to watch an art film instead of a 
spectacular blockbuster, or who focus more on how the story is told than a special 
effect. This thesis does not intend to make generalizations to all people, nor to provide 
any universal theory of how audience receive contemporary blockbusters, but attempt 
to theorize how the cultural-economic logic works to affect people’s reception, and to 
synergize all the critical strength on the industrial practice and the larger cultural-
economic background that tends to create such kind of audience and has actually 
already nurtured some. In the same way, the following discussions of audience do not 
intend to make generalization, only that the exceptions are not the focus of this study. 
At the same time, it cannot be denied either that there are some blockbuster 
movies which appeal to the audiences with both narrative and spectacular special 
effects as they work in tandem to light up each other just at the right moment (such as 
Inception (2010)), the tendency towards synthesizing all elements of fantasy, action, 
sci-fi, horror and any “larger-than-life” form is too obvious to ignore. The fancy 
technologies that privilege cinema production can be easily and conveniently played 
to the full for the spectacular such genres entail.  In terms of the movies per se, the 
quantity of movies that fall under such generic categories has obviously increased 
during recent years, as shown in Figure 1
13
. The expansion in such generic affiliation 
means the increase in the use of the spectacular in association with the thematic 
                                                          
13
 From Wikipedia, list of different genres of films. Retrieved in June, 2012. The data Figure 1 shows 
can only show a general tendency. There are so many genre mixing and genre overlapping, so the 
number of films of certain genre is not exhaustive.   
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requirement, the superbly challenging stunt, the extraterrestrial species beyond human 
imagination, and the dazzlingly picturesque scenery in the other world.  
 
Figure 1 Number of Genre Films across Years 
(summarized from boxofficemojo.com) 
 
Not only does the cinema become more spectacular quantitatively, but also for 
most blockbuster films nowadays, the intensity of spectacles has risen to a completely 
new level compared to those before 1980s. This is well illustrated by Fred Pfeil (1998) 
and also Geoff King himself (2002). The action spectacular of classical narrative style 
offers “an accumulation of unspent dramatic or suspenseful elements throughout the 
narrative’s so-called ‘rising action’ into a force that is discharged most completely at 
the story’s climax” (Pfeil 180). As shown by King, a simplified version of his 
structure might be represented graphically in Figure 2 or a slightly complicated one in 
Figure 3 (New Hollywood 186). An example of a film from the studio era that follows 
this model is San Francisco (1936). 
In contrast, many of the blockbuster productions of the corporate era produce a 
rather different graphic profile, such as Die Hard with a Vengeance (1995), which 















































the high-speed chase and/or the gratifying spectacular release of aggressive impulse 
occurs at regularly recurring intervals throughout the film” (Pfeil 181). This kind of 
narrative/spectacle relationship is represented in Figure 4 (King, New Hollywood 187). 
Another way of indicating the relationship between spectacle and narrative is 
suggested in Figures 5 and 6 (188). Figure 3 is offered as a model of what is said to be 
the more “classical” type of construction, the line representing the linear progression 
of the narrative and the explosion symbols representing moments of spectacular 
display or action. “The classical version is one in which the narrative component is 
supposed to be largely dominant, sustained through periodic moments when the 
emphasis shifts towards spectacle/action that are not overwhelming, before building 
perhaps towards a more sustained spectacular climax” (King, New Hollywood 187). 
Figure 4 shows the relationship implied in some accounts of the contemporary 
blockbuster. Spectacular moments here are both larger and more frequent, 
fragmenting the narrative. Narrative, in this model, becomes attenuated, so as the 
agency embodied by such narrative. Its short segments are cut off from one another 
and serving as little more than the glue that holds together a series of spectacular 
displays, which resembles the free-floating signifiers that do not have a fixed signified 
for a concrete meaning.  
              Figure 2                            Figure 3                         Figure 4 
           






Duration of film 
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 Figure 5 
 
start                                                                                                               climax  
                                                           
 Figure 6 
 
As much King questions the adequacy of this measurement and over-
subjectiveness of this model, it does give a sense at least of the relative differences 
between one film or another. What is more important, the point here is not about 
drawing a “divine” demarcation between the movies in classical era and in the new 
Hollywood era, nor about making quantitative measurement of what constitutes a 
“spectacle,” but rather to grasp the tendency of industrial practice, to trace the cultural 
background that nurtures such tendency – how this tendency is forming and formed 
by contemporary culture and economy. It is thus of equal importance to look into 
aspects other than the movie itself, and to have a view that takes into consideration the 
audiences’ take and taste of today’s films, and how it has changed as Hollywood 
blockbuster becomes a composite commodity that facilitates and is facilitated by the 
reproduction of technological images. 
When it comes to the other end of the big screen – the spectatorship, there is a 
large literature on the dream analogy
14
 of audience involvement with the image before 
                                                          
14 At the heart of the cinema experience is the blurring of the boundaries between the imaginary and the 
real. Representation is experienced as perception. Metz (1982) has called the filmed image “the 
= major spectacular sequence = line of narrative development 
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the 1980s. However useful this analogy can be, there are limitations. The process of 
decoding film languages is as much conscious and social as it is unconscious and 
presocial. Metz says that when he is in the cinema as a member of the audience, he 
“watches” and he “helps.” The cinema audience watches because the image is itself 
seductive, larger than life, an object of desire. The audience thus concentrates on 
looking (420-21). But the meaning of the narrative structure has to be actively 
constructed by the viewers as they watch. The term “suture”, for instance, explains 
how “each shot in a film is continually involved in constructing the relationships 
which will help the film make sense – relationships between one shot and the next, 
one sequence and its adjacent sequences, and so on” (Dayan 24). Since the meaning 
of one shot is held over until viewers see how it is stitched together – sutured – by its 
relation to the next shot, cinema is able to keep it to itself how it is constructed. This 
process of deferring meaning put the viewers in such a position that they have to close 
the gaps and drive the narrative forward to understand what they have seen. Viewers 
thus concentrate more on the meaning of each shot or series of shots than on 
examining the means of construction. In this way, the viewers do not know all they 
need to know until the ending of the film. This aggravates the pressure towards 
reaching the completion, and mastering the narrative. “The spectators are drawn 
between, on one hand, their desire for the image, their luxuriating in this amplification 
of the real and its celebration of the power of their gaze; and on the other hand, their 
desire for ‘entering’ the film, for domination of the narrative, for their achievement of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
imaginary signified,” referring to the fact that the reality which the filmed images call up is always 
absent. “present” only in our imaginations. This recognition has led researchers to examine similarities 
between viewing a film and an analogous condition, dreaming. Dreams do not “really” happen 
although we might experience them as if they did; contradictorily, even though the content of the dream 
may not have happened, the dream experience itself did. Like films, dreams have the capacity to 
express thought through images; they also have a tendency towards narrative structures, and give the 
effect of seeming more than real (Turner, 147).  
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mastery” (Turner 146). That is to say, the pleasure of watching films is supposed to be 
from both the narrative and spectacle. 
However, as the “visual display is elevated to a defining feature of the genre” 
(Tasker 6) with the rise of spectacular blockbusters, such distinction between 
narrative pleasure and visual pleasure blurs to such an extent that the cinematic 
pleasure is almost equivalent to visual pleasure, which also foreground its technicity. 
As viewers need to “concentrate” on and “construct” – “help” – the narrative 
formation in the years of classical Hollywood, audiences of today’s spectacular 
indulge in distraction. In “The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction,” 
Walter Benjamin already lends his insight on the effect of distraction by cinematic 
images
15. According to him, the film “hit the spectator like a bullet, it happened to 
him” rather than the other way around – the spectator enters the film. “It promoted a 
demand for the film, the distracting element of which is also primarily tactile, being 
based on changes of place and focus which periodically assail the spectator” (117). He 
then compares the screen on which a film unfolds with the canvas of a painting. He 
says the painting invites the spectator to contemplation. Before the painting the 
spectator can abandon himself to his associations. Before the movie frame he cannot 
do so, because “no sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already changed” 
(117). It cannot be arrested. Duhamel, Benjamin quotes, notes this circumstance as 
follows: “I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been replaced 
by moving images” (117). The process of associating with these images by the 
spectator is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change. This constitutes the 
shock effect of the film, which, argues Benjamin, like all shocks, should be cushioned 
                                                          
15  This essay, though written in 1936, is still relevant here, because the early silent cinema, 
characterized by Tom Gunning (1986) as “a cinema of attractions,” is a previous instance in the history 




by heightened presence of mind. “By means of its technical structure, the film has 
taken the physical shock effect out of the wrappers in which Dadaism had, as it were, 
kept it inside the moral shock effect” (118). This also applies to contemporary 
blockbusters, with the constantly changing images becoming considerably 
spectacularized and proliferated, thus endlessly enlarging the shock effect. Again, 
Benjamin cites Duhamel as he “has expressed himself in the most radical manner” 
(118). What Duhamel objects to most is the kind of participation which the movie 
elicits from the masses. Duhamel calls the movie 
A pastime for helots, a diversion for uneducated, wretched, worn-out creatures 
who are consumed by their worries…a spectacle which requires no 
concentration and presupposes no intelligence…which kindles no light in the 
heart and awakens no hope other than the ridiculous one of someday becoming a 
“star” in Los Angeles.                                                         (qtd. in Benjamin 118) 
As radical and over-generalizing as this is, it does point to the painful fact about 
today’s cinematic experience that from “concentrating” and “constructing” to 
“distracted” and “shocked,” the audience’s active engagement with the movie has 
been tuned to a minimal level. This is, however, not to say that the audience today has 
turned into some mindless group who has lost their ability to think and judge. It is 
only a shift in the mode of watching a film, and this shift is not formed on its own, but 
subject to how the film changes, how they adapt to the cinematic changes, how the 
subject is “stitched in” in a novel way, and finally how the economic and cultural 
condition causes and reflects these changes. 
Cinema puts the mass in the position of critic, which used to be a privilege of 
few. But with today’s blockbusters an epitome of infinite spectacles that provide 
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nothing but visual pleasure, the reception of the movie devalues that position, because 
it is a process in a state of distraction that “requires no attention” (Benjamin 119). 
“The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one” (Benjamin 119). 
This is also not to say that there is absolutely no narrative or Hollywood 
screenwriters suddenly become dumb and exhausted with their creativity. The 
narrative is “absent” or “lacking” in the sense that it is eclipsed or overwhelmed by 
the spectacle. For one thing, the narrative power of contemporary blockbusters is 
weakened out of industrial concern. With an increasing number of mega productions 
coming in more than one episode, the serial format of contemporary blockbusters 
always resort to open ending to build up expectation for the next one, which, as 
discussed before, disrupts the closure and thus the integrity of a narrative. Resident 
Evil series would be good case in point, as the protagonist Alice always encounters 
new challenges during the last minute of the movie after the first one and half 
showing how she survives the endless attack by zombies and monsters. This format 
resembles TV shows, only with much longer intervals, which further fragment the 
continuity of the story, if there is one across all the episodes. There are also cases 
where each sequel stands out as an independent story that does ends with a 
completion. The continuity is formulated through the main characters or the 
“signature face,” but the plot follows a repetitive pattern. For example, in Pirates of 
the Caribbean saga, Jack Sparrow chases after different mission or treasure each 
episode; in Transformers, old enemy down, new villain rises, and it’s a whole set of 
good-triumph-evil story all over again.  In this case, what keeps the audiences coming 
for the endless sequels is not so much the story to be told, because they somehow 
already know what is going to happen. What they can expect from the sequel is how 
the same story is to be presented in an upgraded version of visual-audio pleasure. 
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For another, with the over-amplified emphasis on the visual feast widely and 
intensively promoted by film marketing, the audiences are largely implanted with this 
preference to the spectacular. This is what they are made to think they have paid for 
and what deserves their attention. With this purpose in mind, they pursue only the 
surface value of the movie, the spectacle, and dwell comfortably on it. Even if they 
sometimes feel lack of plot or creativity in the story while watching the film, an 
explosion, or a marvelous scene of wonderland, will work quite well to convince the 
audience to put aside their doubt and to indulge in the visual guilty pleasure. In this 
way, the audiences have minimum active engagement with the movie, but sit there 
passively and loosely, waiting for the images to impose on them and distract them. 
Usually it is not that the contemporary Hollywood films have no soul or no deep 
value of making implicit meanings. Most of the newest spectacular movies are 
actually quite “old-fashioned” narrative-wise. They still reinforce the conventional 
ideology like good forever prevails over evil (like Harry Potter, for instance); that 
evil will be controlled, punished, or destroyed by justice, more often than not, 
represented by a superhero (like Superman Returns, Hancock); or that individualism, 
patriotism, freedom is worth pursuing, which is so typical of American value system 
(like Iron Man, Captain America, The Lord of the Rings). And some are even trying 
to tell the unconventional, or to add a little twist to the classic. For example, the story 
does not have to end in a “happily-ever-after” heterosexual romantic relationship, as 
exemplified by most of the action heroine films. However, based on a knowingness 
resulting from genre routine, and intertextuality with other content and media, the 
audiences often can foresee what is going on and thus care less about what the films 
tells through plot. They would rather resort to the other set of “rules” of pleasure, 
because “the criteria for the good life revolve around the desire to enlarge one’s self, 
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the quest for new tastes and sensations, to explore more and more possibilities” 
(Featherstone 118). Therefore, the logic becomes like this: as long as they are offered 
an upgraded fill of visual enjoyment, they do not mind hearing the old story again. 
The “soul” of the film, be it a restatement of conventional ideology or a new voice of 
discourse, has its thunder stolen by the appearance, thus conveniently assumed 
invisible. 
While cinema was considered as an important form of ideological state 
apparatus that interpellates people into certain position and adopt certain values by 
subjugating them into dominant ideologies, which is particularly so in classical 
Hollywood era, it now functions in a subtly different way. Spectacular film of today 
subjugates people into images, the computer-generated simulacra that cease to be 
representation and become the hyperreality. This subjugation into images positions 
people nowhere but in an unstoppable circulatory loop of desire, consumption and 
pleasure, like anything else in media and society. It is both empty and full, empty of 
mind, full of sensual. According to Baudrillard, 
The centrality of the commercial manipulation of images through advertising the 
media and the displays, performances and spectacles of the urbanized fabric of 
daily life therefore entails a constant reworking of desires through images. 
Hence the consumer society must not be regarded as only releasing a dominant 
materialism for it also confronts people with dream-images which speak to 
desires, and aestheticize and derealize reality.                 (qtd. in Featherstone 66)  
For film, appropriate amount and tempo of narrative and spectacles has been 
disrupted, and the distinction of form and content has dissolved and imploded into a 
bizarre juxtaposition of anything that gives no more than shock, pleasure, and 
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sensation. For the cultural-economic logic operating behind the (re)production and 
reception of films today, Fredric Jameson captures it quite well in his writing on 
postmodernism. Jameson, another eminent theorist of postmodern culture, sees 
postmodernism the cultural dominant, or the cultural logic of the third great stage of 
capitalism, late capitalism which originates in the post-WWII (2001). He describes 
postmodernism as the spatialization of culture under the pressure of capitalism. He 
teases out the characteristics of postmodernism in the phrase “postmodern depthless 
culture” and the notion that “ordered historical development should give way to the 
perception of the past as a conglomerate of images, fragments and spectacles which 
are endlessly reduplicated and simulated without the possibility of discovering an 
essential order or point of value judgment” (96). In the similar vein as Baudrillard, 
Jameson argues that “postmodernism is based upon the central role of reproduction in 
the ‘de-centered global network’ of present-day multinational capitalism which leads 
to a ‘prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm’ through the 
saturation of signs and messages… to the point at which everything in our social 
life … can be said to have become ‘cultural’” (qtd. in Featherstone 8). And for 
Baudrillard, the accumulation, density and seamless, all-encompassing extent of the 
(re)production of images in contemporary society has been forming a qualitatively 
new society in which the distinction between reality and image become effaced and 
everyday life becomes aestheticized – the world of simulation or postmodern culture 
(in Featherstone 68). 
As the audience is always a historical and cultural product, in this context, 
he/she is the product of the postmodern cultural-economic logic. How he/she reacts to 
a movie is under the influence of the “present age which prefers the sign to the thing 
signified, the copy to the original, representation to reality, the appearance to the 
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essence…” (Debord 11). The postmodern condition develops “an aesthetic of 
sensation, an aesthetics of the body which emphasizes the immediacy and 
unreflexiveness of primary processes (desire), what Lyotard refers to as the figural, as 
opposed to the discursive which has its basis in secondary processes (the ego)” (qtd. 
in Featherstone 122). “It is, therefore, legitimate to subvert narrative into a series of 
flows, to dwell on the sonority as opposed to the meaning of the spoken word, to 
focus on the body as art” (Featherstone 124). This aesthetics facilitates a vicious circle 
among the audience and the film industry. With the endless flow of fascinating 
images and simulations, the audiences keep demanding more and better images to 
feed their enlarged appetite, an appetite produced also by the film industry, or the 
larger cultural-economic logic. In order to satisfy such demand, the studios work 
desperately to come up with the more and the better to surpass the previous products 
and their peers. This, in turn, only serves to consolidate the already “spoiled” 
audiences’ obsession with pleasurable visuals to the effect that they rarely look into 
(the depth of, if there is any), but tend to look at (the surface of) the films. This 
aesthetics and this circle is exactly the cultural-economic logic operating behind 




Chapter 4 The Action Heroine Cinema Consumed 
    
The action heroine films discussed in this study are one type of contemporary 
mainstream Hollywood products that share the same production mechanism of the 
blockbuster. The films, the images, and the whole package of the entire industrial 
chain are subject to the cultural-economic logic of consumption and reproduction of 
technological images – the serialization and merchandising of a film into a media 
franchise composing of commodities in multiple forms and providing multiple 
pleasures, the intensive use of and obsession with spectacles made by sophisticated 
filmmaking technologies, and thus an overwhelming consumer culture in which 
audiences are engaged in the endless consumption of depthless signs and images—all 
of which keeps the images of action heroine commercially profitable and culturally 
prominent. It is also this cultural-economic logic that makes the consumption of 
action heroine films a complex and elaborate process that goes far beyond the binary 
debates between feminists and postfeminists. 
The specific films for this study are listed in Table 1 (see Appendices). They are 
mainly three series, Lara Croft: Tomb Raider (2001, 2003), Underworld (2003, 2006, 
2012), Resident Evil (2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012) and two single productions, 
Aeon Flux (2005) and Elektra (2005). In this chapter, I will argue that the action 
heroine films are consumed in four ways, namely, consumed as the composite 
107 
 
commodity, as the spectacles of technology, as the spectacles of female body, and as 
the idea of feminism.  
 
As the “Composite Commodity” 
Strictly speaking, not all these 21
st
-century action heroine films can be 
categorized as “blockbusters”, especially when it comes to the production budget and 
expected box office – the resplendent mark of the favorite for today’s Hollywood. 
Compared to those “genuine” blockbusters of concurrent age whose budgets are 
mostly over 100 million dollars, these action heroine movies, ranging from 
Underworld with a relatively low budget of 22 million to one rare high 115 million 
dollars (Lara Croft: Tomb Raider), cost much less to make. It is even more 
appropriate to label some of them as B movies considering the financial aspect only
16
. 
Accordingly, due to the limited investment, these action heroine films may not enjoy 
the same level of publicity and marketing as those mega productions. 
Despite their lower production expenditure, however, all of these movies 
manage to make solid profit, gaining worldwide gross that far exceed the cost (except 
for only one movie, Aeon Flux). And some of them did enjoy a high media exposure 
in its marketing stage. For instance, when the fourth one of Resident Evil franchise 
                                                          
16 B movie generally refers to low-budget commercial picture. But in its current usage, this term has 
somewhat contradictory connotations: it may signal an opinion that a certain movie is (a) a genre film 
with minimal artistic ambitions or (b) a lively, energetic film uninhibited by the constraints imposed on 
more expensive projects and unburdened by the conventions of putatively “serious” independent film. 
The term is also now used loosely to refer to some higher budgeted, mainstream films with exploitation 




came out in September, 2010, its trailers and posters were equally visible in various 
promotion channels; its total gross ranked the second compared to the movies which 
opened in the same month, surmounting The Legend of Guardians: The Owls of 
Ga’Hoole, an action-adventure animation but with a higher budget. Besides the 
enormous cost and expected financial return, there is another aspect which a 
blockbuster refers to – the array of special attractions and dazzling effects put on 
screen to bring in audiences in droves, be it sets, stars, costumes, or technical effects. 
Although these action heroine movies cannot compete with those market-
commanding mega productions in terms of the money invested and earned, they do 
have a lot in common with the blockbuster with regard to the second aspect: casting 
of big stars, generic affiliation of action, adventure, sci-fi, fantasy, and horror, and 
extravagant use of special effects for the spectacular. For each action heroine film 
here, the actress who plays the central role is (or at least was) among the highest paid 
stars in show business, whose name and face are well established among either fans or 
simply movie-goers. Angelina Jolie, who plays Lara Croft in Tomb Raider, is a good 
case in point. She is a highly prolific actress that commands many of the Hollywood 
commercial screens, and most of her characters tend to be strong personalities, which 
might be police officer (in The Bone Collector, 1999), spy (in Salt, 2010), special 
agent (in Taking Lives, 2004), assassin (in Mr. & Mrs. Smith, 2005; Wanted, 2008), 
criminal (in Original Sin, 2001; The Tourist, 2010), or mother that fights for her child 
(in Changeling, 2008, which earned her a nomination for Academy Award for Best 
Actress). As an icon image for action heroine as Lara Croft, she has been cited as the 
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world’s most beautiful and sexiest woman, a title that brings her substantial media 
attention. In the promotion of Tomb Raider movies, considerable media exposure has 
been focusing on Jolie’s fitness and preparation for her role through the action 
makeover, such as a special diet, meditation, yoga, training of weapons, gymnastics 
fights, motorbike riding and husky racing, which are mentioned in the DVD behind-
the-scenes documentary. “Special emphasis is laid on Jolie’s lack of fear, on her 
mission as ‘an actor training to be an Olympic athlete’ and on her apparent 
identification with the character she plays” (O’Day 207). 
In a similar manner, Milla Jovovich, appears in a number of science fiction and 
action-themed films, such as The Fifth Element (1997), The Messenger: The Story of 
Joan Arc (1999), and the Resident Evil series, for which she has been referred to by 
music channel VH1
17
 as the “reigning queen of kick-butt.” Charlize Theron (who 
plays Aeon Flux), a winner for the Academy Award for Best Actress in 2003, also 
stars plenty of successful commercial films, and the Oscar win pushed her to The 
Hollywood Reporter’s 2006 list of highest-paid actresses in Hollywood, ranking the 
seventh only behind Halle Berry, Cameron Diaz, Drew Barrymore, Renee Zellweger, 
Reese Witherspoon and Nicole Kidman
18
. Together with the florid special effects, 
breathtaking stunts, and lifelike make-up, these star images act as an invaluable asset 
                                                          
17 VH1 is an American cable television network based in New York City. The original purpose of the 
channel was to play popular music. Its more recent claim to fame has been in the area of music-related 
reality programing and the channel’s overall focus is on popular culture 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VH1).  
18 Accidentally or not, all these six highest paid actresses have played female characters that are active, 
strong and unconventional. For instance, Halle Berry in X-men, Catwoman, Cameron Diaz and Drew 
Barrymore in Charlie’s Angels, Renee Zellweger in Cold Mountain, New in Town, Reese Witherspoon 
in Legally Blonde, and Walk the Line, and Nicole Kidman in Cold Mountain, The Hours. 
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that is supposed to play a magic with the number as if the cost went ten-fold simply 
because the movie possesses a well-known face with a charming look, whose 
irresistible appeal works so well to build up audience expectation and to guarantee the 
box office just as a blockbuster does. 
As the reproduction of images is a contemporary routine for blockbusters, this 
logic prevails in action heroine cinema as well. Like other commercial films, these 
movies are enmeshed in a complex network created by mega corporations to reach a 
global market as large and pervasive as possible. In so many ways, these movies are 
typical “composite commodities” that keep pushing the limit of what a title and an 
icon image can do. Among the movies studied here, most are adaptations from other 
popular media, or some are later followed up to be adapted to other media. 
The most illustrative example would be the Tomb Raider and Resident Evil 
movies, which are based on the prototypes of the hugely popular namesake video 
games. The original Tomb Raider is an action-adventure video game first released in 
1996, followed by incessant series of updates until today. The game was then 
developed into a lucrative franchise consisting of video games, comic books, novels, 
theme park rides and movies, centering around the adventures of the fictional English 
archaeologist Lara Croft, who went on to become a major icon of the virtual gaming 
industry and registered by the Guinness Book of World Records as the “Most 
Successful Human Virtual Game Heroine” in 200619. The name as well as the visual 
                                                          
19 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lara_Croft:_Tomb_Raider 
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image of Lara Croft cannot be more familiar to those game players of Tomb Raider 
who may have manipulated the avatar of Lara Croft for countless hours in search for 
ancient treasure. Meanwhile, Tomb Raider was also licensed to comic book publisher, 
and some of its scores are in market as promotional items in limited edition that later 
became rare collector’s items. In June, 2001, the first Tomb Raider film Lara Croft: 
Tomb Raider came out featuring Lara Croft racing against time and villains to recover 
a powerful artifact called the Triangle of Light. And this movie is the second most 
successful video game adaptation to date (after Prince of Persia (2010)) (Wikipedia 
footnote18). Together with its sequel, Lara Croft Tomb Raider: Cradle of Life (2003), 
the film was included in the six Paramount Parks. The whole process of reproducing 
the images from the game into more games, into movies and more movies, into print, 
and into theme park ride, successfully repeats what it takes to make a Hollywood 
product into a composite commodity offering multiple experiences, multiple pleasures, 
and multiple opportunities for consumption. So does Resident Evil. As a media 
franchise originally created as a survival horror game series, Resident Evil was 
initiated with the eponymous PlayStation title in 1996, which later branched out to 
include action games and was re-released on several other platforms. It has been 
expanded to comic books, novels and novelizations, sound dramas, live-action and 
computer-generated feature films, and a variety of collectibles, such as actions figures 
and strategy guides. 
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The movie Elektra is an adaptation from a comic series published by Marvel 
Comics
20
, the birth land of so many American superhero stories and images. The 
character Elektra also appears in some other comics of Marvel’s, including Daredevil 
and X-Men’s Wolverine. Meanwhile, she is playable character in many video games 
of Marvel’s, and also in the toy line of Marvel Legends. Underworld is an original 
film series with one pre-sequels and two sequels depicting the conflict between 
vampire and werewolf. There have been various spin-offs and tie-ins in a range of 
other media. IDW Publishing has published a number of Underworld comics, and in 
addition to the novelizations of first two Underworld, and an original novel titled 
Underworld: Blood Enemy, there is also contract for the production of Underworld: 
Bloodline
21
. Aeon Flux made its first appearance as an avant-garde science fiction 
animated television series that aired on MTV
22
 in various forms throughout the 1990s, 
with film, comic book, and video game adaptations following thereafter. The live 
action motion picture Aeon Flux loosely based on the series and featuring Charlize 
Theron was released in 2005, preceded in the same year by a tie-in video game based 
mostly on the movie but containing some elements of the original TV series
23
. 
                                                          
20 Marvel Comics is an American company that publishes comic books and related media. Marvel 
counts among its characters such well-known properties as Spider-Man, the X-men, Wolverine, the 
Hulk, Avengers, Fantastic Four, Thor and Captain America. Marvel characters and stories have been 
adapted to many other media, including films, which dominate the blockbuster titles in recent years, 
television programs, video games, prose novels, and theme parks 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marvel_Comics).  
21 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underworld_(film_series) 
22  An American cable television, originally for playing music videos, but now primarily for 
broadcasting a variety of popular culture and reality television shows targeted at adolescents and young 
adults, while still playing a limited selection of music videos (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MTV). 
23 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeon_Flux 
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More often than not, these cinematic versions of the media content only account 
for one of the many products in the long streamlines of consumer commodities. The 
inter-adaptation between games, comic books, films, television series, and novels 
becomes a golden pattern that ensures the most thorough use of a media title. And it 
goes on and on to branch out each version by serializing, by merchandising or any 
way possible. For these action heroine movies, there are three series that composed of 
at least two installments (two for Tomb Raider, five for Resident Evil, and four for 
Underworld), with the expectation that one more will be coming soon for each 
franchise. Also for these movies, there are comprehensive lines of merchandise, 
which include DVDs, Blue-Rays, soundtracks, novelizations, books, action figures, 
photos, posters, wallpapers, props (original and copies), clothes, and so on. 
For a large part, the cinematic rendering of each action heroine is not 
particularly aimed at telling a unique story about a female character, nor intended to 
distinguish the filmic version from other version in the same streamline, or from other 
films. On the contrary, it is for generating a commodity that draws on exactly its 
similarity with other media and other films while appearing to be different in the 
sense of experiential pleasure achieved by technological wonder. These films, or any 
other related media product, cling to the fame and expectation from the already 
established titles to re-attract the familiar customers while inviting new ones that 
might not be game players but movie lovers or any other type of consumers, and put 
up on the market what is considered as the “signifier of difference.” By “signifier of 
difference,” I do not mean there is a unified “signified” behind that all different kinds 
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of representational products can refer back to as a benchmark for a specific and fixed 
meaning. This is because, according to Baudrillard, the dialectic of signifier and 
signified has ended. In Saussure’s theory of the sign, the signifier or word is 
distinguished from both the signified or mental image and the referent. The structural 
relation between signifier and signified thus shows how one value of the sign is 
constituted (Poster 3). Baudrillard calls this relation a “symbolic” structure to 
communication maintained by preindustrial societies: signs included words that were 
attached to referents and were uttered in a context that are open to possible reversal by 
others (Poster 4). Such is the signifier/signified dialectic that facilitates the 
accumulation of knowledge and of meaning, the linear syntagma of cumulative 
discourse (Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard”). However, as the era of sign emerges in the 
late twentieth century, argued by Baudrillard, when signs and codes proliferate and 
“produce other signs and new sign machines in ever-expanding and spiraling cycles” 
– a process termed by Baudrillard as semiurgy – signs become completely separated 
from their referents, “resulting in a structure that resembles the signal: signifiers act 
like traffic lights, emitting meanings to which there is no linguistic response” (Poster 
4). Baudrillard terms such composite organization of signifiers the “code”, which 
functions by pulling out the signified from the social and re-configurating them in the 
media as “floating signifiers.” Television advertisements as a particular example, says 
Poster, constitute a new language form where the code transmits signifiers to the 
population who are subject to this “terroristic” mode of signification (4). With no 
distinction between signifiers and what they signify, objects signify but each other in 
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a closed circle, in which signification is mutual – all “objects have the same solidity, 
or suffer the same dearth of solidity, and they are all engaged in the same never-
ending cadrille of disappearances and reappearances” (Bauman 35).  
Therefore, the consumer objects replicated in exponential speed, be it on cinema 
screen, on computer screen, or on comic books, are best understood as a network of 
floating signifiers that are inexhaustible in their ability to incite desire. And the desire 
acts on behalf of the “difference” to be put on the market. The object thus obtains “its 
coherence, and consequently its meaning, from an abstract and systematic relation to 
all other object-signs. It is in this way that it becomes ‘personalized,’ and enters in the 
series, etc.: it is never consumed in its materiality, but in its difference” (Baudrillard, 
System of Objects 22). All the images, in cinema, in game, in comic, in spin-off store, 
or in cyber-database, are different in the sense of being carried in different media, in 
varied formats that are installing the “personalized” desires, but they are 
undifferentiated because they are all commodities based on reproduction technology 
with no origin or true meaning. In Baudrillardian terms, sign value runs rampant 
while use value has died out. Images scatter everywhere in a floating manner with no 
essential anchoring point for stable meaning, acting as the alibi for the use value 
which has long been replaced by sign value. Each sign simply refers to each other for 
its temporary meaning, being its own referent, if there is any. 
This floating signifiers’ self-referentiality recalls the process of what is termed 
as intertextuality, which is not a new phenomenon, but now becomes closely 
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associated with postmodernism. The term “intertextuality” was coined 
by poststructuralist Julia Kristeva in 1966 to explain literature text. It generally means 
that an author’s borrowing and transformation of a prior text or to a reader’s 
referencing of one text in reading another. While “the classical sign is a sealed unit,” 
as Roland Barthes explains in “Theory of the Text,” “whose closure arrests meaning, 
prevents it from trembling or becoming double, or wandering, the same goes for the 
classical text: it closes the work, chains it to its letter, rivets it to its signified” (33).  
But, such closure, he also claims, must apply to traditional exegesis (such as historical, 
or biographical), because for Barthes, any text cannot be disassociated from the active 
work of reading, and the very concept of intertextuality means that no text is an 
untouched, unified whole. The text is never a sealed entity, but “a galaxy of signifiers, 
a network of interrelated codes, an open, dynamic playground where the endless 
process of signification takes place” (Cancalon, and Spacagna 1). For Kristeva, 
meaning is not transferred directly from writer to reader but instead is mediated 
through, or filtered by, “codes” imparted to the writer and reader by other texts (69). 
So signifiers refer always and only to other signifiers. Words gain their meaning not 
by referring to some concrete object in an outside reality or present to the mind of the 
language user but from the endless play of signification. As Sim says, “Language can 
be transformed, translated, transferred, but never transcended… [and] postmodernism 
embraces an extreme notion of intertextuality, in which the play of meaning is infinite, 
in which anything goes” (285). And postmodernism’s close relationship with 
intertextuality is especially in use as postmodern media-scape takes heterogeneous 
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forms, in which the signifiers thus run wilder and wider. Just as John Frow points out 
in his essay “Intertextuality and Ontology”, 
[The concept of intertextuality] was not restricted to particular textual 
manifestations of signifying systems but was used, rather, to designate the way 
in which a culture is structured as a complex network of codes with 
heterogeneous and dispersed forms of textual realization. It formulated the 
codedness or textuality of what had previously been thought in non-semiotic 
terms (consciousness, experience, wisdom, story, gender, culture, and so on). 
                                                                                                                          (47)   
 This shows, rather than the simple observation that all texts contain traces of 
other texts, a much more complex conception of the interactions between texts, text 
creators and their readers’ living contexts. And this kind of conceptual framework is 
conducive to examining postmodernity in that “it enables us to think of media 
discourse as being qualitatively continuous with the experience of everyday life” 
(Meinhof, and Smith 3). And as contemporary life is preoccupied by the ever more 
sophisticated media technologies, media texts, which are in many cases essentially 
multimodal, illustrate particularly well the disparate and heterogeneous processes – an 
intertextual universe in which signs, texts, culture and everyday life refers to each 
other in a circular manner. That is to say, that many media texts exist in, and make use 
of, what we shall call several different semiotic modes at the same time, among which, 
spoken and written text, visual images and music are the most familiar ones. This 
multimodality is clearly a very different thing from remodeling a source text A in a 
subsequent text B (Meinhof, and Smith 10). 
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Therefore, a film like Tomb Raider or Resident Evil is, on one level, a cinematic 
text that plays intertextual reference with numerous other action-adventure films, 
while generic intertextuality is only one type among kinds played between filmic texts 
(other kinds may include that by director, casting, script, visual elements or 
soundtrack). On the other level, it is at once an audio-visual product in intertextual 
relationship with so many other commodities replicated, adapted, remediated and 
merchandized from or into it, which, while penetrating people’s everyday life through 
endless cultural signs, penetrate this play of intertextuality into their life too. And this 
play is a gorgeous one that flashes the spectator with the seductive surface, the 
resplendent stimulus, which is exactly what the product as film relies on to make the 
difference. Thereby, the makeover of Tomb Raider game into the two movies starring 
Angelina Jolie in 2001 and 2003 respectively is not particularly made for telling a 
story of adventure about a female archaeologist who hunts for magical treasure before 
evil hands abuse it, though this central line of narrative validates such media 
rendering as “film.”  It is more for another set of visual presentation of a basic and 
familiar narrative with the star image of Jolie as the major asset. Postmodern 
intertextuality makes the watching of Tomb Raider (or any other mainstream genre 
film) an always familiar activity of endless play that transcends time, text, and media. 
For one thing, contemporary technologies of mass (re)production and multi-
channeled distribution offers modern spectators easy availability of a host of filmic 
images competing for a brief moment of attention. Under such circumstances, the 
model of spectatorship has shifted into a hyper state in which the “hyper-spectator” 
has the “memory (or hyper-memory) of the whole history of cinema” (Cohen 157).  
New media technologies create a virtual and universal digital-cinematheque, 
comprising an immense museum of cinema prepared for our visits. Digital cable 
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systems provide their subscribers with hundreds of choices of films each week and 
ready access to any film in their immense film libraries. Band width offers a 
digitalized hyper-space, where all films are stored and ready to roll, running side by 
side all the time on their separate or interactive screens. “The hyper-spectator’s 
random access memory (RAM) scans any and every detail of filmic dialogues, iconic 
configurations, conventions and narratives, and relates them to the universal history of 
cinema” (Cohen 159). In this tremendous archive and labyrinth of compressed hyper-
space there are places for all genres, ages, categories, nations, and eccentricities. Just 
as easily as we now surf on the Internet cross-referentially among the never-ending 
hypertexts, the hyper-spectator “surf” “hyper-films” moving from film to film, from 
genre to genre, or from one director to another (Cohen 161). Such hyper-ness of 
contemporary spectators builds up for them an intricate knowingness that provides 
ample room for postmodern intertextuality. For another, as spectators used to “view 
films in a building dedicated to the showing of films as a commercial enterprise” 
(Cohen 159), contemporary Hollywood has already expanded its sprawl outside the 
cinema wall to include consumer goods, media products, or even mega-malls and 
mega-hotels playing on movie references. Concurrently, the play of intertextuality 
goes beyond the film text, and expanded to omnifarious forms of representations in 
video game, in action figure, in rollercoaster ride, or in the themed restaurant wall. 
While film industry is a gigantic storehouse of images, in most cases of contemporary 
industrial practices, the film is only made to be one spin-off to a certain media 
franchise, or made to be the prototype for following spin-offs. An even more gigantic 
pool of signs is out there to revolutionize people’s engagement with films. 
Hence, when watching Tomb Raider movies, viewers may undergo a series of 
déjà vu, ranging from generic reference to cross-referential association by director or 
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actress. As spectators accompany Lara Croft through her adventure, they may jump 
back to the more ancient setting of treasure-hunting where Indiana Jones (in Raiders 
of the Lost Ark and later Indiana Jones series) maneuvers through numerous obstacles 
and enigmas, to the scenes of hazardous Amazon jungles in The Rundown (2003) (as 
Lara drives through Cambodian jungle), to Mission Impossible when Lara shows the 
same nerve and skills in diving from incredible height, or even to the chasing and 
gun-shooting scenario in the action classic Die Hard. In other words, watching the 
movie Tomb Raider is a pieced-together process of a female Indiana Jones that will 
always Die Hard even on The Rundown journey to accomplish a Mission Impossible. 
When watching Resident Evil movies, viewers may be reminiscent of the zombie 
apocalypse classic, Night of the Living Dead by George Romero (1968), or Alien 
series which also feature gruesome creatures and advanced weaponry technology. 
When watching Underworld saga, viewers may travel back to an older series of 
vampire action, Blade, or simply to the beautifully grim mystery around Dracula. 
When watching Aeon Flux, viewers may be impressed by the black leather tight Aeon 
Flux is wearing which highly resembles the outfit of Catwoman. Such intertextual 
experience is carried to such an extent that to watch these action heroine movies is 
like to pick up any of the already available images, scenarios, narratives from a huge 
galley and to run a pleasurable commutation. 
While the examples of intertextual travelling only within filmic sphere can 
already go on forever, this hyper experience could be further complicated if the 
viewer has certain knowledge in the female stars’ filmography or happens to be a fan 
of the game or comic. For Hollywood cinema at least, stardom provides a good 
starting-point for cross-referentiality. “The very concept of a film star is an 
intertextual one”, relying on “correspondences of similarity and difference from one 
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film to the text, and sometimes too on supposed resemblances between on-and off-
screen personae that is reported, written, featured not only in cinema but also in 
magazine column, tablet coverage, or television interviews” (Reader 176). That is to 
say, the intertextuality never stops at one type of texts, and is relentlessly diffused to 
hook up with signs residing in any other media. For instance, for Tomb Raider game 
players, the cross-media spectatorship is composed of even closer and more intense 
inter-referencing. When they are watching movies, the intertextual association goes 
beyond the cinematic mode of representation to the world of Tomb Raider game and 
game-related products. The main character is the same; her abilities remain superb; 
the narrative is still about treasure-hunting adventures; even the costume of Lara Croft 
remains unchanged as light-blue vest and dark shorts. But at the same time, the 
cinematic version offers a whole new set of experience and signifiers that is not for 
the story per se, but for another visual presentation of the story. Compared with what 
the players experience in the virtual world made of digital graphic in the game of 
Tomb Raider or Resident Evil, what is offered on the big screen in cinema is the 
real(istic)/photographic images (even though some are still made by digital technique, 
they are made to “fit into” the “real” world), the enlarged effects of shooting, 
bombing, or monster growling, and especially the human agency of flesh and blood 
that personifies the virtual characters. All of them tickles people’s fascination about 
how technological artifacts can refresh spectator experience with intensified level of 
visual pleasure, but never functions to differentiate the film or particularly that film 
from other films or from games, because the only thing that exists is the array of 
“signifiers of difference” that are actually identical copies through technological 
means; there is no uniqueness or originality, there is no referential point for 
differentiation, there is no “signified of difference.” 
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Such intertextual reference runs back and forth across the playground of screens 
of cinema, of televisions, of computers or increasingly of smart phones, each carrying 
a set of signifiers but without constant agenda of signification. When we are talking 
about movies, we could refer to games for some narrative or iconography (but not 
“the” narrative or iconography); when we are picturing the character in mind, we 
could download from so many websites the photos of Jolie in costume; and when we 
are looking at pictures of Jolie, we could click the hyperlink to pages gossiping about 
“BrAngelina” (a blending from the couple of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie) if the 
movie is seen after Mr. and Mr. Smith (2005, after which the “BrAngelina” came into 
being). During this running-back-and-forth across the different surfaces, the 
spectatorship is thus split into multiple fragments floating around the different 
surfaces – the screens, the media, the products – open to a number of engagements, 
but each of the engagements could only bring more uncertainty to the cinematic 
experience of viewing one specific movie, because each of them participates in that 
relay of “endless play of signs” and expels the possibility of a solid and singular 
signification. The movie as a composite commodity seems to synergize a wide range 
of texts, experience and pleasure under a name like “Tomb Raider,” but it is actually 
fragmenting what used to be a concrete text (but already an “intertext” that borrows at 
least genre conventions) into multi-model texts, sensual stimuli, or theme-park 
simulacra. Hence, being an exhibition of extensive droves of codes, signs and 
spectacles that always make intertextual traverse, the movie, such a composite 
practice, is at once a process of fragmentation. 
Jameson insists that our awareness of the play of stylistic allusion “is now a 
constitutive and essential part” of our experience of the postmodern film (24). It is 
thus neither new nor old to see the movie of treasure hunting or the movie of zombie 
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killing by female protagonist that is simply a repetition of past genre films and a 
concurrent adaptation. There is not even any intention of parody as there is only 
superficial copies of sets, scenes, stunts and spectacles (as to why the female lead 
does not count as a change or difference, I will elaborate in following sections). “In a 
culture dominated by codes so pervasive that they appear natural, the intertextual, 
viewed as the presence of these codes and clichés within culture, can cause a sense of 
repetition, a saturation of cultural stereotypes” (Allen 168). Jameson, commenting on 
how postmodern theory tends to wipe out notions of what he styles “depth”, writes: 
“depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces (what is often called 
intertextuality is in that sense no longer a matter of depth)” (12). He also argues that, 
“pervious modes of identity and expression, based on a shared sense of the ruling 
norm, give way to a heterogeneous, rootless culture in which neither norm nor a 
resistance to that norm seems any longer possible” (qtd. in Allen 169). In a 
postmodern context, intertextual codes and practices predominate because of a loss of 
any access to reality. Under such circumstances, a parody of dominant norms is no 
longer possible and in its place there is what Jameson calls pastiche: 
In this situation, parody finds itself without a vocation; it has lived, and that 
strange new thing pastiche slowly comes to take its place. Pastiche is, like 
parody, the imitation of a peculiar mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a 
neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, 
amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that, 
alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy 
linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind 
eyes…the producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the 
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imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the 
imaginary museum of a now global culture.                                              (17-18)  
Such intertextual practice is no longer capable of radical double-voicedness. It 
collapses into a kind of pointless resurrection of past styles and past voices wheeling 
expeditiously around the surface with ever more florid and rapidly updated 
appearance to hide the fact there is nothing underneath the surface and the surface is 
all that contemporary culture has. If the intertextual allusion loses its satiric power or 
any ulterior motive, it only adds to the reproduction of signs and thus further 
exacerbates the process of fragmentation. When Booker, M. Keith talks about the 
inevitable fragmentation of postmodern Hollywood films, he focuses on the formal 
fragmentation of cinema, and attributes the film editing, cutting in particular, as the 
main cause. In the first place, even before the postmodernity enters the scene, 
Film, after all, is always already mechanically reproduced. There is no ‘original’ 
film of which the various prints distributed are mere copies: each film exists 
only as mechanically reproduced copies. Further, film is inherently fragmented 
in both its construction and its presentation to audiences; each film is shot as 
separate scenes and presented as a montage in which these scenes are joined by 
a sequence of cuts that, for Benjamin, disrupt the sense of wholeness that gives 
traditional art much of its religious flavor.                                                         (ii) 
When the issue of fragmentation takes into consideration the role of 
intertextuality and the “composite commodity” where technological reproduction 
surpasses the cinematic mode into a more thorough consumer culture, fragmentation 
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of films goes further. This anticipates Jameson’s later characterization of 
postmodernism that fragmentation is a reflection of the character of life in the late 
capitalist world. According to Jameson, the formal fragmentation of postmodern texts 
is closely related to the increasing psychic fragmentation of individual subjects (25). 
“Meanwhile, this psychic fragmentation itself implies that the mind of the individual 
artist is no longer stable enough to be the source of a unique personal style, resulting 
in the necessity of borrowing styles from others via pastiche” (Booker xviii). This 
tendency is further sped up by the rapid change of the postmodern era, in which 
individuals virtually cannot maintain any genuine sense of historical continuity. It 
then relates to a second stylistic feature Jameson identifies besides the pastiche – what 
he calls schizophrenia. He uses Lacan’s definition of schizophrenia – a form of 
psychosis – as a metaphor to describe the fragmentation of subjectivity. The 
schizophrenic, he claims, experiences time not as a past-present-future continuum, but 
as an “eternal present,” which may be occasionally and briefly visited by the past or 
the possibility of a future (in Storey 151). And Storey further explains, 
The “reward” for the loss of conventional selfhood (the sense of self as always 
located within a temporal continuum) is an intensified sense of the present…To 
call postmodern culture schizophrenic is to claim that it has lost its sense of 
history (and its sense of a future different from the present). It is a culture 
suffering from “historical amnesia”, locked into the discontinuous flow of 
perpetual presents. The temporal culture of modernism has given way to the 
spatial culture of postmodernism.                                                                   (151) 
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With the codes, images, and spectacles rotating so fast while cross-referencing to so 
many other memories, relevant or irrelevant, past, present or future, that the whole 
process of the contemporary hyper-spectatorship becomes a schizophrenic experience 
composed of vertiginous amount of fragments. 
One result of this loss of historical sense, according to Jameson, is a tendency 
for contemporary artists to see the past styles as a sort of aesthetic cafeteria from 
whose menu they can nostalgically pick and choose without considering the historical 
context in which those styles originally came into being (in Booker xviii). While this 
rhetoric stays on the “aesthetic cafeteria of past styles”, what I want to add and 
emphasize is that this is more than a “cafeteria” and more than the artist only. With 
each film developing into/belonging to a colossal franchise, the fragments do not only 
reside in the film text but spilt out to any related media products. Just like what a late 
capitalist economy would do, the “cafeteria” would be a chain business whose 
products could include anything from fast food to classy wine, or possibly even 
pesticide. The watching of Resident Evil, for instance, jumps back and forth between 
film and film, film and game, film and advertisement, which may composed of a 
whole bulk of fragments ranging from Milla Jovovich’s magazine shoot, Avon (the 
make-up brand Milla endorses in 2012), to the newest game walkthrough of Resident 
Evil 5. What is more, the “pick and choose” process is increasingly done by spectators 
based on their respective knowingness of contemporary cultural and media landscape, 
whose subjectivity has undergone a breaking up not only in terms of historical 
continuity but also in terms of space coherence – the fragments have been to more 
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than one form of media. This “random cannibalization of all the styles of the past” 
(Storey 148) and present, from one media and another, reduces the movie to a series 
of diversified spectacles, a collection of heterogeneous images disconnected from any 
genuine sense of referent reality or historical process, the consumption of which 
constitutes a typical schizophrenic experience – that of “isolated, disconnected, 
discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link into a coherent sequence” 
(Jameson 119) – while this breakdown is not only in temporality, but also in space, a 
further erasure of reality. 
It is also futile attempt to locate the reality of each franchise at its debut state, 
because on one hand, the technological reproduction goes so fast and ubiquitously 
that the copies, adaptations and spin-offs have already diffused on a large and 
intensive scale before the “original” could establish its meaning – it is hard to tell the 
meaningful from the prevalent. On the other hand, even the “first” appearance is 
already created for the purpose of being reproduced in the first place, which is an 
inevitable adaptive response to media landscape. The postmodern consumer culture 
has already prescribed the destiny of every single media product – reproduction 
precedes appearance. In the ensuing discussion of this section, I will take Tomb 
Raider as a case study to expound how reality is lost even in Lara’s first appearance. 
Despite the claim that Angelina Jolie be the most “iconic” human embodiment 
of Lara Croft, which in turn has boosted up Jolie’s fame in her acting career, Lara 
Croft is perhaps more famous as the “digital heroine” – the protagonist in the video 
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game solving puzzles, fighting enemies and locating the treasure – than the one that 
played by Angelina Jolie in two concrete stories on cinema screen. The character of 
Lara Croft was initiated by England’s Core Design in 1996 “as the visual and 
interactive centerpiece of the video game Tomb Raider: an avatar controlled by the 
player in order to explore exotic environments and raid deathtrap-laden tombs for 
treasure and mystical artifacts” (Rehak 159). As described by Flanagan, 
Lara Croft might be compared to a person, but she is much more onscreen. Lara 
wields amazing physical prowess and multiple firearms. She is capable of any 
physical activity demanded by the game’s incredible situations: back-flipping 
out of buildings, swimming underwater, punching tigers, round-housing monks, 
and even biting foe…while barely clad in scanty, skin-tight “explorer” clothing. 
In addition to her superhuman traits, Lara is precise, rides in great vehicles, and 
unless there is user error, never needs a second take.                                       (78) 
Although the 1996 game avatar is the first appearance of Lara Croft, this does 
not mean this is the reality about its image. The larger environment of new media and 
her digital nature as a software-generated character without human referent unleashes 
the game to a sphere that is more than an interactive, goal-oriented electronic 
experience designed to entertain and immerse players (Rehak 159) – but a sphere of 
multiple instances of consumption and experience, which then determines her 
hyperreal existence and inevitable upcoming simulations and simulacra. This 
“playable, copyable, endlessly reframable digital star who serves her collective 
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makers and users in myriad ways”, offers similarly varied avenues for signification 
over and above the context of a single image, body, identity, experience or product 
(Rehak 160). 
Such translatability of Croft also manifests a revolution in media production and 
distribution that is based on digitality. According to Rehak, “the impact of digital 
recording, manipulation and transmission of data has made it possible for a character 
born of computer – conceived in 3D software, rendered and animated on high-speed 
graphics displays – to be copied and permutated into whatever form a given medium 
demands” (163). Croft thus could be present across various media forms, functioning 
as, simultaneously, action heroine, Internet avatar, pin-up, entry of fan albums, spoke-
model and public service announcement. As a text readable by all kinds of audience, 
Croft manifests in as many forms as there are for people to view. “She can appear 
bikini-clad in The Face magazine while giving ‘interviews’ to PC Gamer’s website, 
‘posing’ for a calendar ‘shoot’ and, of course, exploring crypts and castles on the 
screens of any player who has purchased or pirated her computer games” (Rehak 163). 
It is within this porous network of sign reproduction and circulation that the symbol of 
Lara Croft loses its meaning and reality, and becomes an uncertain and fluctuant 
object, which, however, is exactly why it plays so well in the postmodern consumer 
culture. 
Lara Croft, as a female character, was originally conceived to provide an 
alternative to traditional gender alignment in videogames, but she then began to carry 
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public significance beyond Tomb Raider’s jungles and crypts. Like Sonic the 
Hedgehog and Mario the plumber, she “became a brand in her own right, a means of 
personalizing technology while instilling consumer loyalty to the Sony corporation” 
(Rehak 162). This “brand in her own right” resembles a collage of different signifiers 
and signifiers of difference – a “GARAP” that Baudrillard exemplifies in the opening 
paragraph of The System of Objects, 
Let us imagine for the moment modern cities stripped of all their signs, with 
walls bare like a guiltless conscience. And then GARAP appears. This single 
expression, GARAP, is inscribed on all the walls: pure signifier, without 
signified, signifying itself. It is read, discussed, and interpreted to no end. 
Signified despite itself, it is consumed as a sign. Then what does it signify, if not 
a society capable of generating such a sign? And yet despite its lack of 
significance it has mobilized a complete imaginary collectivity; it has become 
characteristic of the (w)hole of society. To some extent, people have come to 
“believe” in GARAP…it would suffice to associate the sign GARAP with 
product for it to impose itself immediately.                                                       (10)  
“All the walls” here could be the analogy to the products and all the forms of 
media in which the composite commodity of Lara Croft is carried. In addition to the 
media appearances in computer games, comic books, action figures and motion 
pictures, Croft has been featured in calendars, men’s magazines, promotional tours, 
music videos, Nike ads, billboard and television campaigns for Tomb Raider, as well 
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as Lara’s Book – the “walls”. And such “walls”, in turn, ensured the popular 
awareness of the avatar – the “GARAP” – which quickly outstripped the treasure-
hunting and puzzle-solving scenarios where Croft was brooded in the first place. She 
seems highly capable of migration, “cloning herself from one media environment to 
another and maintaining simultaneous existences in each (she is a “media raider” as 
well)” (Rehak 162). What is more, compared with “real” person celebrity doing 
advertising, like Bob Dole
24
 for Pepsi, who ends up being frowned upon, audiences do 
not seem bothered by her participation in commercial domains advertising Pepsi. 
“Through the endless translation of information between diverse technological 
frameworks and cultural hierarchies in this postmodern media” (Rehak 162), Lara 
Croft has, writes O’Rourke, “always transcended her videogame origins, due to the 
strength of the character…in many ways she was a movie, TV show, comic or novel 
waiting to happen, it always seemed just like circumstance that you experienced her 
first adventures via a videogame” (2002). 
The reason for the ease of Croft’s translation could be about Croft’s “polysemous 
perversity”, her ability to endlessly re-signify. “In this sense, she merely extends the 
essential emptiness of the avatar, a semiotic vessel intended to be worn glove-like by 
players” (Rehak 162). It then ends up like what Baudrillard argues about GARAP, 
                                                          
24 Bob Dole is an American attorney and politician. He represented Kansas in the United States Senate 
from 1969 to 1996, was Gerald Ford’s Vice Presidential running mate in the 1976 presidential election, 
and was Senate Majority Leader from 1985 to 1987 and in 1995 and 1996. Dole was also the 
Republican Party presidential nominee in the 1996 presidential election. In his retirement, he worked 
part-time for a Washington, D. C. law firm, and engaged in a career of writing, consulting, public 
speaking, and television appearance, which include television commercial spokesman for such products 
as Viagra, Visa, and Pepsi-Cola (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Dole). 
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Yet, this basic lexicon, which covers walls and haunts consciences, is strictly 
asyntactic: diverse brands follow one another, are juxtaposed and substituted for 
one another without an articulation or transition. It is an erratic lexicon where one 
brand devours the other, each living for its own endless repetition. This is 
undoubtedly the most impoverished of languages: full of signification and empty 
of meaning. It is a language of signals. And the “loyalty” to a brand name is 
nothing more than the conditioned reflex of a controlled affect.                       (21) 
That is to say, her multiplicity and instability is exactly the source of her popularity 
and ease of commercialization. Since “in order to become object of consumption, the 
object must become sign” (20), the very emptiness allows for producing the signifiers 
of difference to incite personalized desires for consumption: playing the games, 
reading the comics, collecting the action figures, watching the films (possibly not only 
in cinema, but in DVD or on computer), buying the magazine, the calendar, the Nike 
shoes, the Pepsi, and so on. The various signs of Lara Croft are “Only signs without 
referents, empty, senseless, absurd and elliptical signs, absorb us…” but “the mind is 
irresistibly attracted to a place devoid of meaning.” It is “non-sense that seduces”; 
seduction employs “signs without credibility and gestures without referents” 
(Baudrillard, Seduction 74–5). 
Even the appearance of Lara Croft is similarly an unstable one. The graphic 
design of first generation Croft is relatively low in resolution, mainly composed of 
polygons, which might not be considered as a desirable image for its lack of perfect 
concrete embodiment. However, she is an open text as such. As argues by Steven 
Poole, Croft’s appeal stems precisely from this lack of individuating detail: 
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She’ll never be thoroughly realistic. For Lara Croft is an abstraction, an 
animated conglomeration of sexual and attitudinal signs (breasts, hotpants, 
shades, thigh holsters) whose very blankness encourages the (male or female) 
player’s psychological projection and is exactly why she has enjoyed such 
remarkable success as a cultural icon. A good videogame character like Lara 
Croft or Mario is, in these ways, inexhaustible.                                             (153)  
Such abstract entity allows for multiple representation and embodiment, hence 
opening up the market to various appropriations and adaptations. Croft’s “success as a 
cultural icon” that crosses over so easily results from the fundamentally convergent 
nature of new media
25
. With the digital technologies as the shared weapon to 
reproduce and circulate endless images, new media works so seamlessly with the 
postmodern consumer culture to create multilayered commodities catering and 
appealing to ever increasing proportion of demography. Lara Croft’s translatability 
illuminates the hidden (or rather quite conspicuous) connections binding media 
together, which in turn, enable her easy crossover. Sufficient common ground exists 
between the spheres of gaming, film-making, advertising, and publishing that Croft’s 
“transit across their public faces serves as a kind of industrial signposting for 
consumers, a means of orientation within apparently competing forms of textuality 
and commerce” (Rehak 168). Her ability to transcend different media with multiplied 
appearance is a phenomenon that enjoys the trendy label “synergy.” However, this 
                                                          
25 New media can provisionally be described as “a global network of communication technologies and 
information flow whose material backbone is the digital computer and whose aesthetics and formal 
properties are heavily shaped by digital processes” (Rehak 161). 
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“synergetic” nature of Lara Croft does not mean she becomes a consolidated or 
concrete entity where the “real” meaning of each image can be retrieved. This 
“synergy” is simply a loose and anarchistic assembly or bricolage of whatever 
fragment possible for market, of which the only organizing logic is a capitalized 
pleasure. 
As a star image that frequents all kinds of commercial platforms, the visual 
presentation of Lara Croft has been kept a flickering one. From the visual history of 
Lara Croft
26
, it can be seen that she takes different forms on different gaming 
equipment, and has undergone gradual transformation from the very first creation to 
later updates in terms of the resolution and texture. For example, the Tomb Raider 
game, “Angel of Darkness” released in the summer of 2003, features a Croft rendered 
with 5,000 polygons as compared with the first game’s 500 (Rehak 170), and later this 
year, a rebooted Tomb Raider will introduce the most realistic portrayal of Lara Croft, 
who looks like a real human with blood and flesh. At the same time, in the absence of 
a human referent, dozens of women participate in “casting” the avatar of Lara Croft, 
imitating her clothing and hairstyle to “flesh out” a fictive persona. This is a part of 
Tomb Raider marketing involving both fans and producers. Fan websites of Tomb 
Raider feature photographs of women on a regular basis. These women could be both 
unknown amateurs and professional models (such as Rhona Mitra, Lara Weller and 
Nell McAndrew), who are dressed in Croft’s trademark outfits and wielding her props. 
As Polsky observes, “she was never just one woman, but rather three very similar 
                                                          




looking catalog models decked out in safari outfits” (31). One such officially 
authorized “cosplayer”, Rhona Mitra, was quite successful as the avatar’s lip-
synching double in concert performances for an Eidos-funded CD of tie-in music. But 
as her popularity grew, Mitra began to overplay her role (Rehak 165). After Mitra 
claimed in an interview that “I know that I’m her,” she got fired by the software 
company because of this heresy, although she was “arguably the most popular human 
Lara yet” (Polsky 32). This excommunication signaled a strong tendency of the 
company’s strategies – Croft was maintained as an open-ended construct: 
Eidos announced that from that point forward, they would hire human Lara 
models only on an ad hoc basis and made it a point to introduce two new human 
models at the same time as a gesture of their commitment to preserving Lara’s 
multiplicity. Ironically, Eidos’s decision to push multiplicity was a response to 
the pressure brought on by Mitra’s appropriation, her becoming Lara. The post-
Mitra human models, however, always referred to Lara in the third person. 
                                                                                                              (Polsky 33) 
And according to Polsky, even in the game developers’ machinations to hire 
Angelina Jolie to cast in the 2001 and 2003 movie adaptations, multiplicity and 
instability is still the decisive criteria,  
The openly bisexual, but undeniably human, Jolie appears to possess the 
uncanny ability to sustain the complex alliance of identification and desire that 
digital Lara wields over her fans…I believe that to a great extent Jolie’s success 
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in the role of Lara can be attributes to her own public image of instability 
(perhaps it is this very quality that allows Jolie to so seamlessly “become” her 
characters).                                                                                                       (35)  
It is Lara’s quilting, multiple affordances and fragmentation all over 
contemporary media that contribute to the game’s, and more importantly, the 
franchise’s very success. As says Rehak, it is Croft’s very rootlessness or lack of 
physical referent that enables such multi-vocality (167). This is in resonance with 
what Polsky argues, “the failure to anchor Lara in one body, one character, or one 
narrative facilitates opportunities for players to participate in her continuing evolution” 
(35). At the heart of Croft’s stardom, summed up by Rehak, is the apparent 
contradiction between Croft’s “emptiness” and “fullness”, “which stems from a kind 
of public overload – an avalanche of imagery and meaning – in the face of which 
audiences have no choice but to begin writing, indexing, cataloguing” (167). Lara 
Croft thus can be understood as a kind of industrially produced intertext, a dense 
weave of prefabricated linkages that serves exactly as a preface to composite 
commodity. 
The success of the action heroine figure as a plural and instable, abstract entity 
is surely not limited to the case of Lara Croft. All the action heroines in concern are 
undergoing the same process of reproduction, translation and fragmentation, just in 
different degree catering to different consumer base. It is in this very process that the 
figure of action heroine is totally transformed into multiple commodity objects, free-
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floating signifiers that do not anchor to any stable reality about these images. It is this 
very process that finally leads to the death of the action heroine as a meaningful 
representation (and this will be further elaborated in the third section of this chapter). 
 
As the Spectacles of Technology 
As composite commodities, the big titles that each feature a female action hero 
synergize all kinds of pleasures while allocating difference to each product in the 
streamlining of it. Such industrial practice, together with the hyper-spectatorship 
nurtured by contemporary media-scape, has rendered the watching of action heroine 
films a typical undergoing of postmodern aesthetics and sensibility – a fragmented 
experience consisting of transient signifiers that always only point to other signifiers – 
and further contributed to the instability and thus meaninglessness of each image. But 
this is only an extensive embodiment of postmodernity in contemporary media and 
culture, which tells how images penetrate people’s everyday life. As constantly as 
people may be seeing various signs at the bus station, at the shopping mall, or in front 
of their personal computer, the intensity of spectacles is far less than how images are 
presented in the duration of a blockbuster movie that keeps bombarding audience with 
actions, bombings, crashes, and all other fascinating images. If the reproduction 
technology makes the images proliferate on a large scale and mingle with people’s 
daily routine through all kinds of commodities and commercials, the cinematic mode 
of it converges and compresses all the images into a two-hour-long screening of 
enlarged projection, and then consolidates them with the spectacularity of omnipotent 
138 
 
digital special effects. Therefore, to make it intensive, Hollywood does a very good 
job by making each image a spectacular one, which, then, tells how images seduce. 
Each of the action heroine film is representative of the postmodern film with its 
extravagant richness, its unending barrage of spectacular images, and its unabashed 
sense of itself as spectacle. Be it Tomb Raider or Underworld, Resident Evil, or Aeon 
Flux, the intensive aggregation of spectacles makes the film itself an extraordinarily 
enticing commodity to consume. 
I will analyze the spectacles in action heroine in two categories. One is the 
spectacles of technology for this section, and the second type for next section, which 
is emphatically unique to action heroine, is the spectacles of the female heroes’ bodies 
that are highlighted by the generic fact that it is a woman who occupies most of the 
screen time. For spectacles of technology, there are also two facets. One refers to 
those spectacles made by technologies, or more specifically, the generic spectacles 
that utilize special effects and any other filmmaking technologies (for instance, make-
up, cinematography, stunt, and most notably, the computer generated images, or the 
digital technology), to visualize the impossible in science-fiction, fantasy or horror 
based scenario, or to enhance the stunning effect and to add varieties for action and 
adventure. The spectacle of this facet is a regular feature in contemporary 
blockbusters. Due to its intention to bring shock effect and spectacular content by 
means of highly professional post-production technologies behind the scene, I will 
term this kind of spectacle in the following discussion as “the spectacular.” The 
second type of spectacles relates to technology not specifically through the 
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background supporting role of technology, but on the contrary, by putting the theme 
of technology right in front of the audience. In other words, this kind of spectacles 
depict what and how technologies are used in the film narrative, and further how 
technologies, especially the so-called high tech, are thematized in these movies, for 
which I will term this kind of spectacles as “technology-themed spectacles.” For 
instance, the weaponry system and the cybernetic technologies used by Lara Croft to 
track the treasure and her enemy, or the ongoing scientific research on virus in 
Resident Evil – these are spectacles that epitomize technology in a particular way, 
from which we could see further how the cultural-economic logic frames our 
fascination with and consumption of technology. 
When it comes to “technology,” there have been innumerous discussions of it, 
its changes, and its interrelation with cultural change in recent years. From the 
perspective of the ever more technologized cultures of the industrialized society, the 
entire world has undergone huge changes (Rutsky 1), which is, as Baudrillard says, 
“the mutation of [a] properly industrial society into what could be called our techno-
culture” (A Critique 185). This mutation into techno-culture has often been related to 
postmodernity in terms of a broader shift from the modern to the postmodern. 
However, although technology is indeed indispensable to notions of both modernity 
and postmodernity, by no means is modern or postmodern culture determined by 
technology, nor does this indicate the rise of techno-cultural mutation nowadays is 
caused by some particular changes in technology. “Rather, whatever changes or 
mutations have occurred in contemporary cultures—whether one calls these cultures 
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postmodern or not—seem to be based less on changes in technology per se than in the 
very conception of technology, of what technology is” (Rutsky 1). 
This is the very idea of what Heidegger raised as the “question concerning 
technology” – what he calls “the essence [Wesen] of technology” that “is by no means 
anything technological” (4). The commonly accepted definition of technology labels 
technology as instrumental, as a means to an end. Heidegger argues, however, this 
narrow conception of technology is merely the modern manifestation of “the essence 
of technology,” which obscures the non-technological “essence,” and also blinds 
people to a broader “essence” “that informs not only the modern view of technology, 
but also the quite different conceptions of traditional technology and the techne of 
ancient Greece” (Rutsky 2). By seeking to re-envision the broader view of technology, 
Heidegger has actually raised the question that are particularly appropriate to “how 
the conception of technology may have changed in an age of high technology, and 
thus appropriate to what might well be called ‘the question concerning high tech’” 
(Rutsky 2). 
A first glance of “high technology” would seem to render an idea of “a matter of 
more technology”– a more extreme, more effective version of modern technology 
(Rutsky 3). As seen from what the dashing advance in technologies of 
communications, information and military, for instance, could bring to human race – 
that those who possess and instrumentalize these technolgies enjoy an obvious 
advantage in their life and social positions, it is undeniable that the “high technology 
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remains a ‘tool’ for distinguishing social classes”, or in other words, the “instrumental 
or functional conception that deﬁnes modern technology still remains an important 
aspect of high technology, or ‘high tech’” (Rutsky 3). At the same time, however, 
high tech also includes, or rather, highlights, the non-instrumental, or “non-
technological” aspect, the aspect that has been obscured in the modern conception of 
technology in Heidegger’s terms (Rutsky 3). And this aspect is actually linked to a 
domain considered right opposite to modern technology: that of art and aesthetics. 
Such connection does not come from nowhere, for the relationship between the two 
has undergone various shifts from the beginning of western culture. In fact, the Greek 
root of technology, techne, was generally translated as “art,” “skill,” or “craft” and 
depicted activities ranging from engineering to the arts. For the Greeks, “it was not 
technology alone that bore the name techne,” but art too “was simply called 
techne”(Heidegger 34). Slowly, it split along two lines: one, the “technical” or 
“technological” and two, the arts. The rupture between the technical and the artistic 
had repercussions in cultural fields, when the social “sciences” and the humanities 
became “subjects” distinct from “science.” Technology became the privileged 
province of the latter. And the arts, seen as the very opposite of technology, was 
deemed non-technical. The “scientific revolution” and subsequent developments 
reinforced this division – a division that persists to this day. Indeed, modernity, 
defined in terms of the instrumental rationality and technology, is the basis on which 
the West distinguishes itself from “non-technological” others. However, Heidegger 
does not mean that such close relationship between art and technology in ancient 
142 
 
Greece has simply been lost, but has always been basic to technology, to its “essence,” 
even when these two spheres are explicitly in contrast to each other in modern 
conception.  
However, there are changes to technology. When technological development 
enters the postmodern age, the word “technology” is usually prefixed with a “new” or 
“high.” Different from modern technology defined as simply a tool or means to an 
end, high tech emphasizes on issues of representation, style, and design, seeming to 
retrieving the aesthetic aspect that is originally contained in the word “techne” 
(Rutsky 4). This concern with representation and style, as Rutsky points out, lies not 
only in the design of technological objects themselves, but also in the practice of 
providing a “high-tech look” or style for objects that are not in themselves highly 
technological (4). For instance, basketball shoes could have a “high-tech style”  
In “high-tech design,” then, the modernist ideal of functional form has been 
largely abandoned in favor of a technological look or style that need not be 
functional in any traditional sense. The efﬁcacy of such items becomes, for the 
most part, a matter of cultural style, cultural desires. Yet, the high-tech concern 
with style and stylishness is not limited to questions of design; in high tech, the 
very “function” of technology becomes a matter of representation, style, 
aesthetics—a matter, that is, of technological reproducibility. In high tech, the 
ability to technologically reproduce, modify, and reassemble stylistic or cultural 
elements becomes not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself.   (Rutsky 4)  
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This is how postmodernity is related to, though not determined by, high tech. As 
high tech is defined by this process of technological representation, of reproducibility, 
alteration, and assemblage, which are the very properties of postmodernity, 
particularly in Baudrillard’s terms, it can be said that high technology is simulacral 
technology, or, technology of reproduction. “What this technology reproduces –and 
thus puts “into play” – is representation itself, style itself. But then, representation and 
style have always been technological, supplementary, simulacral.” That is to say, “in 
high tech, however, this simulacral status becomes an end in itself, rather than merely 
a means to an end or a copy of an original” (Rutsky 4). In this sense, what I want to 
emphasize here for this study is the high technology’s nature of being “simulacral”, its 
ability to alter, to modify and to simulate. If high technology’s reproducibility enables 
the extensive proliferation of a certain cultural icon, or a media franchise in the form 
of composite commodity, like Lara Croft for instance (elaborated in the previous 
section), its ability to modify/alter/simulate is both the means and the end to the 
intensified spectacles in the movies. Or to be more specific, the computer generated 
imagery, the magic-like technique to create monsters purely from innumerable pixels 
and motion capture, or the post production that gives the final touch to bring 
perfection, are all means of high technology to produce spectacles, but at the same 
time, such means are themselves spectacles. On one hand, the filmmaking high 
technology makes it possible to feature the impossible spectacles in the movie, and 
thus to bring visually pleasurable content for consumption. On the other hand, the 
technology itself becomes the “end”, the very spectacle, the object to be consumed. 
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Therefore, a high-tech aesthetic or style does not simply mean a particular look 
that possesses specific set of visual features, but refers to “a cultural concern with 
‘stylishness,’ with ‘aesthetics,’ that is intrinsic to high tech” (Rutsky 5). Put in the 
context of cinema, to speak of a high-tech aesthetic is, similarly, not simply to speak 
of a specific astonishing image, but of a fascination with what the “highest” 
technology (the most up-to-date technology) is capable of, which in turn constitutes a 
spectacle for audience to marvel at. According to Botkin and others, “high” as in high 
technology is equal to another expression – state-of-the-art. By this term, it means an 
inclusion of function and design, implying not only the most recently developed 
technologies, but also an incorporation of both function and design into aesthetic 
processes. Rutsky further points out that the rhetoric of high tech is often related to 
the avant-garde artistic movements in the early twentieth century. While admitting the 
difference between the two – that “if the rhetoric of the modernist avant-gardes served 
to distinguish an artistic vanguard from the rest of the population, the notion of a 
high-tech avant-garde privileges a ‘highly technological’ vanguard that is also, often, 
‘highly capitalist’” (5), Rutsky emphasizes on their common concern – the 
conjunction of the technological and the aesthetic: 
the very fact that metaphors such as “state of the art” and “avant-garde” have 
been so commonly employed – and accepted – in describing high tech is 
evidence that an “aesthetic” dimension has become part of the deﬁnition of 
contemporary technology. Technology has come increasingly to be seen as a 
matter of aesthetics or style, as an “aesthetic movement.”                    (Rutsky 5) 
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However, it is not only the conception of technology that has changed, Rutsky 
continues to argue, but also the notion of aesthetics. The definition of the aesthetic can 
no longer be based on the dichotomy between either the aura/wholeness, or the 
modernist terms of instrumentality/functionality. Just like technology, the aesthetics 
becomes an instable and reproductive process, “which continually breaks elements 
free of their previous context and recombines them in different ways” (8). The 
demarcation between the technological and the aesthetic further dissolves and the two 
begin to “turn” into one another (8). Such a transformative condition is, again, highly 
resonant to the postmodern turn especially in terms of the free-floating signifiers and 
endless signification. And such is also the way the action heroine movies, so 
representative of postmodern movies, play with both technological and the aesthetic, 
and with their implosion – the movies provide a popular/well-publicized venue for the 
representation of technology, both directly and indirectly, and in turn, the imagery 
that is supposed to speak for the aesthetical side of movies becomes more and more 
generated and facilitated by the high tech. 
Although modernism never seems able to recognize the shift in the conception 
of technology and continues to conceptualize technology almost entirely in the terms 
of instrumentality and functionality, there is an opposite tendency to technologize art. 
This tendency is based on a desire to make art practical and functional, which is well 
suited to the modernist mass production (Rutsky 9). For instance, a house is to be a 
mass-produced “machine for living in” (Corbusier 95) and the object of design is to 
be “of no discernible ‘style’ but simply a product of an industrial order like a car, an 
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airplane and such like” (qtd. in Rutsky 10). Hence, in terms of production, art is said 
to be subject to a standardization and rationalization in a similar manner to what 
Fordism practices, while in terms of use, the artistic object becomes more and more 
conceptualized in practical or functional sense. “In both cases, an instrumental or 
technological rationality is to be applied to art, stripping it of superﬂuous ornamental 
and ritual value. The result is a new ‘machine aesthetic’ in which form is to follow 
function” (Rutsky 10). 
In a similar vein, Walter Benjamin, as mentioned before, attributes the loss of 
“aura” in artwork to the advent of technological reproducibility. He makes this 
analogy between the modernist “emancipation” of “constructive forms” from art and 
the Renaissance freeing of the sciences from philosophy (“Paris” 161). Such analogy 
indicates that, just as modernity’s scientiﬁc technological, instrumental view of the 
world is based on the “death” of animistic, magical, or spiritualized conceptions of the 
world, artistic modernism is premised upon the “death” of the aura – an autonomous, 
“living” spirit that “animates” artwork in Benjamin’s terms (in Rutsky 11). And 
modernism, in turn, finds the analogy between technological reproduction – with its 
related techniques of assemblage, collage, and montage – and the rationalization and 
functionality of mass production (Rutsky 11). The reproduction techniques, such as 
montage and assemblage, resembles the set of procedures adopted in the factory 
assembly lines, and the “products” made by these techniques are thus viewed 
functional as well (11). This is how the production of a movie, with its wide use of 
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montage, editing, alternation – the technological reproduction – is a typical example 
for Benjamin of modernist transformation of aesthetics into a functional form. 
However, Rutsky further argues, such belief in the “functional form,” or 
“machine aesthetic” “betrays the extent to which modernism misunderstands its own 
“aesthetic” uses of technology”, because modernist aesthetics is actually based on 
“the myth of functional from” for most cases, and “taking technology and mass 
production as models for art and artistic production does not, after all, make 
modernist art inherently more functional” (11). In a discussion of modernist 
architecture, Reyner Banham also points out that the so-called “functional forms” 
only “looked” technological, and they were rarely particularly technological or 
functional (25). Therefore, about the functionality and technological reproducibility, 
Rutsky says, 
the analogy that modernism attempts to draw between the functionality of mass 
production and technological reproducibility is similarly flawed. In both cases, 
modernism conﬂates productive functionality with efﬁcacy of use or 
representational efﬁcacy. Although rationalization and standardization may 
make factory production, and perhaps its products, more functional, the efﬁcacy 
of, for example, a photograph or ﬁlm is only minimally related to the 
rationalization and standardization of its production.                                      (11) 
Similarly, the use of high tech does not make a movie more functional, but more 
of a style of functionality. Just as a picture ceases to be a unique piece of art put in a 
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frame and hung on the wall but becomes a ubiquitous digital file, scanned, shot, and 
copied, on one’s computer subject to whatever drawing software, or a representation 
of a beautiful narrative (if we can call it that way) ceases to be the uninterrupted 
performance for hours on stage in theatrical form or even passionate directing with 
proficient shooting and devoted acting in cinematic form. It becomes an assembly 
work pieced together by lots of post-production – the background is added later, the 
props are inserted afterwards, and even the eyes, the skin, and the hair of the 
characters are generated wholly in this post stage (like those Na’vi in Avatar). When 
pictures can be created solely out of drawing tools on computer or brought to 
perfection by them, it seems that the nimble manipulation of a highly complicated 
software through commutations of mouse clicks and keyboard punches is much more 
“professional” or “awesome” than what can be done by an actual painter with real 
paint, brushes and canvas, no matter how skillful he is. This is all because of a high 
tech illusion and fascination that the more advanced, the better, and such “criteria” 
goes to the art as soon as technology and aesthetics begin to turn into each other (and 
what is more, such computer generated images can be stored and multiplied) in an age 
we prefer to see a flawless cover face revised by Photoshop, rather than the face with 
freckles and truth. Thus we would rather say that this is less about how all such 
assembly technologies of filmmaking post-production enable the movie to become 
more functional and more efficient, (well, if “being a blockbuster” were a function, it 
is certainly more functional. But to the root, people are consuming not the “function” 
of a blockbuster, but the style that the blockbuster looks) but more about how the look 
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of the high technology, no matter it is the end product made by it, or simply the 
thought of high technology, works as a highly fascinating object for the masses – isn’t 
it a great idea to see what we usually have no easy access to on an enlarged screen, in 
high-resolution detail, and in a pleasurable and relaxing seat? – And the look is 
enough, because that is all a culture of signs asks for. 
To put it in Baudrillard’s theoretical terms, the “machine aesthetic” of modern 
design is virtually a simulation of the rationalized, standardized forms of machines 
and factories: it is no more than an aesthetic, or a style that is divorced from any 
functional or instrumental context but posing as if it is still in it. The effect of machine 
aesthetic on the very conception of technology itself, knowingly or unknowingly, is 
that technology becomes more of style and aesthetic than of functionality or 
instrumentality, which further testifies the “turning” happens on both sides, especially 
with the rise of technological reproducibility (Rutsky 12). 
So as the modernist conception of technology starts to undergo an “aesthetic 
turn,” the conception of “the aesthetic” also undergoes its own “technological turn.” 
The efforts of modernism to expel the aura, and to make art more functional and 
technological could be viewed as an attempt to extend an instrumentality or 
technological rationality to the realm of art, and to cultural forms more generally 
(Rutsky 12). Yet, it is this extension itself that leads to a “turning” in the notion of 
both technology and the aesthetic. As Rutsky summarizes,  
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In “aestheticizing” the functional and the technological, modernism separates 
technological form from function; it allows stylistic or aesthetic elements to be 
“unsecured” from their previous context and to be recombined or reassembled 
into new conﬁgurations according to the dictates of “style,” of “aesthetics.” Yet, 
the “aesthetic,” as it comes to be seen in terms of the technological, moves away 
from romantic notions of wholeness and spiritual value; in other words, it loses 
its sense of aura. As such, the aesthetic will become indistinguishable from 
culture more generally. The aesthetic, in short, becomes a matter of style, a 
technological or techno-cultural style.                                                              (12) 
Hence, both the technological and the aesthetic have become techno-cultural. 
Rutsky’s line of theorizing technology and aesthetic runs parallel to Baudrillard’s take 
on the postmodern categories of implosion and simulation, in that the distinctions 
between art and technology tend to disappear, and both parties begin to simulate each 
other. Such tendencies and condition constitute the general culture – or the cultural-
economic logic – of late capitalist society in which the movies in concern are 
produced and reproduced, and also serves a central concern of the following sections’ 
argumentation.  
 
         The Spectacular 
In view of this techno-cultural background in which “the ability to 
technologically reproduce, modify, and reasonable stylistic or cultural elements 
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becomes not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself” (Rutsky 4), we can then 
further explore how technology works as spectacles in contemporary blockbuster 
movies, and particularly the action heroine movies. This section will look into the first 
kind of spectacles of technology – “the spectacular.” 
Like other spectacular blockbusters of concurrent time, the action heroine films 
in this study also boast spectacular scenes, shots, stunts, and set pieces that are no less 
imaginative, eye-catching, and breathtaking. Though unable to compete with those 
mega productions in terms of the investment in each specially made shot (hence not of 
the best “quality”), these action heroine films do manage to provide certain sensual 
relish at the according level to their production condition respectively, which might 
include, for instance, the budget, or the technological state at the time of production in 
view of the soaring progress of filmmaking technology. Viewers who went to the 
cinema at the release time of each action heroine movie would have found it 
intriguing to see Angelina Jolie taming a hi-tech combating robot twice her height in 
perfect composure at the beginning of Lara Croft: Tomb Raider, to see her jumping 
from the balcony to rock back and forth on her rubber ropes while literally using them 
to swing into prolonged action with numerous enemies, or to see her punching a shark 
underwater right in its face before steering this ferocious animal as if it were another 
ride of hers. They would have found it exciting to see a pale-faced beauty with human 
countenance suddenly revealing her vampire fangs in Underworld, to see a hulky man 
mutating ghastly into hideous werewolf in painful detail, or to see the legendary 
ancient figure of vampire wielding modern weapon to kill its mortal enemy. They 
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would have found it thrilling to see the first walking dead with bloody bitten face first 
coming into sight in Resident Evil, to see piles of zombies pouncing at one human, to 
see the grossly monstrous licker looming behind helpless people, or to see Alice spin 
kick in slow motion. They would have found it enthralling to see the bizarre but 
idyllic shaping of buildings in Aeon Flux, to see Aeon Flux jumping from impossible 
height in a graceful curve, to see the assassins communicating secret information by 
exchanging pills hidden in the tongue, or to see tender grass transforming into sharp 
blades when Flux’s face is one inch from ground. All such spectacles, the examples of 
which can go on forever, play a great part in holding the audiences in the seats or 
perhaps on the edge of the seats, and are typical of “the spectacular” type boasting of 
their spectacular content created by the amazing filmmaking technologies. 
Following the golden pattern of maximizing pleasure, and the overwhelming 
postmodern eclecticism that elbows out any purity and uniqueness, these films are 
unexceptionally quintessential examples of generic hybrids. As can be seen from 
Table 1, none of them could be assorted under one and only generic category. Each 
and all are compounds of at least three genre elements, which might contain adventure, 
fantasy, science-fiction, thriller, and horror in addition to their common entry of 
action. Unlike other genres such as history or drama, which focus on storytelling and 
character portraying, these genres depend more conspicuously on iconographic 
visualization of the scenes, phenomena or artifacts that are impossible to be seen in 
daily life and would be impossible to make without the support of special effects 
technologies – that is, spectacles. Each generic element of these films could be 
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thought of as a series of spectacles that help to define the film as such. Then it is not 
hard to imagine the density of spectacles in hybrid text less than two hours. When the 
star image, another important spectacular asset of the movie, enters the scene, the 
whole array of spectacles just make sense through a simple permutation and 
combination hinted by given genre convention. So Lara Croft: Tomb Raider movie is 
the spectacle of Angelina Jolie causing, carrying, and clashing other spectacles: the 
spectacles of her engaged in spectacles of action, under which, there are back flipping, 
diving, boxing, motor racing, and any imaginable variety; of her travelling through 
spectacles of adventures, to the exotic site of Cambodia in episode 1, of Tanzania in 
episode 2, to the ancient underground or underwater cave of myriad treasure; of her 
witnessing the spectacles of fantasy unlocking the miraculous power of the Triangle 
of Light, or the Pandora’s Box. And similarly, Resident Evil movie generates another 
set of spectacles in which Milla Jovovich shoots zombies’ head on innumerable 
occasions, witnesses bitten human transform into walking dead, and fights against 
Umbrella’s ulterior scientific research actually equaling horrifying disaster. 
In view of the prevalence of such generic repetition, the question is, why these 
genres in particular? And not only for the action heroine films (the “action” as in 
action heroine is of course a genre already), but also for the general mood of 
blockbuster industry? Or why Hollywood bends on creating spectacles of action, 
adventure, fantasy, science fiction, horror, and thriller? A simplistic answer to this 
question is because these generic spectacles sell, and the Hollywood is just good at 
producing them as American film industry commands the highest level of filmmaking 
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technology that is indispensable to making such spectacles. The further question is 
why these spectacles sell and what the audience is actually consuming? For one thing, 
people have been inculcated by the depthless cultural-economic logic a preference to 
the spectacular images and an indulgence in sensual pleasure. For another, through the 
consumption of the technologically made images, and particularly the images’ 
spectacularity only achievable by such technologies, people are at the same time 
hooked to their own fascination with what the high tech is capable of and ultimately 
the high tech itself. That is, they are actually consuming spectacles of technology. I 
will elaborate on these two points in the following paragraphs. 
When people watch the films, they are engaged in a consumptive activity of 
their fascination with the spectacular. Consuming these films also consumes their 
fascination. This fascination comes from the cultural-economic logic of contemporary 
media, culture and society, where images rule, depthlessness prevails, and touching 
the surface is the aesthetics of postmodern life. Huge quantities of images are 
circulated and consumed with every passing second. What catches the eye even for a 
brief span of time is already a success in this “attention economy” (Beller). However, 
as “the society of the spectacle” communicates its tenet of immediacy and 
unreflexiveness to the masses through media hype, advertisement, and cinema, the 
process of cinematic spectacles catching the audiences’ attention is actually “a 
process in a state of distraction that requires no attention” according to Benjamin, 
because “the public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one” (119). Therefore, if 
what Benjamin means by “attention” is a deep contemplation that put the mass in the 
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valued position of critic, the “attention” here in the course of watching the spectacular 
action heroine films refers to a fleeting and pleasurable look that stays only on the 
surface of images and thus puts the viewers in the position of consumer. Such a 
pattern of “attention” seems to be an instruction manual-like guide to teach people 
how to consume the present-day myriad of images. The audiences, though not all of 
them, have been implanted with the preference to consuming the sensational, to 
consuming what is easy, playful and pleasurable.  
In the opening scene of Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life, Croft loses 
her underwater vehicle and oxygen mask in deep sea after she gets injured by her 
rival’s sneak attack. Without any resort, she uses her own blood to attract sharks, and 
then punches an approaching one to subdue it, holding to it as a motor to bring her out 
of the water. While audiences are watching such scenario of emergency tactics, they 
are prepared to be shocked by whatever imaginative and bold measure taken: Jackie 
Chan using a short stick as a pulley to slide down high building, for instance, or 
Batman turning his damaged car miraculously into a lighter black motorbike. So as 
the audiences see Croft use a shark as vehicle, they are so preoccupied with marveling 
at how thrilling to ride that dangerous creature, or so invested into connoisseur-ing 
this scene with memories from similar scenarios of other movies as side dishes, that 
they barely think more than what fits the eye, nor link her action to any further 
implication (if there is any). Be it Lara Croft Tomb Raider, Resident Evil, Underworld, 
or single production of Elektra and Aeon Flux, each movie is replete of such action 
pieces and fantastic effects, but it does not matter whether such spectacles can be 
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linked together to contribute to the compactness of narrative. Spectacle is the 
spectacle, fragmented but seductive; spectacle is meant for the awe at the moment, to 
propagate its own spectacularity, and to, according to Steven Best, “relegate subjects 
to the critical and creative margins of society and to obscure the nature and effects of 
its distorting power” (47). Viewers look at each action as an action, the images as 
fragmented images in their relegated places. Whatever potential interpretation 
pointing to sexism/racism/imperialism in these films, if any, is thus marginalized and 
lost in the endless presentation of spectacles. These images are the priority 
commodities to be consumed, and trivialize the potential deep meaning to the extent 
that it gradually disappears. 
Just as Baudrillard corroborates how the object is converted into a mere sign of 
its use, because the object is now abstract and divorced from physical needs, these 
cinematic spectacles are similarly abstract and divorced from their signified (the 
signified as in the form of, for instance, ideological implications), and become merely 
signs. Under the “radical semiurgy” where the autonomization of the signifier 
becomes the prerequisite of how signs work in contemporary media culture, and the 
relative unity and stability of the industrial world/sign breaks apart, watching such 
spectacular movies becomes a consumption of the floating superficial, the pure 
signifiers. And how audiences watch these spectacles – like how the consumer 
consumes the sign – is “integrated within the system,” (Kellner, Beyond 4) the system 
working just like the “instruction manual-like guide” to instill the consumption 
pattern. So the image is “bound neither truth nor reality; it is appearance and bound to 
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appearance” (Baudrillard, “Simulacra” 167). And the more spectacular the image is, 
the further the reality breaks apart from the image, and the more thorough the 
autonomization of the image is, because besides the myriad of images that invalidates 
the usual pairing of signifier and signified, the focus on the spectacular will draw 
people further away from the contemplation on signification. This is just what 
Baudrillard says, “we do not get closer to the reality of a thing or an event by burying 
it under layer upon layer of images. Indeed, images take us further away from the real 
which today is reaching a point where any firm distinction between reality and 
representation can tumble over the abyss of hyper-simulation” (“Simulacra” 168). 
Therefore, the audiences are not there for recondite reflection on what reality the 
action heroine movie could tell them (besides a repeated story of the protagonist 
defeating the villainy through waves of action), or which image could reflect what 
profound meaning – they are there for a showcase, for a grand display. For one thing, 
the high-paced movie cannot wait to fill the audiences with next set pieces; before 
they could react, the roller-coaster of spectacles has already taken them to another 
high point. For another and more importantly, the way they consume spectacles has 
long been registered into them as an integrated system by the larger cultural-economic 
logic, for the spectacle has been used as a tool of pacification and depoliticization in a 
“permanent opium war” which “stupefies social subjects and distracts them from the 
most urgent task of real life – recovering the concrete totality of human activity 
through social transformation” (Best 48). This is not to say that all audiences are 
mindless and identical beings (the audiences discussed in this study refer to those of 
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the late capitalist societies), but that since “the spectacular society spreads its 
narcotics mainly through the cultural mechanisms of leisure and consumption, 
services and entertainment” (Best 48), the overall commutation and circulation of 
spectacles has been so into people’s life that people cannot avoid being “mindless” 
particularly when sitting in front of a vast sea of free-floating signifiers – if there are 
only signifiers with no signified, why bother to dig, and if the signifiers are so 
pleasing to look at, why not enjoy them. As the present age is marked by the 
preference of “the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, representation 
to reality, the appearance to the essence…” (Debord 11) the only way that could keep 
attracting them among the fierce industrial competition is to raise the level of 
spectacularity and thus to hail the current “aesthetic of sensation, an aesthetics of the 
body which emphasizes the immediacy and unreflexiveness of primary processes 
(desire)” (Featherstone 122).  
In conformity to this aesthetics, one after another action heroine movie comes 
boasting its increasingly higher degree of spectacularity, which nurtures an audience 
that is ever more spoiled – like pampered child asking for more candy and sweeter 
candy – sitting in the dark theater comfortably expecting to taste the eye-candy, to be 
“blockbuster-ed!” The emphasis on the spectacular thus widens the gap between 
viewers and the image – the gap already created by the multiple layers of spectacles – 
and hatches an urge to spectate rather than participate. Therefore, as watching these 
action heroine movies which present constant parade of spectacles, the audiences, 
whom the blockbuster industry has already been doting on for more than a decade 
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with ever more newfangled visceral stimulus, put on their habitual mechanism to 
embrace the “different” set of images. This regular system to process the image, any 
image, works in a simple enough way– swallow it and then spit it with a few 
occasional exhilarating hoorays at the explosive moment. The audiences thus become 
a passive and bottomless receptacle of car exploding, hand-to-hand combating, and 
monster howling, indulging in that tickling process of visual pleasure where they 
consume their expectation for and their obsession with the spectacular. 
One of the most important “narcotics” spread by the spectacular society 
pertinent to the movie is the preview before its release. As a form of screen 
advertising and media hype that has been at the forefront of film promotional 
techniques ever since the 1910s, the movie trailer has played a hugely important role 
in building up audience expectation and nurturing that habitual mechanism. In turn, it 
is also a crucial reflection of the industry’s, as well as the audience’s attachment to the 
spectacular. “Its limited running time of two to three minutes has often been seen as a 
marker of overt salesmanship and spectacular imagery over subtlety or layered 
communication” (Johnston133). 
While many of modern blockbusters (mostly with action, adventure, science-
fiction, or fantasy premises) are sold “on the basis of spectacular attraction, the scale 
and quality of spectacle is a major factor in the advertising, promotion and journalistic 
discourses surrounding their release” (King, Spectacular Narratives 4). The film 
trailer, as the first audio-visual link viewers have with forthcoming features whether 
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through a cinema, television, train LED, or computer screen, then, is to display and 
hype that spectacle, making it a central promotional message to attract future 
audiences. Given the direct address of trailers, and the apparent compression of visual 
spectacle within the trailer narrative, it is a conspicuous reflection that spectacle is the 
top priority to be consumed. As a highly concentrated essence of the major 
spectacular pieces in the whole movie, the trailer seems to make a promise to its mass 
receivers that the movie would be a widely grand and pleasurable experience allowing 
the audiences to “sit back and revel in the spectacle of the special effects” (qtd. in 
Johnston 145). 
Key visual effects scenes – most notably the ancient rock statues coming into 
life and taking up offensive in Tomb Raider, the gruesome sticky monster swooping 
down from dark ceiling in Resident Evil, the bat-formed vampire unfolding its wings 
in Underworld, and so on so forth – could be included in the teaser and main trailer to 
make impact. Such shots then soon become the recurring images repeated in other 
forms of advertising, from bus stop posters to short television spots. As Johnston says,  
Further iterations of the image (whether in ten-second television trailers or in 
press kits) isolate it from narrative: the image becomes a central element of the 
film’s ‘consumable identity…It was the extraction of those images, and the 
subsequent publicity they received, that built up the expectation of CGI 
spectacle within visual marketing materials.                                                  (143)  
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Again, it is not to say that the trailer is void of any hint of how the story side of 
the movie is structured. It just does not matter so much as the strings of spectacles. As 
an industrial practice to always hold back the crucial plots as a gesture to push the 
receivers to go to cinema and check out themselves, narrative suspense in preview 
works in a less effective way than the spectacular in an age when little is expected 
from a movie story that is told and retold for so many times – from previous episode 
or from other media – that viewers definitely know Lara Croft would smash the evil 
and find the treasure. For another, the quick editing and montage makes a two-minute 
teaser overwhelmingly packed with intense actions and shocking spectacles. The 
fragmented images break the storyline into discontinuous bits and pieces, which 
makes it ever more difficult to locate the narrative as the central concern, although the 
bits of plots do inform the potential viewers with a general idea that, for instance, 
Resident Evil being a zombie-themed thriller – and that is all. In addition to the 
trailer’s content and form, what makes the trailer more of a pure spectacle is due to 
some industrial act of moving special shots early in production before the whole 
movie with a solid and concrete story takes shape, so they would be available for 
inclusion in the trailer and start promotion as early as possible (Johnston 144). 
The preview is one of the prime locations for displaying advance “free samples” 
of future film productions, and the likeliest venue for luring a wide audience with a 
montage of spectacular images. After watching the whole movie, viewers have 
actually got – in addition to a narrative that does not matter so much as the spectacles 
– no more than what is offered in the trailer, only in a less high-pitched pace and 
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much more elaboration. The viewing process is like playing a game in which viewers 
try to identify and single out the location of each trailer spectacle in the movie. For 
instance, the trailer of Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life has literally listed 
all the major spectacular scenes in the whole movie, which include exotic scenery in 
Africa and China, aircraft landing on water, Lara fencing with her servant, riding 
horse while shooting perfect tens, somersaulting in her yacht, smiting a shark 
underwater, racing motorbike on the Great Wall, sliding down a rope from a cliff, 
jumping from skyscraper and parachuting, and numerous cuts of shooting, explosion 
and action. The first ten to twenty seconds of both trailers of Tomb Raider films 
usually features a brief introductory hint as to what is the target treasure for the 
upcoming adventure, and then the following chunk time of two minutes is replete of 
fast-paced cuts of spectacles, while playing rock music with exciting heavy beat. Such 
an intense preview compressing all pieces of the most valuable assets – “valuable” in 
the sense of the degree of spectacularity and thus the visual attraction to get the 
audiences into the theater in the first place – makes the movie appear like a must-see 
piece, which if you missed it, would be a tremendous loss of yours. The trailer acts 
exactly as a pre-embodiment of the movie’s sign value, because to watch it is 
assumed to be a highly fashionable choice in view of all the fantastic spectacles 
shown by the trailer (which is everywhere). The hype created by the particular way of 
putting together a free sample thus works as a highly effective advertisement to lure 
the potential consumers, as if the preview were saying bluntly, “Dear customers, if 
you buy the ticket to Tomb Raider Lara Croft, we will assure you a marvelous 
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experience with our gorgeous Lara Croft through her exotic adventures. What are you 
waiting for? This is definitely a best choice for your hot summer you don’t want to 
miss!” 
The more important aspect, however, about the spectacular and the way it 
appeals lies in what makes it so. Put it in a historical trajectory, such spectacularity of 
trailer and of the movie is neither singular to these action heroine movies, nor an 
immediate change out of blue. According to Johnston, the placement and display of 
such spectacle are not straightforward processes and are closely linked to issues of 
genre popularity and special effects development. By the end of the 1990s, with 
further developments in CGI, special effects spectacle has been more prevalent in 
trailer message than at any other point in trailer history (145). Spectacle, now largely 
created by CGI effects, is a more important element of trailer structure than in 
previous decades. The image, combining model work, motion capture, stunt, make-up, 
explosives and CGI, is obviously intended as a spectacular final image, a lure that 
audiences would not be able to resist. The growing prevalence of the “spectacular 
genre” and generic hybrid are interconnected with the advancement of technology. 
The identification of special effects as grand displays of “industrial light and magic” 
(Sobchack 7) is actually a fascination with the dreamlike wonder that visual 
technologies can help achieve and realize. 
The spectacular images in the action heroine movies illustrated before involve 
multiple layers of technological participation. To achieve certain special effects, to 
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give a few example, there are, first, before-hand trainings of the starring actresses to 
make them better fit into action scenarios even if there are stunts to be done by 
stuntman; there are then on-spot wiring for actors to jump (from) high, explosive 
settings to make bombing convincingly in time, and all kinds of angle, length, and 
movement of the shooting camera that may need be positioned on a high-rising crane 
or be moving fast along trails; and there are, most importantly, post-productions to 
achieve what is unachievable by the preparatory or the on-spot techniques – polishing 
the unreal background or scenery, adding flesh or textures to motion captures, keying 
in the non-existent monsters to already shot scenes and so on. And most of such 
stunning post work is done by the computer-generated imagery techniques that use 
algorithms and models to create digital images for intended purposes. For example, 
the ancient rock statues hidden in the cave suddenly come into life to guard against 
intruders when Lara Croft and her enemies go in there for the Triangle of Light. The 
statues themselves and their movements of smashing, hacking and crushing are made 
by such digital technologies for a supernatural scene that looks as if it really happens. 
And in Aeon Flux, there is the thrilling shot of Flux sneaking into the dictator’s 
residence and almost falling on the lawn when the tender grass turns into sharp blades. 
While such imagery could only be possible by forging intricate props on the ground in 
the past, it is now moved to the post stage and appears more convincing. 
New technology has fuelled those genres’ ability to display new sceneries, new 
worlds, new life-forms, new possibilities of stunts, and new spectacles of destruction. 
Despite the place of computer-generated imagery in almost all branches and genres of 
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modern filmmaking (like the flying feather in Forrest Gump), “the films with fantasy, 
science fiction, action-adventure genres continue to be a nexus where effects of 
technology and spectacular visual imagery interact” (Pierson 82), and where 
spectators consumes the maximum amount of technological images. For all the 
movies under consideration, the images involving computer generated imagery, 
digital technologies, or any other special effect technology, are “must-appears” in 
their movie trailers. As long as there are monsters or creatures with super power in the 
movie, the spectacles of them will show up in the trailer for at least once. For instance, 
the black monsters that emerge briefly at the end of Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The 
Cradle of Life is used as an opening hype in the trailer. The pale-faced vampire 
suddenly revealing fangs (which involves highly intricate technique of making-up), 
the lycan transforming into furry and fiendish beast appear several times in the trailer 
of Underworld. The genetically mutated licker (an alien-like creature) howling 
frantically with flying mucous is similarly a frequent scene in Resident Evil trailers. 
And the trailer of Elektra opens with the elaborate visuals of how the heroine’s 
enemies exert their supernatural power (for instance, the snake tattoo on a male 
ninja’s chest grows out of his body and becomes a real one). When audiences look at 
these technological spectacles, they cannot help wondering at how both realistic and 
fantastic these images are and indulging in the visual pleasure of how special these 
effects are, while at the same time, they are also applauding how sophisticated the 
technology is to make such high quality imagery. And it is in this process that the 
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audience is made to “worship” modern technology and thus to recognize it as their 
social condition. 
And meanwhile, what makes spectacle and cinema more of something that only 
the big screen experience can truly offer is the resurrection of 3D technology in recent 
years. The sequels of the action heroine films that are produced during the past three 
years, such as Resident Evil: Afterlife (2010), and Underworld: Awakening (2012), 
also jump on this bandwagon to add one more dimension to the viewing process, thus 
to add more spectacularity through technological means. When these effect movies 
are released both in 2D and 3D, people would not mind spending a few more dollars 
on a more engaging and realistic experience of enlarged pleasure. They are paying for 
what the one more dimension can bring, and at the same time, paying for the 
technologies that add this dimension – on the audiences’ side, it is the pair of 3-D 
glasses. Compared to 2-D, the 3-D form of screening would be an upgraded way of 
living one’s life. People are consuming the technological progress in such a material 
and sensual way that their fascination with technology seems to come true and 
tangible. When looking at these spectacular images that fleeting across their eyes 
incessantly, they are further satisfied with dwelling on the simulated surface instantly 
made possible by codes and digit. 
Stars, sound, color, widescreen, 3-D, and now an intense use of CGI: the 
expansion of elements that are capable of offering generic spectacle appears to 
confirm that spectacle can offer “a range of pleasures associated with the enjoyment 
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of ‘larger than life’ representations, more luminous or intense than daily reality” 
(King, Spectacular Narratives 4). “Viewer expectation of spectacle is actually located 
around those technologies and processes” (Barker, and Brooks 38). Cinema, as a form 
of art, as well as a representational technology from its very beginning, “has always 
been a central locus where the artistic and the technological constantly interact to 
effect changes” (qtd. in Johnston 170). 
Thus people’s fascination with the technological images cannot only be ascribed 
to spectacle itself or the consumption of spectacle itself, but also accredited to what 
makes such images possible – the supporting technologies to produce them, especially 
the new technologies that rises in the twenty-first century. While viewers are 
consuming the various fantastic spectacles, they are, at the same time, consuming the 
technology. For one thing, these spectacles are made by the technology – the 
technology as a means; for another, the technology – what the technology is 
ultimately capable of in bringing ever pleasurable visual forms, and how the 
technology as a means finally produces the end spectacle – is a spectacle itself, which 
is to say, the technology serves as an end for consumption. 
Besides the rising use of high technology for filmmaking, the consumption of 
technology as both means and end as in the action heroine films has much to do with 
the shift in the conception of technology discussed earlier in this section. In this 
techno-cultural space, technology can no longer be seen as machinery or hardware. 
“Rather, technology becomes increasingly a matter of technologically reproduced 
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information: images on a videotape, scenarios of a computer game, Web sites on the 
Internet. This is the paradox of high-tech aesthetics: as the form of technology edges 
toward ‘invisibility,’ technology increasingly comes to be seen in the form of data or 
media” (Rutsky 15). While the digital technology used to produce and merge 
computer-generated images with other shots and scenes, thus making the spectacles of 
the impossible or the supernatural look so real that people would deem it definitely 
should look like this if the impossible really happened. That is to say, the technology 
that supports the spectacularity of images is supposed to work behind the screen in 
subtle ways, but this does not mean that it is taken as a separate hardware that takes 
forms of the concrete devices with so many buttons, looking complicated to operate. 
Technology, in this sense, is increasingly what is there on the screen, as media, as 
data, as the images. And as the spectacular level rises, the technology as in the form 
of technologically reproduced images will become even more salient, for the knowing 
audiences (knowing that the impossible images in the movies are made by digital 
technologies, but not shot from real scenes or happenings, no matter how vague the 
idea is), while marveling at the spectacular image, are at the same time marveling at 
how sophisticated the technology is.  
At a more general level, the change in the conception of technology means that, 
“as the cultural world around us becomes ever more liable to technological, digital 
reproduction, any distinction between technology and culture begins to vanish. 
Technology comes increasingly to be seen as a matter of cultural data, as a matter of 
techno-culture” (Rutsky 15). This helps to further explain why Hollywood has action, 
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adventure, fantasy and science-fiction as its favorite genres. Hollywood’s big studios 
command the top technologies for digital post-production (which also explains why 
they command the film industry in the world), which those popular genres rely on so 
much to become culturally prominent. Thus Hollywood is capable of producing the 
images to support the generic iconography that none of other film industries can equal. 
And in turn, the sophisticated filmmaking technologies of Hollywood are more and 
more recognized through the cinematic images that are later widely circulated in 
cultural sphere – Technology has increasingly “come to be seen as an ongoing process 
of screening, of multimedia” (Rutsky 16). Hollywood’s mastery of the essential 
technologies not only manages to generate the final images to sell, but the mastery 
itself is another important point to sell, to allure, to win fascination – Hollywood uses 
the “high technology” as both the product and the brand. They (Hollywood studios) 
possess the high technologies, not only can they create those incredible spectacles, but 
they are good at doing it. So to watch these films is not only to consume the incredible 
final spectacles, but also to consume the cultural prominence of “being 
technologically good at it,” and to consume the sign value that represents a trendy 
appreciation for a full efficacy of the most advanced technologies. 
 
         The Technology-Themed Spectacles  
Postmodern spectacular cinema, the action heroin films as typical examples, 
present spectacles of technology not only in the form of the behind-the-scene digital 
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imagery generation techniques, but also directly representing technologies in a 
particular way, which constitute the two types of consumption of technology in the 
viewing process of action heroine movies. The second type of technology-themed 
spectacles is related to technology not by its form but by its content. Unlike the first 
type of spectacles relying on CGI or any digital technology to enforce their effects, 
these spectacles are not necessarily made of high technology. They embody 
technology through various signs, scenarios, shots, and set pieces that have a certain 
form of technology as their content and subject, for example, a close-up of a spying 
gadget, a scene of a laser gun, a panorama of a spaceship, or simply a snapshot of a 
research laboratory. 
This type of spectacle has once again been closely interrelated with the generic 
affiliation of the action heroine movies. For instance, the most frequent genre 
category, action, brings on familiar memories of spectacles of explosion, gun shooting, 
and combatting helicopters. Science-fiction, particularly for its theme on “the future 
science”, is about spectacles of spaceship, alien shape, or highly sophisticated 
communication and weapon technology. Fantasy is about spectacles of magical light, 
human transforming, or supernatural creature. Horror is about spectacles of 
monstrosity, ghost looming behind, or suddenly coming out, and for most cases, the 
monstrosity is caused by lapse in scientific experiment as in Resident Evil. 
For the first episode of Resident Evil, viewers unanimously express, in the 
commenting area of online movie website (IMDB), their appreciation of and 
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fascination with one single scene in the movie: the laser defense system of Red Queen. 
Red Queen is the artificial intelligence of the Hive
27
, which controls and monitors the 
whole facility. Besides numerous surveillance cameras and steel doors protected by 
passing code, Red Queen has all kinds of killing mechanisms to deal with intruders. 
After cracking the passing code of one sealed door and entering the room, the 
commandos finds themselves immediately shut in a narrow and long corridor-like 
chamber, the other end of which is another sealed door. When they begin to decipher 
the code, a horizontal laser beam suddenly comes across and moves along the room. 
Before they realize what is going on, the laser has already cut one commando into half. 
The leading commando avoids one beam by hanging to the ceiling, only to find that 
the next laser attack is an inescapable beam net. When watching this scene, the 
fascinated viewers are marveling at, on one hand, the intriguing defense technology of 
Red Queen that kills intruder ruthlessly and efficiently – the representation of a high-
tech killing machine. On the other hand, they are captivated by the digital technology 
that make the spectacle of commando being cut an elaborately sanguinary and 
painfully realistic one, when they see the cutting line gradually appear from the flesh 
and the small chunks of body parts fall apart. The spectacle of technology becomes a 
main site of pleasure and consumption for this scenario. And for a further enquiry of 
its implication, such a scene of literally fragmenting a human’s body by laser beams 
                                                          
27 In the movie, the Hive is a top-secret generic research facility station manufactured and controlled by 
the Umbrella Corporation, a leading international corporation that secretly conducts bio-weapon 
research. One day, a thief steals a case containing vials of the T-Virus, a generically constructed 
mutating virus (which causes the dead people’s transforming into zombies), and contaminates the Hive. 
The contamination causes Red Queen to seal the Hive and kill everyone inside using the facility’s 
automated systems. A group of commando, not knowing what caused the action by Red Queen, was 




resembles, figuratively, the viewers’ spectating process, consuming process, and even 
their overall existential condition under the late capitalism, which is sliced into bits 
and pieces by the technological reproduction. This is because, as discussed in 
previous section, the unavoidable floating and circulating of endless copies of signs 
and commodities split consumers’ consumption activity into unrelated segments. 
Without a signified and with the ubiquitous intertextuality, people are lost in this 
myriad play of images and thus there is nowhere to locate their subjectivity. 
Actually, the whole movie of Resident Evil, as well as its sequels, goes to great 
lengths and details to represent and show off technologies. For example, when they 
finally get to the chamber of Red Queen, there appears a Holographic representation 
of Red Queen in the form of a little girl who engages them in direct conversation. And 
there are numerous shots and scenes showing the sophisticated structure and 
equipment of that research facility. In the two minutes and fourteen seconds trailer of 
Resident Evil 1, the first half of it is all about such shots as the labs, the experiment 
tubes, the underground facilities, the surveillance camera and monitors, and all kinds 
of cybernetic technologies used by the protagonists, some of which are shown from 
the perspective of the central artificial intelligence. And the walking dead makes its 
first appearance only at 1:15 of the trailer. For a movie whose major theme is the 
zombie disaster and therefore the consequent horrors according to genre convention, 
the major focus of its marketing trailer is put on, however, the representation of 
technology. This is again a showcase that the technology-themed spectacle becomes a 
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selling point for contemporary blockbusters if we look at the classic zombie films that 
depended on gory horror as the major assets. 
In the same way, for Underworld, and its first and third sequel, Underworld: 
Evolution, and Underworld: Awakening, extensive segments spreading the whole 
trailer displaying various high-end modern weaponry used by vampires and lycans 
(werewolves), while the former is a species from ancient legend and the latter still 
wanders between human and beast. Such a strong contrast between the old, the 
mythical, the tribal (as of the vampires and lycans) and the new, the technological and 
the modern (as of the weapon they hold) makes even more patent and prominent the 
spectacle of that killing technology, because even the oldest form of creature – the 
immortal species evolving from legendary ages of dark, brutal and non-enlightened – 
knows that they need to adapt to and adopt the modern technics to survive. In the 
latest episode, the heroine Selene is confined in a tube that keeps specimen in a 
similar scenario to Resident Evil, for scientific research on the most powerful hybrid 
from vampire and lycan. The spectacle is no longer limited to that of a typical blood-
sucking creature that attacks by biting, but starts to include what bewitches modern 
audience – the technology of destruction, the promise of the better and the more 
powerful by scientific research. This succumbs to the logic of techno-rationality, “an 
inner logic of all modern social systems that has seen the rise of scientific techniques 
and technology as the overriding powers in society” (Slattery 86).28  
                                                          
28 Techno-rationality, however, also “sweeps aside individual opposition, rights and freedoms in the 
name of logical progress” (86), for which I will come back for discussion later.  
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In Aeon Flux, the erratic shape of building, the futuristic landscape, the hand-
shaped feet
29
, and fantastic secret weapons used by assassins constitutes a beautiful 
galley of the technological state in a post-apocalypse society which makes wide use of 
clone technology to keep human proliferate.  In Tomb Raider series, Lara Croft keeps 
changing and updating her cybernetic technologies, the special gadgets and devices 
for training, transportation, tracing, and communication, which include headsets, hand 
phones, GPS trackers, training robot, plane, computer (with her hacker technician), 
and holographic glasses. And besides the pistols (the twin Heckler and Koch USP 
Match) she always carries as her main sidearm in hip holsters (which are integral to 
her iconic outfit), she has been in constant engagement with multiple kinds of 
firearms, be them used by Lara herself or other characters (see List 1 and List 2 in 
Appendices). Take, once again, the opening scene of Tomb Raider Lara Croft as 
example where Lara Croft fights with a high-tech robot. The robot is made by Lara’s 
nerdy technician for her personal physical training, and also for “self-challenge.” It 
looks like automatic version of ordnance with double machine gun points as its two 
arms. It is a total killing machine that moves and reacts very fast (while the actual 
level of automatic robot researching of current time is still stagnating on how to make 
it move smoothly like a human), emblematizing the imaginary of what the future 
technology will be capable of. However, as high-end and undefeatable as the robot 
                                                          
29 The story of Aeon Flux is set in 2415, after a virus wiped out 99% of human population on earth. All 
the survivors live in a walled city-state ruled by a congress of scientists. Due to the infertility caused by 
the virus, people in this city are actually clones grown from recycled DNA. Aeon Flux is one assassin 
of a secret anti-government organization, and she finds out this scheme of human reproduction. In such 
a background, individual in this city can have some genetic surgery to make changes to his/her body 
part. Aeon Flux’s partner adopts such alternation and changes her feet into the shape of hands, so as to 
make her feet more flexible for mission. 
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looks, Lara finally takes it down after a few intense rounds and easily turns the robot 
into a music player by swapping its chip. This scenario, together with all the fancy 
equipment Lara utilizes for her purpose, seems to indicate that, as a super capable 
human being, Lara is in total control of the various forms of technology, and no 
matter how destructive the technology is, as most of them are technologies for 
military uses, she is totally able to make them to her proper use. 
However, this picture of mankind in perfect manipulation of technology is rather 
a utopian vision that could probably only be seen (visually) in Hollywood movies – 
the media images. The media representation, especially in entertaining industry, is the 
main location for people’s technological fascination and imaginary. Then the question 
is how such media images frame people’s perception (of technology) at all. Let us 
first see how these movies frame the use of technologies – Without the various high-
tech gadgets and multiple firearms, Lara Croft would not be able to locate the treasure 
or to wipe out the villainy; Red Queen (the artificial intelligence central control of 
Hive) dictates people’s life in Hive researching on T-Virus, while T-Virus decides the 
fate of the human race (in Resident Evil series); the ceaseless research on the most 
powerful hybrid of human and werewolf, if successful (to be continued in more 
sequels), would create the most powerful and species on earth (in Underworld series); 
and the clone technology is the only hope for human reproduction in a post-
apocalypse city (in Aeon Flux). From all these film images, technologies are depicted 
as essential and desirable, as the central theme, and as the almighty power either in 
blessing the human race or eliminating it. The media images preaching the imaginary 
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of a techno-utopianism are actually everywhere to see in addition to the genre films or 
similarly themed television shows. For instance, the advertisements of all kinds of 
commodities, which might include running shoes, medicine, cell phones, glasses, 
laptops, plastic surgery, telecommunication services, or massage chair, brand the 
high-tech-ness either in terms of design or functionality based on a discourse that the 
advanced technology would ensure a better life. As Baudrillard points out, the main 
locus people develop their imaginary is the screen: 
We live once in a world where the realm of the imaginary was governed by the 
mirror, by dividing one into two, by theater, by otherness and alienation. Today 
that realm is the realm of the screen, of interfaces and duplication, of contiguity 
and networks. All our machines are screens, and the interactivity of humans has 
been replaced by the interactivity of screens. Nothing inscribed on these screens 
is ever intended to be deciphered in any depth: rather, it is supposed to be 
explored instantaneously, in an abreaction immediate to meaning, a short-
circuiting of the poles of representation.                                  (Transparency 54) 
All the screens, all the media images instill in people a fascination with technologies, 
entrusting their longing for better life to the potential further development of science 
and technology – to their vision that one day the technology would enable human race 
to reach a utopian state in which every single problem would be solved by technology.  
This techno-utopian and techno-rational view, and the penetration of technology 
into every facet of society, however, is not necessarily a blessing. For one thing, there 
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is still, as said before, the gap between the technologically “have” and “have-not”. 
The most cited example of techno-rationality trend is the growth of monopoly 
capitalism, the growth of state control and planning of the economy, the spread of 
bureaucracy, of automation and mechanization. These are all rational and apparently 
sensible developments, but all of them create an increasingly impersonal and 
alienating world in which the individual seems increasingly powerless, isolated and 
frustrated. In One-Dimensional Man, for example, Marcuse argues that the two main 
classes in capitalist societies have ceased to be effective historical agents. 
“Domination is no longer by class but by the impersonal forces of scientific-
technological rationality. There is no opposition as the working class has been 
assimilated by mass consumption and rational production processes” (qtd. in Slattery 
86). For Baudrillard, the bigger concern is the interrelated effects of technology, 
media, and images on men who ultimately lose their subject position and uniqueness. 
He says, even if a utopianism has been achieved, it is achieved “by casting off the 
negative, by disseminating the energies of everything condemned by society within a 
simulation entirely given over to positivity and factitiousness, by instituting a 
definitively transparent state of affairs” (Transparency 43) Baudrillard characterizes 
our current situation as 
a man who has lost his shadow: either he has become transparent, and the light 
passes right through him or, alternatively, he is lit from all angles, overexposed 
and defenseless against all sources of light. We are similarly exposed on all 
sides to the glare of technology, images and information, without any way of 
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refracting their rays; and we are doomed in consequence to a whitewashing of 
all activity - whitewashed social relations, whitewashed bodies, whitewashed 
memory – in short, to a complete aseptic whiteness.              (Transparency 44)  
He compares the technological utopianism to a surgical compulsion seeking to excise 
negative characteristics and remodel things synthetically into ideal forms devoid of 
any distinctive traits. “If men dream of machines that are unique, that are endowed 
with genius, it is because they despair of their own uniqueness, or because they prefer 
to do without it – to enjoy it by proxy, so to speak, thanks to machines” 
(Transparency 51).  
Paul Virilio, another postmodernist theorist who looks at technology, raises his 
dispute to techno-utopianism by exploring the original purpose of technology and the 
relationship between technology, military and human history. According to him, the 
development of technology is bound up with the military system which provides its 
origins and impetus. So while the techno-utopian view holds that the technological 
progress drives human history, Virilio says, “history progresses at the speed of its 
weapons systems” (3). He argues that all media of the last two centuries are military 
technologies. For instance, radio and telegraph was invented for direct communication 
with and commanding of troops, and cinema was meant for providing a near-direct 
vision from the front for propaganda purpose. Although many forms of technologies 
are now further developed for non-military use, Virilio believes that technology 
cannot exist without the potential for accidents. This kind of accident is not only 
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restricted to the sense that a locomotive would be subject to derailment someday, but 
could also be from our loss of wisdom and sight of our immediate horizon because the 
real space and real time, or rather the reality, is largely remediated and framed by 
media images – the landscape of darkness blind us to the future collisions. If 
technology, in this light, is so closely related to the modern warfare, then media 
images frame people’s perception of the actual wars.  
Virilio and Baudrillard both have their arguments about the Gulf War, which, 
though, are quite different. Virilio uses the expression of “logistics of perception” 
(War and Cinema) to describe the use of images and information in war. By this term, 
Virilio means that in contemporary warfare, logistics does not simply mean the 
movement of fuel, ammunitions, tanks, and personnel etc., but also the movement of 
images both from and to the battlefield. In discussing about the creation of CNN and 
the concept of the newshound, Virilio explains that the newshound will capture 
images that will be sent to CNN, which may then be broadcast to the public. By 
logistics of perception, it also means the televising of military maneuvers and the 
images of war, the viewers of which are not only people at home but also the military 
personnel involved in the conflict. Thus the “field of battle” also exists as a “field of 
perception.” The Gulf War, according to Virilio, is a “world war in miniature” (War 
and Cinema 35). Baudrillard, on the other hand, has a rather radical argument that the 
Gulf War did not take place, an infamous argument incurring infinite dispute. By no 
menas is Baudrillard saying that these events never happened. By describing these 
happenings as non-events, Baudrillard actually attempts to make us question their 
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validity. He characterizes the Gulf War as non-event, where there is no shared, 
organic experience, but only individual viewers who are isolated by their 
technologically mediated experience. The war is “rather an atrocity 
which masqueraded as a war” (Merrin, “Uncritical” 447). The American army, by 
using powerful air forces, was not directly engaged in combat with the Iraqi for most 
of the time, thus suffering few casualties. And almost no report was made about Iraqi 
deaths. So in a way, the war “did not really take place” from the perspective of the 
West. In addition, people got to know the war in the form of images of propaganda. 
The media representations closely watched by the audience stripped of the possibility 
to distinguish the experience of what truly happened in the battlefield from its stylized, 
selective “simulacra” (Baudrillard, Gulf War 235) – or rather, spectacle. At this point, 
I do not intend to justify Baudrillard in his statement of “The Gulf War did not take 
place,” nor do I want to determine which one, Virilio or Baudrillard, has provided a 
more valid argument, but to, despite the radical difference between them, find the 
common ground for further argument – that they both point to how media images 
form people’s perception of events, of war, of technology in whatever use, and build 
people’s fascination with technology. 
Actually most of the action heroine movie narratives deliver stories about 
accidents caused by technology, and these accidents sometimes develop into war-
scale that put the whole human race at stake. The most salient example would be 
Resident Evil series. The “accidental” release of T-Virus – a most advanced type of 
bio-weapon research – leads to a world-wide infection, which turns human beings into 
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walking dead feeding on flesh. And in Aeon Flux, in order to keep in balance a society 
depending on clone technology for reproduction, measures must be taken by the 
government to eradicate the innocent living people to be replicated, and clashes 
occurs when the secret anti-government organization attempts to assassin the 
governor. These movies seem to send out warning signals that technology could be 
dangerous and threatening in that it would ultimately cause accident. However, 
narratively speaking, the movies usually manage to provide a solution to the 
disastrous situation caused by technological lapse, thus bringing the story back to a 
reassuring equilibrium. For instance, for Aeon Flux, the governmental conspiracy is 
finally debunked, and people in that city that used to be infertile begin to recover their 
fertility. The final shot of Aeon Flux showing a re-grown green world outside the city 
wall (the wall was used to segregate the city from the polluted outside world). And for 
Resident Evil, which is now still in serial production thus no closure yet, features 
every episode ending with Alice and her fellow survivors succeeding in killing the 
main monster and arriving at a zombie-free territory – though temporarily, indicating 
that there is still hope; and they manage to do so because they have all kinds of 
modern weapons as essential means for killing. In general, these movies, following 
Hollywood’s conventional storytelling in which good always triumph evil, also make 
sure that the righteous heroine will snatch the destructive power back from the wrong 
hands at the final moment, thus dissolving the tension or panic from a technological 
disaster. If there are bad people abusing technology, then there must the good ones 
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who make proper use of technology to strike a counter-force, thus renewing the 
assurance that technology is non-threatening and un-harming. 
Despite the depiction of what atrocity technology could incur in the movie, the 
patterned closure to finally quench the disaster actually works to reinforce the techno-
utopian discourse, because it turns out to emphasize how technology is able to keep 
itself in check. There could be problem caused, but the problem will eventually be 
solved by technology – a happy closure that could only strengthen people’s 
fascination. However, in addition to this recurring narrative of technology fixing 
technology, what works even more efficiently to further nurture people’s fascination 
is that as remediated by the high resolution big screen and especially after being 
visualized and amplified by special effects, the accident becomes a spectacle of threat, 
a spectacle of disaster, a spectacle of the mighty power of technology. In other words, 
what people see here are, again, media images that separate people from reality and 
simulate a hyperreality. “What such machines offer is the spectacle of thought, and in 
manipulating them people devote themselves more to the spectacle of thought than to 
thought itself” (Baudrillard, Transparency 51). That is to say, people are obsessed 
with the spectacular idea of technology more than the technology itself; their 
fascination with technology is based on a spectacle-ization of technology, a “wow” 
effect of “it can do this!” rather than “but it may cause that…”  
So it is not a choice between nuclear bomb or nuclear energy, but a spectacular 
thought of the nuclear. This spectacle-ization of technology, in some sense, could be 
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analogous to what Virilio sees as the second type of accident – an accident that 
happens whenever people are watching media images. This does not mean, however, 
the projector in cinema could burn down or explode and hurt people, but means that in 
front of these media images, we lose our sight of the immediate horizon – the 
potential threat posed by technology, and we are dazzled by the kaleidoscopic 
spectacles of technology, unable to foresee that the very technology we are looking at 
might cause collision in the future, be it fictional or not, and even already causes 
violence, pollution, or conflict today. And when things become spectacles, they are 
subject to consumption. If even a real war becomes a media image, a “non-event”, 
and a technologically mediated HD experience – then how could a fictional war-like 
scenario in a movie possibly dispel people’s fascination with technology? On the 
contrary, in front of the magnificent mushroom cloud explosion on the big screen, 
they are more in awe of the nuclear bomb, of the technological miracle. As 
Baudrillard says, “It’s beautiful, but it’s not war,” the Gulf War ends up a mediated 
event, a beautiful televised spectacle consumed by viewers. In a similar manner, the 
destructive power of technology is framed by that theater screen as a safe spectacle. 
Therefore as hard as Virilio expounds the close relationship between technology and 
war, the consumption of the technology as spectacles in these movies is just a “happy 




As the Spectacles of Heroines’ Bodies 
The sexualized bodies of female characters on screen have always been the most 
heated site for debate in feminist film study. The overall thesis of this debate 
concerning the female representation in mainstream films is that, to put it simply, the 
objectification of eroticized female body has put women in a degraded position under 
the hegemonic male gaze. The heroines here are subject to the same old cinematic 
practice of eroticization. Their bodies, in action as well as sexualized, are consumed 
as the other type of spectacles in these action heroine cinema. However, such 
consumption, I would argue in the following section, is much more complicated than 
that of the conventional female characters. This complication is caused not only by 
the fact that these heroines are active, strong, smart and skillful – all the traits that 
differentiate them from the traditional women in film, but also by the contemporary 
cultural-economic logic specified all along.  
 
         Subject or/and Object 
These action heroines do compose a lion’s share of spectacles for consumption 
in a type of cinema categorized under a generic entity pertinent to them – action 
heroine cinema, and the representation of the female lead (it is the heroine but not the 
hero) is thus indispensable. The way for them to become pleasing spectacles for 
people to look at and thus enjoy is through, on one hand, how they are presented on 
screen and, on the other, how the casting stars are framed in media. 
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The overall appearance of these action heroines is beautiful, slim, with nicely-
shaped bodily curve. Due to the necessity for action at any moment, their costumes 
are generally athletically oriented. They rarely wear high heels or any laced dresses 
that a stereotypical “lady” should be wearing, whether when they are on mission or 
not. For instance, in Tomb Raider I, when Lara Croft, as a famous archaeologist and 
wealthy heiress, attends an antique auction, a fairly formal occasion that may require 
a lady of her status to be dressed in suit at least, she simply wears a black motorcycle 
jacket and strides into the auction room with her sunglasses on. As what they wear 
enables them to leap easily into action, however, these action heroines are given 
signature costumes which highlight their femininity. Jolie’s Lara outfit is modeled on 
her game avatar, comprising a close-fitting black or light-blue vest and shorts which 
emphasize her rangy form and amplified breasts, black boots with combat lace-ups 
and fetishistic straps and her trademark pistols strapped to each thigh. Jovovich as 
Alice boasts the strangest “action babe costume” (O’Day 213). In Resident Evil I, she 
wears a long red cocktail dress, which she finds in bed prepared for her after a coma. 
The dress is held up by “the tiniest of shoulder straps and diagonally slashed at the left 
waist to reveal a short black mini skirt underneath, with plain black Prada boots for 
footwear” (213). Alice’s outfit, strongly suggestive of outwear as underwear, draws 
attention to her female body and, uniquely for Resident Evil series, she wears it 
throughout most of her ordeal, as the plot does not allow for costume changes (213), 
except when she borrows the black leather jacket of Spence – her lover and enemy. 
But in the following episodes, as the situation becomes bleaker and Alice becomes 
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stronger and more self-conscious, her outfit changes correspondingly from the red 
feminine dress to dark red vest and black long pants in the second episode, cowboy-
like wind coat with mini-pants in the third, military-style black criss cross straps for 
vest and shoulder in the fourth. Similarly, Selene (by Kate Beckinsale in Underworld 
series) is forever in her shiny leather black tights that make her sexy shape highly 
prominent, while rejecting with disdain the “perfect evening gown” provided by 
another female vampire of her clan, and occasionally in a long wind-coat outside. 
Elektra played by Jennifer Garner is dressed in a red corselet-like “armor” when she is 
on mission, which shows off her cleavage nicely. Charlize Theron’s Aeon Flux 
usually wears skin-tight black or white suit, or occasionally just two slice of cloth 
scarcely covering her chest. Her signature outfit consists of a back tight with a 
revealing area exactly above her plump breasts that gives a good view of their shape 
whenever she is in “sensitive” posture, like bending over. As a rule, their clothes 
ensure no tripping on lace, but also no slacks blocking their captivating curves. 
In addition to the feminine and sexualized, though not so explicitly, costumes 
wore by the heroines, literally all the films in study play knowingly with the 
eroticization of the female figure. Both Tomb Raider and Resident Evil include an 
early teaser shower scene in the first episode, where the heroine is unrobed, Lara 
turning coquettishly to one side to reveal the outline of her left breast while talking to 
her servant about what clothes she loathes to wear, Alice placed in a more Psycho-like 
scenario as she was found naked and wrapped in the shower curtain which she pulled 
down as she fell unconscious by inhaling the gas released by the Red Queen. Resident 
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Evil, however, “with its 15 UK certificate and US R rating, takes this eroticization 
further, making sure that Alice gets wet in the laboratory so that her nipples show 
through her dress” (O’Day 213) and, in almost every episode of Resident Evil’s 
denouement or beginning, returning us to her naked body as she wakes alone in the 
Racoon City hospital, or in Umbrella research laboratory. One of Lara Croft: Tomb 
Raider’s most successful action set pieces – the extraordinarily beautiful bungee 
ballet sequence, in which Lara jumps from the balcony to rock back and forth on her 
rubber ropes before using them to swing into fierce action – manages to put Lara in 
quite neutral shirt-pants-style pajamas rather than explicitly sexual woman-style 
silken gown, but her shirt, with only the first two buttons done up, actually reveals her 
upper body in an implicit and teasing way when she flips up and down. 
Also in Tomb Raider movie the second episode, after Lara Croft and her former 
lover and helper on the Pandora’s Box mission, Terry, escape from their enemy’s 
encirclement by parachuting off a skyscraper together, they hide and rest in a boat. 
“Newly showered and outfitted in a suggestive and strapless white wrap, Lara 
succumbs to a moment of passion with Terry in her stateroom.” Shot in hazy lighting, 
the scene “emphasizes the charged, sexual atmosphere, as Lara slides from beneath 
his prone body to sit astride him, pinning his hands and permitting the camera a 
partial view of her ample breasts” (Waites 209). Aeon Flux, in addition to its bizarrely 
revealing costume of the heroine, makes the eroticization consummate in a sex scene 
where we see Charlize Theron’s nude back and a subtle profile of her left breast while 
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she is riding on Trevor and trying to strangle him
30
. In Underworld: Evolution, 
vampire Selene and hybrid species Michael show us an elaborate love scene that is 
gleaming, tender and involves full side nudity of the two. When Michael reaches to 
unzip Selene’s leather tight from the back, the close-up of her hip curve under soft 
illumination makes an extremely sensually pleasing spectacle to look at.  
What labels these eroticized scenes of heroines as essential spectacles is that 
they are listed into the movie trailers as must-see shots together with all the other 
spectacular scenes illustrated in the previous section. In every single preview of these 
action heroine films, there must appear at least one cut that emphasizes the eroticized 
bodies or body parts of the heroines, be it partial nudity of her, sex scene, or a close-
up of her lips. For example, the shower scene of Lara Croft in the first episode, and 
the sexual scene with Terry in the second episode are all included in their respective 
official trailer. So is the sex scene of Selene and Michael in Underworld: Evolution 
trailer. As a rule, each scene will not last more than two seconds. It flashes and moves 
on to other spectacular images of shooting, fighting, or explosion. More often than not, 
the couple of seconds’ shot of sexy heroine has virtually nothing to do with the plot 
development or the generic necessity, for, narrative-wise, the exposure of her back or 
her breast is, after all, not an indispensable step to solve the enigma or to defeat the 
villain (she does not use her sexuality as weapon to seduce as femme fatale does after 
                                                          
30 Aeon and Trevor are a couple in their former-life. In their present life (renewed by clone technology), 
Aeon is an assassin from an anti-government group assigned to kill Trevor, the “dictator” who is 
actually an innocent and good leader. They both have vague memories about their former life and 
residual affection for each other. So when they meet each other in person, they fall into a moment of 
passion and make love, and after Aeon wakes from their intercourse, out of natural vigilance, she turns 
against Trevor again and tries to choke him. 
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all). Nevertheless, as irrelevant as they are in terms of hinting narrative, such erotic 
spectacles are essential attractions for audience, which has been a tacit routine in 
commercial films as long as there is a line involving relationships or sexual desire. 
This routine persists regardless of whether the main character is male or female in 
catering to, in psychoanalytic terms, the voyeuristic spectatorship, which I will get 
back to in detail later. Therefore, in addition to the condensation of technological 
spectacles mostly embodied in forms of weapons, explosions or fighting that work to 
fulfill people’s fascination with technology, these eroticized scenes seem to add the 
final touch to the spectacular trailer (or rather, the whole spectacular movie), the 
touch that fulfills the primal desire of looking. And when a woman, with fit and 
attractive body, occupies most of the screen time as the major player in various action, 
why not spice up the look with a little nudity? Not to mention that the particular 
beautiful body is incarnated by a well-known star. 
Marc O’Day, in his “Beauty in Motion”, terms what I call action heroine as 
“action babe”. According to him, “the term ‘action babe heroine’ is intended to 
capture the yoking together of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ elements which comprise this fantasy 
figure. She is at once – to draw on the contemporary popular cultural lexicon for 
describing beautiful young women – a ‘babe’ and, equally importantly, she is ‘fit’” 
(205). “Babe,” originally an expression for endearment in personal relationship, picks 
up its current meaning with infantilizing and sexist connotations from its wide 
circulation in media representations and everyday conversation, such as lads’ culture 
of men’s style magazines, soft pornography and internet site, and is used quite 
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unselfconsciously by many, particularly young people (205). And in a similar manner, 
“the use of the term ‘fit’ to designate physical attractiveness has emerged from 
commercialized sport and body culture into mainstream usage, stressing the idea of 
the body beautiful as the healthy, exercising, worked-on, athletic body” (205). And 
O’Day further elaborate, 
The circulation of extra-textual publicity and behind-the-scenes materials on the 
action babe stars, characters and movies draws pervasively on this “fit babe” 
discourse, highlighting the ways in which the gendered body of both the star and 
the action babe heroine are processed through the twin lens of eroticization and 
active strength. Representational gatekeeping in the action babe arena demands 
an actress who is “young” (usually in her twenties or early thirties), slim, 
shapely, often (though by no means exclusively) white and marketed as of 
primarily (though not necessarily wholly) heterosexual orientation, who 
repeatedly undergoes the celebrity makeover of the beauty and gossip industries 
and is willing to undergo what we can call “the action makeover” to prepare her 
for the rigors of fights and stunts in the action babe spectacle.                      (205) 
It is undeniable that the action babe stars are among the beauties of the contemporary 
entertainment industry. Several of them, Milla Jovovich, who plays Alice in Resident 
Evil series, and Charlize Theron, who plays Aeon Flux, for example, started out as 
fashion models and came to prominence as movie actresses. All undertake fashion, 
advertising and promotional work of various kinds. Jovovich, for instance, was the 
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face of L’Oreal and reputedly Miuccia Prada’s muse. Kate Beckinsale has worked in 
television and print campaigns to promote GAP denim, Diet Coke, Absolut Vodka 
and Lux Shampoo. Ever since Hollywood’s star system came into being, the erotic 
glamour and sexual availability of the famous actresses have been the key ingredients 
in the assembly lines of goddess. As such, the action heroines/the actresses are regular 
features of the articles for men’s style magazines, answering questions riddled with 
double entendres and suggestive “inside” details, while the pages are full of on-the-
edge-of-soft-porn pin-ups playing on the soft and feminine visual aspects of the stars 
(O’Day 206). For instance, in one of FHM (For Him Magazine), Angelina Jolie and 
Rebecca Romijn-Stamos are included in the portmanteau “American Beauties,” which 
contains large HD photographs of each in various states of undress and remarks such 
as Jolie’s: “I’m just a big softie” (O’Day 206). All these attention, publicity and 
promotion from media and popular culture for the casting actress have made the 
action heroine more of an invaluable asset in film to appeal to consumers – a 
spectacle dressed up by the cinematic mechanism.  
This spectacle of the action heroine functions as the central visual and narrative 
driver within the overall audio-visual feast which contemporary action-adventure 
aims to offer its audience. As Jose Arroyo suggests, at one level the action star 
operates as an integral production value, while the digital and other computer 
generated effects which deliver the requisite number of set-piece thrills in the action-
adventure entertainment package can be seen as forms of product differentiation. 
Arroyo argues that such a package delivers the effect of the sublime – the combined 
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effect of quick cuts, slow motion suspension, shots of different length, tone, music, 
star image, and any desired effect achieved by technology – “a greatness beyond all 
possibility of measurement or imagination.”31 The sublime here is a “ride,” a ride that 
“fixes people’s gaze with awe and rushes them headlong into terror, thrill, and 
fascination, a ride during which the viewer is too busy rushing through its aesthetics 
to think of anything but its erotics” (Arroyo 24). And at certain moments in the action 
spectacle the human body functions as an almost abstract graphic element within the 
overall orchestration of non-representational signs such as color, motion and music, 
an orchestration which at its most successful is not only obviously artistic but also an 
affecting contemporary representation of the sublime (23-25). So the movie itself, for 
instance, Lara Croft Tomb Raider, is a star vehicle structured around a protagonist: 
but it is not important to know much about Lara Croft, the character Angelina Jolie 
plays. What is important is how Jolie the star looks, smiles, leaps, kicks, outwits. In 
such movies, the star functions less as character than as an integral production value. 
Thus, Angelina Jolie as “Angelina Jolie” in Lara Croft Tomb Raider is its own kind 
of spectacle (as when she first reveals her face of Angelina Jolie after a number of 
shots of her training ground and the fighting robot in the opening scene). Moreover, it 
(her star image as a spectacle) is an integral part of the spectacle presented during the 
more elaborate action scenes. O’Day agrees with Arroyo in recognizing product’s 
commercial language and aesthetic language of representing the unrepresentable, but 
O’Day also points out that it is equally important to emphasize, from a 
                                                          
31 The sublime, originating from the Latin sublīmis, refers to the quality of greatness, whether physical, 
moral, intellectual, metaphysical, aesthetic, or literature.  
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phenomenological perspective, the unique ontological, photogenic and acting qualities 
of each of the action heroine actresses (207). He then suggests running a brief 
commutation test to the stars in the action heroine films. For instance, “how different 
Charlie’s Angels would have been if, as was mooted, Angelina Jolie had played the 
third Angel, or if Liz Hurley “was” Lara Croft” (207). And just as O’Day says, for all 
the wire-work and post-production effects, we are invited to believe that this is, for 
instance, Milla Jovovich – not a body double or a digital simulation – who jump kicks 
the walking dead who is attempting to bite her. The fact that (we believe) this is Milla 
Jovovich matters, and this is her that we want to look at with pleasure (207). 
Despite the fact that the contemporary female leads are still subject to the same 
old sexist configuration of male gaze and erotic objectification, however, I will argue 
that there are differences between the traditional heroine and this group of action 
females that newly rises in these two decades, and further elaborate on how their 
unconventionality works in today’s cultural-economic logic of consumerism and late 
capitalism. 
First, let us focus on what constitutes today’s heroine’s properties as different 
and unconventional. As discussed in the opening chapter about the comparison 
between the past female images and contemporary action heroines, the turning point 
is not how they look, but what they do, what role they play, and the fact that they are 
at the same time the central figure in the film that pushes forward the narrative and 
brings resolution to enigma, and peace to disturbance. All these complicated the 
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viewing process. Endless textual instances tell that the main role is taken exclusively 
by the heroine. As a living synthesome of intelligence, competence, resourcefulness, 
and toughness, she is the agent that controls the direction of diegesis development, 
brandishes swords and guns, and engages in perilous combat to overcome villainy and 
save the day. 
While traditional hero, gendered as male, like in James Bond, Die Hard, 
Superman stories, outwits and destroys the villain before finally wins the “princess” – 
the sexual object of the hero, here it is Lara Croft who is sent to find the magical 
triangle before the evil snatch it for vicious purpose in episode one, and to prevent the 
over-ambitious scientist from opening the Pandora’s Box in episode two; it is Alice 
who possesses the superb power she never abuses, and who smashes the ferocious 
monsters at each final scene; it is Selene who slashes the arch criminal into half, and 
manages to slaughter the darkest monsters while the “forefather of all power” fails to 
end the catastrophe simply because of his over-sentimentality and selfish intention. 
The function of “princess” in these films, on the contrary, is acted by men, who 
are more scared of the anomaly power, and are often rescued or protected by the 
heroines: Alex’s (in Lara Croft: Tomb Raider) life is retrieved by Lara who uses the 
triangle to reverse time and reverse the knife flying at him; Michael (in Underworld) 
can only huddle himself down in the corner while Selene stands in front shooting 
away the attackers; Mark (in Elektra), as a father supposed to protect his daughter, 
clings to Elektra for help. In addition to this functional invertion, some of these films 
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feature the female protagonist as the story narrator telling the story from her point of 
view, such as Underworld series, Resident Evil series, and Aeon Flux. This allows the 
plots to move forward along the heroine’s side of line. 
If relationship and romance used to destine women under the label of emotional 
animal that will finally be tamed by a Mr. Right, the action heroines have a firm and 
free control over their love life. They do have feelings, and fall in love, but that is 
lower priority, a peripheral interlude far behind their principle and pursuit. If the 
potential man is taking the side as noble as hers, she may accept him; if the man’s 
deed runs counter to what is righteous, she will resolutely give him up and take her 
priority. This rule is amply applied in the film texts. Aeon first hesitates to kill the 
dictator, Trevor (actually her former-life lover), whom she is supposed to assassinate 
so as to overturn his regime, because she finds a vague intimation and connection 
with him, but later when she discovers Trevor is not the real villain but the one who is 
trying to find the cure for all people, she is determined to assist him at the risk of 
being executed as a traitor. The reason why Aeon is reconciled with her former-life 
husband is because he agrees with her in that “leap of faith” to end the meaningless 
cloned life. The opposite case is found with Alice and Lara. Before Alice regains her 
memory, she is quite glad to accept the jacket Spence (her fake husband
 32
) offers her 
to shield cold, but once Alice discovers the fact that Spence is actually the one who 
causes the infection and wants to sell the T-virus in the black market, she resolutely 
                                                          
32 Spence and Alice are colleagues working for Umbrella Corporation under the disguise of a couple to 
protect the entrance to the underground facility below the mansion they live in. From the fragmented 
memories of Alice about their past, she actually loved him before she gets amnesia from the gas. 
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turns against him and finally kills him without any sympathy. At a final scene, Alice 
takes off the ring (property of Umbrella Corporation) with contempt and throws it 
away, which symbolizes her complete break from this “wrong” relationship and the 
nasty organization she is fighting against. In the same way, when Lara finds that Terry 
also covets Pandora’s Box, she shoots him without hesitation despite the help he 
offers before. Sometimes, these women act like a “Loner”. Elektra could have ended 
up in a “happy ever after” relation with Mark, a single father, and his daughter Abby, 
both of whom she actually loves a lot, but she walks away, maybe for fear that her 
“killer identity” may affect them, or simply because she is a free spirit. And a 
conversation shown below between Lara (L) and Terry (T) further presents this 
female “Loner” (Bont, Jan de, Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life): 
T: So where do I fit in? 
L: What do you mean? You’re the guide. 
T: I mean, when you think back on the vast scheme of your hugely adventurous 
life, where do I fit in? Was I the love of your life? Or just another bump on the 
road? Was I time well spent? Four months? More good than bad?...Come on, 
it had to be more than that, am I right? 
L: (pretending to be serious) You’re right. It was five months (laugh). 
T: You’re laughing at me. 
L: No, no. As a fact, (light-heartedly) I used to find you charming. 
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T: I am charming. 
The conversation shows a man, Terry, enquiring a woman, Lara, how much he weighs 
in her heart. This is a total reversion from the stereotypical scenario when this usually 
starts with the female raising the question – because more often than not, Hollywood 
movies tend to depict women as emotional creatures that think too much and care too 
much, as in most of the “weepies”33. But Lara here adopts a fairly light-hearted 
attitude towards romantic relationship. 
To play the reversion even further, some films intentionally fix the eroticized 
male body on display for gaze. In one scene of Lara Croft: Tomb Raider, Lara sneaks 
into Alex’s34 room to give him warning when Alex is in a shower. With complete 
composure, she confronts this wholly naked muscular guy, walks close to him, looks 
down at his lower part briefly and coquettishly, and says “Always a pleasure”, leaving 
Alex standing there looking embarrassed. This constitutes a pure erotic spectacle 
when the male character is put in a shower, a favorite practice of Hollywood to 
sexually objectify women. As action-adventure film used to put male body on show 
when they are in action or wounded, in whichever situation, his masculinity is said to 
allay his to-be-looked-at-ness. However, for this scenario, Alex’s muscular body 
                                                          
33 Also called melodrama films, which are a subgenre of drama films characterized by a plot that 
appeals to the heightened emotions of the audience. Such films generally depend on stereotyped 
character development, interaction, and highly emotional themes. Victims, couples, virtuous and heroic 
characters or suffering protagonists (usually heroines) in melodramas are presented with tremendous 
social pressures, threats, repression, fears, improbable events of difficulties with friends, community, 
work, lovers, or family. Film critics sometimes use the term “pejoratively to connote an unrealistic, 
pathos-filled, campy tale of romance or domestic situations with stereotypical characters (often 
including a central female character) that would directly appeal to feminine audiences” (Dirks T. 
“Melodrama Films.” filmsite.org website opinion: http://www.filmsite.org/melodramafilms.html) 




(though the image of muscle might carry a connotation of aggression) is in a passive 
state, (and his later action does not win him back any respectability, for he is 
destroyed by his own venality and needs to be saved by Lara) constituting a spectacle 
that may invite objectifying look from females, be it Lara (who is literally looking at 
him at ease), or the female spectators. The moment of Lara looking at Alex fixes the 
man for gaze, freezing the eroticized male body specifically for her visual pleasure. 
What else is interesting to know is that, through cross-referential clues, this male body 
makes a very celebrated object allowing for female gaze (in addition to a possible 
identification by male spectators). Alex in Lara Croft: Tomb Raider is played by 
Daniel Craig, who is the sixth actor to play James Bond, replacing Pierce Brosnan. He 
gains his fame through his highly acclaimed performance in Casino Royale. One of 
the film photos featuring him topless walking on the beach showing his beautiful 
muscle goes viral on the internet, used as an illustration of how a sexy man should 
look like, be it for heterosexual desire or homosexual pleasure.   
The phenomenon of the voyeuristic gaze has been extended to the male body 
that is objectified in films, advertising, fashion, and soaps. Since the 1990s, the 
male body has been fragmented, objectified, and eroticized. This was at first an 
influence from the gay movement, but now the male image has been made more 
heterosexual in the figure of the metrosexual35. The spectacle of an often nude 
                                                          
35 Metrosexual is a neologism derived from metropolitan and heterosexual coined in 1994 describing a 
man, especially one living in an urban, post-industrial, capitalist culture, who has strong aesthetic sense 
and spends a lot of time and money on shopping for his appearance and lifestyle. “The typical 
metrosexual is a young men with money to spend, living in or within easy reach of a metropolis – 
because that’s where all the best shops, clubs, gyms and hairdressers are. He might be officially gay, 
straight or bisexual, but this is utterly immaterial because he has clearly taken himself as his own love 
object and pleasure as his sexual preference. Particularly professions, such as modeling, waiting tables, 
media, pop music and, nowadays, sport, seem to attract them but, truth be told, like male vanity 
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and wet Daniel Craig in the latest James Bond film testifies to this recent 
development.                                                                                      (Smelik 182) 
Closely associated with this line of textual and extra-textual details is a 
complication of previous theorization about the look. The action heroine cinema 
breaks open, or rather doubles up, Laura Mulvey’s dictum. While in the classic 
Hollywood movie, it is the active male protagonist who acts as the “figure in the 
landscape,” the subject who advances the narrative, with “woman” connoting “to-be-
looked-at-ness” and freezing the narrative as the passive object of male gaze, the 
situation in these movies forms a sharp contrast with the movement of women into 
medium and even big budget starring roles, where the female characters not only do 
action but also confront supernatural force, science-fictional hazard or unprecedented 
horror, increasingly both the central hero and/or heroine. Although these action 
heroines are still, in different ways and with differing emphases, relating to the 
operation of power in a patriarchal society, they can be seen to function 
simultaneously as the action subject of the narrative and the erotic object of visual 
spectacle. The generic specificity further contributes to such complication, as O’Day 
says, 
While it remains the case that in patriarchy it is often men who look at women 
and women who are looked at, both the action hero and heroine can increasingly 
be viewed as simultaneously active and passive, both in action and on display. It 
follows that Mulvey’s opposition between narrative and spectacle finds little 
favor among action-adventure critics, who view both narrative and visual 
elements as part of the overall filmic spectacle. Hence the much used copula 
action/spectacle implies that the action narrative itself is as much excessive 
                                                                                                                                                                      
products and herpes, they’re pretty much everywhere” (Simpson, Mark, in “Meet the Metrosexual,” 
Salon.com, July 22, 2002) 
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spectacle as those lingering close ups of the hero/ine’s beautiful body 
traditionally described by the term.                                                                (203) 
The second complication, which delves into the issue of spectatorship in 
psychoanalytic terms, has something to do with the complex and fluid process of 
cinematic identification. Just as the action heroine can be seen to embody both 
masculinity and femininity, and to occupy both the position of (narrative) subject and 
(erotic) object, spectator identifications are thus not necessarily locked within the 
active, sadistic “male” gaze and the passive, masochistic “female” gaze. As reviewed 
in Section One, Chapter Two, plenty of critiques of popular cinematic genres, such as 
those by Mary Doane, Miriam Hansen, Jackie Stacey and so on, have by now 
demonstrated that each viewer is capable of making a range of identifications in 
relation to any given film. “Such identifications can, for instance, both confirm and 
question our gendered identities and they may be, however fleetingly, sadistic and 
masochistic, cross-gendered, and moving through a range of alignments and 
allegiances in relation to the unfolding filmic spectacle” (O’Day 204). 
Carol Clover’s analysis of the Final Girl in slasher movie, again, provides a 
detailed example of such fluid identification by examining the ways in which teenage 
boys and young men can identify cross gender with the Final Girl, “a figure combing 
feminine and masculine traits in ways partly comparable to the action heroine” 
(O’Day 204) except that the Final Girl is forced to take masculine measures after 
prolonged affliction and persecution while the action heroine gets this combination 
naturally imbued in her and seeks to deliver people from oppression. In the same vein, 
since it is the heroine who is more masculine than the male characters, who leads the 
story and triumphs at last, and who possesses the unique ability to combat, think and 
act, the viewers, whether male or female, may identify with, for instance, Lara Croft, 
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and follow her agency throughout the whole adventure of scheming, traveling, 
fleeting, and fighting, with Alice, and see the disaster from her perspective as the first-
person narrator, or with Selene, and align themselves with this vampire to gradually 
disentangle the conspiracy in her clan. As pointed out by O’Day, “the institutional 
context of the high concept cinema demands that, in the commercial jargon, movies 
are made and marketed to the broadest possible demographic, and in such a context it 
is more or less common sense to assume that the pleasures on offer will target diverse 
audience constituencies” (204). Hence in addition to the technological spectacles that 
appeal to all of us who are fascinated with the miraculous computer-generated images 
in the movie as well as the imaginary technologies depicted therein, the action heroine 
films, simultaneously, manage to satisfy the diverse sexual fantasies and desires. 
The action babe cinema provides an illuminating example of such processes, 
since it is clearly designed to appeal to both (mainly young) men and women. 
Along the have me/be me axes of desire, the action babe heroine can be seen 
most obviously to appeal not only to heterosexual boys and men, who desire to 
“have” her in fantasy but also to heterosexual girls and women, who desire to 
“be” her in fantasy. As Famke Janssen puts it, “we’ve always been ready for 
female superheroes, because women want to be them and men want to do them.”  
                                                                                                            (O’Day 204) 
However, while it is generally the case that the action heroine films stress the 
choices of heroines as heterosexual object, there are occasions in these films which 
offer the possibility of a range of lesbian, gay and/or queer identifications. For 
instance, in Resident Evil, the relationship between Alice, the relatively more 
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feminine heroine, and the muscular commando Rain (played by Michelle Rodriguez
36
) 
resembles the feminine tomboy versus masculine butch opposition. Since Rain is the 
first one of the team to get bitten by a zombie, the following plot thus partly concerns 
Alice’s attempts to secure the antidote so as to save her. As it becomes increasingly 
hopeless to get the cure, Rain makes Alice promise to shoot her before she is 
transformed into the monstrous Undead, but when Alice is about to do so, she grabs 
her gun, looks up at her and declares: “I’m not dead yet.” “I could kiss you, you bitch.” 
Alice responds in joy, which constitutes a moment which explicitly opens up a lesbian 
reading (O’Day 215). There are more instances of such identifications as that men 
who are either heterosexual or gay may cross-identify with either or both the feminine 
and/or masculine characteristics of the action heroine, thus fantasizing the “be me” 
aspects of cross-gender identification. Several of the action heroine stars also cater to 
lesbian desires, particularly Angelina Jolie, as mentioned before, deemed as bisexual 
thus serving a perfect incarnation for Lara Croft’s unstable identity, appeal strongly to 
lesbians, who may identify simultaneously along the “have me” and “be me” axes.  
Similarly, who is to say that women who identify as heterosexual may not in 
fantasy experiment with identifications along the “have me” axis? Or that they 
may not enjoy watching the action babe heroine as eroticized spectacle even if 
they do not desire her as a fantasy sexual object choice? Though these examples 
are false in so far as they attempt to fix and label psychic and bodily processes 
                                                          
36 Michelle Rodriguez is an American actress, who gains her fame through an independent production, 
Girlfight, by playing a female boxer in a male-dominated sport. Following this breakout role, she has 
played tough girls and starred in Hollywood blockbusters such as The Fast and the Furious series.  
203 
 
which are partial and fluid, it is clear that the action babe cinema offers 
pleasures to a wide audience.                                                              (O’Day 204) 
         Overall, the contemporary action heroine cinema has become a salient type of 
the action-adventure cinema, boasting of its wide range of pleasures. On one hand, the 
physical beauty and enticing sexuality of the female stars and the characters they play 
embody conventional qualities of femininity defined by patriarchy, which, by 
Mulvey’s thesis, relate to passivity, vulnerability, sexual availability and to-be-
looked-at-ness. On the other, functioning as central protagonists pushing forward the 
action narrative, these heroines can undoubtedly be coded as active, strong and 
masculine, constituting the figure in the landscape, the position traditionally occupied 
by the male hero in classical cinema. In crude terms, the action heroine is 
simultaneously both the erotic object of visual spectacle and the action subject of 
narrative, combining elements of the “soft body” of “woman” and the “hard body” of 
“man”, as well as traits of successful hegemonic patriarchal femininity and 
masculinity. Such an emblematic fantasy icon, by overturning and complicating the 
old tenet of look and identification, builds a dynamic representation for theoretical 
engagement. 
For whatever complication or disturbance these action heroine representations 
might be able to cause to the prevailing discourse concerning female characters on 
screen, or for whatever “correction” or counterbalance the portrayal of them as 
powerful subject could bring to the erotic objectification of them, the further 
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complication is how contemporary cultural-economic logic takes it, whether such 
disturbance or “correction” really works given the postmodern consumer culture that 
prevails, and how the cultural-economic logic of late capitalism could possibly affect 
the mass audiences’, or rather mass consumers’, reception of such empowered women 
(if only partially empowered). I will address these questions in the following part. 
 
         The New Apparatus 
For the first complication as to how action heroine combines subject of action 
and narrative and the object of visual pleasure, I would like to first stress the 
contextualization of the action heroine for further argument. Textually speaking, 
which means, considering the composition of the whole movie and its generic 
affiliation, these female heroes are positioned in a noisy and dazzling audio-visual 
piece replete of high-paced stunning effects that are busy displaying the spectacles of 
breath-taking action, blazing fantasy, fascinating science-technological miracle, and 
gruesome horror. What is more, this piece never ends at one stop of conclusion and is 
regenerated through an ever more intensified surface of images that keeps coming at 
us relentlessly. For example, in Tomb Raider the first movie, we see Lara Croft 
fighting a robot, racing motorcycle on expressway, and doing bungee with rubber 
ropes in her mansion’s giant lobby, while in Tomb Raider II, we see her in upgraded 
spectacles of punching a shark underwater, flying an airplane and landing it on water, 
and parachuting in a bat-shaped outfit from the highest skyscraper. In Resident Evil I, 
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we have only a brief glance of the monstrous licker at the closing of the movie, but in 
Resident Evil II, we see plenty of more evolved lickers in highly armed outfit 
destroying most of Alice’s team. In Underworld I, we see Selene and Michael against 
plain werewolves and vampires, while in Underworld II, we see them fighting the 
invincible ancestors of vampire and werewolf with much more bloodcurding 
appearance. In response to such fabulous feast of eye-candy, viewers adopt a set of 
mechanisms, which has been hatched ever since the flourishing of such banging 
blockbusters, to process such overwhelming flow of spectacles. This mechanism has 
been adopted by the audiences for a wide range of spectacular images in the same 
way as that of the consuming the technologically made spectacles (“the spectacular” 
as discussed earlier in this chapter), and it becomes ever more integrated with the 
audiences as ever more such florid blockbusters coming out with upgraded visual 
pleasure.  
If the consumption of the action heroine movies were to be compared to the 
consumption of a feast of delicious food as in the each image constituted a nice dish, 
the audiences took in the images in a way as a glutton eats – they swallow and taste 
but rarely (but not never) take time to digest the images (food). To put it in another 
simile, the process of watching a spectacular movie as Resident Evil or Tomb Raider 
is like immersing the viewers in the seas of images and spectacles. The “seas” would 
not pose any danger of drowning anyone, but provide a floating delight in pleasing 
and kicking the viscera, during which the audiences seldom make much effort to 
paddle, swim or dive to make any direction, but float on the surface to let the tide and 
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flow to bring them anywhere thrilling and pleasurable. This mechanism is like a 
standardized operation procedure, in which the representation of action heroines is 
treated or “streamlined” like whatever kind of images: look at it, marvel at it, and then 
move away and forget it. The mechanism continually asks the viewers to wonder at 
the technological miracle and to wonder – how did they do that? (how did those 
filmmakers manage to make such impossible images?) And the fact that they 
(Hollywood filmmakers) did it, and how they did it (as an often-asked question 
actually used to exclaim the power of technology) is “at least as important as why” 
they make these images there (Arroyo 25), or rather more important than why. That is 
to say, it does not matter if these spectacles make meanings or not in the narrative 
context, or if it is balanced or not to over-squeeze spectacles in one place or one 
minute, as long as these images are pleasurable to look at – this is the watching 
priority prescribed by the postmodern consumer culture. 
In most cases, the active agency of the heroine is embodied by the specific 
narrative development, for instance, who takes the initiative to pursue the justice, who 
possess the supreme power to right the wrong, and who is in control of his/her own 
course and the overall situation, which needs to be strung together from between the 
lines. However, with instant distraction of all kinds of spectacles and audience’s 
preference to the spectacular, the narrative details have been put as the secondary in 
the order of watching priority. And thus the active agency of the female lead is 
overwhelmed by all those amazing scenes and her own image as the spectacle, not in 
the sense that people ignore their appearance and existence (as a matter of fact, their 
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appearance is a very important spectacle to look at), but in the sense that the gorgeous 
exterior is the final destination for consumption, and there is little time or need to 
further contemplate on how the spectacles about her form her agency. The narrative is 
consumed together with the spectacles as a provisional line to at least string all those 
spectacles into a familiar story, if not only a fragmented story, or as a temporary 
closure in expectation for the next one (because there will be sequels!). Therefore, no 
matter how important and heroic the role the female lead has played in the story, no 
matter how strong and smart she is, no matter how resolutely she rejects a romantic 
relationship and pursue the justice, it just does not matter so much, for that level of 
meaning is far beyond the more pleasurable domain of consumption. So when Lara 
Croft is fighting a gang of villains quite skillfully, one may rarely look at this scene 
thinking that this woman is powerful. Instead he may look at the scene as a scene, the 
sign as a sign, as all consumer society is based on the consumption of sign value. And 
that is all that the viewer as the consumer wants, and hence not so much need to go 
further to make any deeper interpretation. Or one may have a more fragmented 
looking, looking at her slim legs, her rangy breasts, or her cool but sexy eyes, a way 
of bricolage-ing that is even harder to induce deep meaning. 
More often than not, the female lead that narratively leads the story and finally 
resolves the problem, the most significant agency in the movie, is actually considered 
as the “extra bonus” in watching the films. She is simply one of the consumer images 
that intend to amuse and entertain. Rather than being the “central agency in the 
landscape” in Mulvey’s term, she is more of the “central spectacle in the landscape”. 
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Just as what Arroyo said, in a movie that functions as a star vehicle, what is important 
is not what the character does, but how the star herself looks as a spectacle (26). 
While, however, what the character does is exactly what forms her agency, or, the 
subject position of the heroine, in this analysis, the subject position of her is not as 
important as her role as the spectacle. So that is to say, she is ultimately, as powerful 
as represented, reduced to the status of an object, be it sexual or not, because the star 
image itself is a spectacle already. So the derivative logic of consuming the action 
heroines is not as what postfeminist reading suggested: “as long as women are strong 
and smart, who cares to be subjected to erotic objectification?” but the quite tricky 
opposite: “as long as women are offered as attractive eye-candy, who cares about their 
superb abilities?” The audiences see the movie with a preferential order that is preset 
by their overall experience of blockbusters. The first to come to their eyes is what is 
pleasurable to the eye, the fast-paced fierce action involving punching, kicking, 
shooting, and bombing, or the erotic scene of naked Lara Croft having a shower. All 
this is exactly what the marketing is promoting to the public, and the consumer 
culture installs in the viewers. This industrial strategy well orients consumers’ 
watching habit, and convincingly labels the spectacles as the most valuable 
commodities offered in such films, which would satisfy enough once consumed. The 
audiences would rather stick to the eye-candy aspect of the woman than further 
process the fact that this same woman is smart and strong, for such films are thought 
to be sensual enjoyment that is best coupled with a pack of popcorn and a cup of coke. 
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So the complications raised earlier in this section that claims the action 
heroine’s subject position despite still being the sexual object, as well as the feminist 
or the postfeminist debates (reviewed in Chapter Two) on her being regressive or 
progressive representation, overlook how the proliferation of technological images 
invalidates their analysis that is based on a serious categorization of signs and referent, 
and the deep meaning of representation. For all these complications and debates, they 
are dealing with the connotation behind each image, and treating the movie still as a 
tool of the apparatus to interpellate individuals into dominant ideology, as if the 
movie itself still holds a certain kind of value in terms of ideological meanings. For 
instance, Lara in shower points to an objectification of female body thus a sexist 
representation of women; or Alice defeating the ferocious monster points to a certain 
empowerment of women; and such connotations through semiotic interpretation are 
supposed to work over people to the effect that they deeply believe women are sexual 
objects or women are powerful. But this way to analyze movies is premised on a clear 
distinction between signifier and signified, denotation and connotation, surface and 
depth, subject and object, or probably the use value of the film as a commodity (if 
there were, here the use value might be defined as “to learn and learn from a story”). 
And the problem with this analysis is that with the proliferation of signs, not only in 
and from these movies, but also in the whole mediated world, the semiological system 
changes – there is no distinction between signifier and signified, but signifiers replace 
the signified and float on a self-referential circle constructed by technological 
reproduction. If we incorporate Baudrillard’s critique of the political economy of the 
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sign here, the so-called use value has always already been the sign value; there is no 
such distinction of use value versus sign value, just as there are no deep meanings (the 
signified) versus the images (the signifiers) in the action heroine movies. There are 
only sign values, and there are only images, because “use value has been superseded 
by sign-value that redefines the commodity primarily as a symbol to be consumed and 
displayed” (Mendoza 50), the whole industry of blockbuster is configured under the 
supercedence of the sign value, the endless and depthless spectacles. This is not to say 
that the apparatus theory is outdated or completely disappears, just as ideological 
implications in these action heroine films are still there to see, either a worsened 
sexism or female empowerment. It is that the argument and conclusion reached by the 
traditional apparatus theory of film analysis is quite limited, leading to the conclusion 
of contradictory discourses but never could see through the opposition to reach further 
understanding of contemporary film mechanism, because it is unable to take the 
contemporary cultural-economic logic into consideration, the cultural-economic logic 
that deconstructs the very foundation of such analysis – the institutionalized 
categories of signification – through endless play of images and consumer 
commodities. And if there were still an apparatus, it works under the influence of the 
postmodern images and thus is changed in this new socio-cultural-economic logic – if 
the traditional movie apparatus subjugates individuals into the dominant ideologies of, 
for instance, patriarchy or hegemony, now the film apparatus subjugates individuals 
into endless images and signifiers with uncertain signification (of course this is not a 
sudden change and thus cannot be demarcated by a specific date, just as it is always 
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difficult to divide periodically the modernity and postmodernity). Again, I need to 
emphasize here that what is theorized as this new apparatus is not applied to all 
movies, but to the specific genres of the spectacular form and endless 
commodification. As the movie becomes a compression of spectacles, and 
reproduction of images is so prevailing, the action heroine films are subject to this 
logic as well. The movie, the images in it, the super strong action heroine, has been 
remediated as a symbol, a magnificent sign, simply to be looked at and consumed. 
In this way, no matter what message the movie might possibly deliver to the 
audience, the message, as in terms of deep ideological implication from signification, 
could only end up becoming massage that keeps making people sensually comfortable 
and pleasurable. This transition from “message” to “massage” resonates with 
Marshall McLuhan’s discussion of medium form as message, the often quoted saying 
by the Canadian cultural critic, with whom Baudrillard has long been associated. 
McLuhan’s thoughts on the collective experience of people in a “global village” and 
the transformation of our society and culture by electronic media all give a good 
preview of the key debates in postmodernism.  
Coincidentally, from his claim that “The Medium is the Message” in 
Understanding Media (1964) to his book titled The Medium is the Massage (1967), he 
also plays with this pun of message and massage. By “The Medium is the Message,” 
McLuhan means that the form of a medium (print, visual, musical, etc.) embeds itself 
in the message, creating a symbiotic relationship by which the medium influences 
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how the message is perceived. McLuhan argues that the electronic ways of 
communications, such as radio, television, films, and computers, have far-reaching 
sociological, aesthetic, and philosophical impact, to the extent that they are actually 
altering the ways how we experience the world. He puts the focus of study on the 
medium itself, but not the content it carries by arguing that a medium affects the 
society not only by the content delivered over the medium, but also by the 
characteristics of the medium itself. For McLuhan, it is the medium itself that shapes 
and controls “the scale and form of human association and action” (Understanding 9). 
He takes the movie as an example, arguing that the way this medium plays with 
conceptions of speed and time, transforms “the world of sequence and connections 
into the world of creative configuration and structure.” Therefore the message of the 
movie medium is this transition from “lineal connections” to “configurations” (12). 
Likewise, the message of a newscast about an atrocious crime may be less about the 
individual news story itself – the content – but more about how public attitude 
towards crime that the newscast engenders is changed by the fact that such crimes are 
in effect being brought into the home to watch over dinner (Federman). In his book 
three years later, The Medium is the Massage, his main argument is still that 
technologies are the messages themselves, not the content of the medium. By using a 
pun term “massage”37  McLuhan suggests that modern audiences have found current 
                                                          
37 The new title of his book, The Medium is the Massage as changed from “the Message” is said to be 
more than his own taste for pun or a clever fusion of self-mockery and self-rescue (in view of the fact 
that his saying “The medium is the message” became a cliché). However, there are also sayings that 
such a play of word is actually a typo mistake. The FAQ section on the website maintained by 
McLuhan’s estate says that, “actually, the title was a mistake. When the book came back from the 
typesetter’s, it had on the cover ‘Massage’ as it still does. The title was supposed to have read The 
Medium is the Message but the typesetter had made an error. When McLuhan saw the typo he 
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media to be soothing, enjoyable, and relaxing, just like how massage works on human 
body, connoting that the effect each medium has on the human sensorium, and the 
inventory of the “effects” of numerous media in terms of how they “massage” the 
sensorium. However, the pleasure found in new media is deceiving, as the changes 
between society and technology are incongruent and are perpetuating an Age of 
anxiety (Understanding 26). 
Therefore in McLuhan’s analysis, the message delivered by action heroine 
movies is its form as the cinematic images, as the spectacles, as the epitome of 
technological wonder and fascination. The logic of “the medium is the message” 
redefines what action heroine movies are composed of and how they are structured – 
it is less about the content of each individual movie, the story that a super strong 
woman saves the world, but more about the change in people’s watching mechanism 
engendered by the fact that the spectacles of high-tech and sexualized “star body” 
could be brought into people’s sight and enjoyment simply through the purchase of 
consumer products. And moreover, the message, in the form of spectacular images 
that are either highly sensualized digits or highly sexualized bodies, achieve the same 
kind of soothing, enjoyable, and relaxing audio-visual effects as the pleasure that 
massages could bring to the body.  
However, the argument could be pushed further if we look at how Baudrillard 
differs from McLuhan, especially in terms of how the endless play of signs and self-
                                                                                                                                                                      
exclaimed, ‘Leave it alone! It’s great, and right on target!’ Now there are possible four readings for the 




referentiality leads to the loss of reality. Although both of them are the key cultural 
icon for postmodernism devoted to the discussion of electronic media’s influence on 
people’s perception, Baudrillard emphasizes more on the supercedence of simulacra 
than “the medium is the message.” For McLuhan, the distinction between content and 
form is still there, though he sees medium form rises as a highly important factor to 
affect how people perceive the world, if not more important than the content. And by 
saying the “pleasure we find in new media is deceiving” he sees the new media based 
on certain reality and truth behind these deceiving pleasure. For Baudrillard, however, 
the medium is the message because the medium becomes the message – the message 
itself is irrelevant. That is to say, the medium is the message signifies not only the end 
of the message, but also the end of the medium. “There are no longer media in the 
literal sense of the term – power mediating between one reality and another, between 
one state of the real and another – neither in content nor in form” (qtd. in Brantlinger 
190). The medium/form/message has replaced whatever content there is, and becomes 
the content itself. If traditionally the media was said to mirror reality, McLuhan sees 
that the media is influencing reality, but Baudrillard sees the media replaces reality. 
By this, Baudrillard is suggesting that “there are no ‘media’ in the sense of institutions 
and cultural machines mediating between dominant political and economic powers 
and the population below. He claims that the media and ‘reality’ implode such that it 
is impossible to distinguish between media representations and the ‘reality’ which 
they supposedly represent” (Kellner, “A New McLuhan”).  
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In this way, it is not so much that we seem to attach more importance to the 
medium form than content and thus our perception of the world is ultimately changed 
by the medium as message but not the content as message, but that under this new 
apparatus, the content is the form, and the form is the content—all the stunning effects 
and the “star spectacle” is what we consume in the action heroine film – we replace 
content with the form, and the story, the effects, the scenes all become spectacles for 
consumption. Thus the logic (or the new apparatus) goes like this: the surface of the 
movie is exactly the “deep meaning” of these postmodern artifacts; there is no deep 
versus superficial, but only superficial just as there is no use value versus sign value, 
but the use value is already sign value, and there is only sign value. 
In the past, female images on screen were portrayed as passive and victimized, a 
vacuum sign designed by film apparatus to entice erotic look from male spectators. 
Now even if women are portrayed as active and strong, they are still subject to erotic 
objectification. It is not only because the female characters on screen are indeed 
depicted sexually attractive, but also because such strong and active depiction are 
treated as spectacles as well, and everything turns into spectacular images. This is 
largely prescribed by the postmodern condition, where people prefer dwelling 
comfortably on the visual surface, the spectacularization of everything. According to 
Turner, the cultural approaches to “film as representation” are ultimately to focus on 
the relations between films’ representational “languages” and ideology. He argues 
that there are two broad categories of culturalist approach to the relation between film 
and culture: textual and contextual. Textually, the ideological meanings are conveyed 
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through the conventions and codes for both narrative and image. This is the first, or 
rather traditional way of looking at the world, the A-World as argued by Bauman in 
his understanding of Badudrillardian simulacrum, a world in comparison with the new 
world order and logic, the B-World. 
The A-World is preoccupied with the search for meaning. Meaning is, after all, 
the relation between elusive appearance and solid, yet hidden, reality. Meaning 
is the hard, yet invisible core wrapped tightly in what offers itself to the senses, 
what can be seen and heard: the signifier. That core can be recovered if the 
carapace of the signifier is broken. The A-World needs detectives; Sherlock 
Holmes, who never trusted things to be what they seemed, is that world’s 
archetypal hero. Yet the detective true to his name never treats things lightly—
however untrustworthy he suspects them to be. They may bear false evidence, 
but they are evidence all the same. Appearances lie; but to say that they lie is to 
corroborate (indeed, to construe) the existence of truth. Mistrust of appearances 
sustains (and is sustained by) the unshakeable trust in “real things”. However 
misleading, the appearances are charged with meanings.                                (35) 
The A-World is thus the first or second order simulation, where a reality is still 
out there for what is false and fake. Whereas the B-world is subject to the new logic 
or the new apparatus stated above, and in this world, there is no reality, 
The B-World, on the other hand, has no time for Sherlock Holmes. Not that the 
B-World agrees to live at peace with a lie (whenever alerted to a lie, the 
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residents of that world would be pushed off course and react angrily and 
neurotically); but having been awarded immortality at birth, all things stand 
ultimately for nothing but themselves—there is no division between things that 
mean and things that are meant. More exactly, each such division is but 
momentary, protean, and ultimately reversible. There is nothing outside the text’ 
(Derrida); there is no “outside” in the game of signs. It is just by linguistic 
inertia that we still talk of signifiers bereaved of signifieds, as signifiers; of signs 
which stand but for themselves, as “appearances.”                                          (36)   
Such is the world of third-order simulacrum, where the production, viewing and 
consumption of action heroine films take place. This conceptualization of two worlds 
does not mean there is a clear timeline between the A and B world, nor does it mean 
that now we are all living in the B world. It is not a question of “either-or” but that 
these specific movies in concern reflect the key features of the B world. Therefore, the 
ideological meanings said by Turner tend to disappear in the texts of action heroine 
films, but are replaced by a new set of “ideologies” of how to consume the images. 
This is not about that there is no narrative, but that the narrative is overridden by the 
spectacle, so the meaning (in the A-World) that can be made from narrative is quite 
minimal. According to the new set of “ideologies” (or logic, apparatus), the excessive 
presentation of images, or the spectacularization of images, entails mostly sensual 
amusement to be “looked at” but not to be “looked into.” The media intensify 
massification by producing mass audiences and massification of images, ideas and 
experience. The masses absorb all media content, the content such as the strong 
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agency of the heroine, neutralize, or even resist, meaning, and demand and obtain 
more spectacle and entertainment, thus further eroding the boundary between media 
and “the real,” spectacular movies and ideologies. In this effect, the media, the 
cinematic images implode into the masses to an extent that it is unknowable what 
effects the films have on the masses and how the masses process the films. Therefore, 
when we examine the contextual element of these films, we come to know that the 
textual failure to produce ideological readings is, for a large part, if not wholly, due to 
the overall cultural paradigm of the postmodern condition: depthlessness, the over-
proliferation of commodified images, the obliteration of form and content, and 
accordingly, the sensation-seeking masses who endeavor to “mass-taste” everything. 
This further leads to an overwhelming objectification of everything. As Tasker 
argues, in a patriarchal culture typically representations of the action hero which put 
his body on show allay the erotic and feminine qualities of his “to-be-looked-at-ness” 
by stressing his activity (23). By contrast, representations of the action heroines as the 
figure in the landscape allay their active masculine connotations by stressing the 
heroine’s sexuality and availability in conventional feminine terms. What I want add 
to this argument here is that, the action heroines’ masculine active connotations is 
allayed by their sexuality and availability stressed on screen with specific costume, 
scenario or shooting angle, but also and more by the overall cultural atmosphere to 
objectify everything, in which viewers primarily tend to focus on pleasurable images, 
and participate in this hedonic consumption. The to-be-looked-at-ness is generalized 
to anything, anybody. The case and logic now goes like this, first of all, I take an 
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objectifying look simply at everything, and the sexualization and eroticization is only 
a way to make the image of the heroine a more attractive object to look at.  In other 
words, sexualization does make them spectacles for voyeuristic male gaze, but the 
reason why they are consumed as purely spectacle as sexual object regardless of their 
active agency is surely because they are sexualized, but the more important reason is 
people’s urge to consumer spectacles as pure spectacles, and that people treat them 
habitually so. The so-called male gaze has turned into numb gaze, the amplified gaze 
that has become so habitual to take in anything spectacular, but not specifically at 
somebody or something, that it tends to neglects the further interpretation of how such 
representation of the heroine as active agency creates a discourse that put them in a 
subject position, despite the fact it does not neglect the spectacle of the heroine’s 
high-profile appearance and awesome action. 
This relates to the reversed look at male body and the rise of metrosexual 
mentioned earlier in this section. The neologism of metrosexual has now become an 
image more digestible for consumers: a heterosexual male who takes care of his 
feminine side – he color-coordinates, exfoliates, and cares much about his skin 
condition. However, metrosexual is more of a product from the postmodern consumer 
culture than of an ideological reversion against patriarchal masculinity. As Simpson 
puts it: 
For some time now, old-fashioned (re)productive, repressed, unmoisturized 
heterosexuality has been given the pink slip by consumer capitalism. The stoic, 
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self-denying, modest straight male didn’t shop enough (his role was to earn 
money for his wife to spend), and so he has to be replaced by a new kind of man, 
one less certain of his identity and much more interested in his image – that’s to 
say, one who was much more interested in being looked at (because that’s the 
only way you can be certain you actually exist). A man, in other words, who is 
an advertiser’s walking wet dream.                                 (“Meet the Metrosexual”) 
It is similarly about “being looked at” as what women have been through ever 
since the first consumer commodity invented for women to beautify themselves. And 
this male interest in “being looked at” is a result from the intersection where an 
exhaustive consumer culture and people’s fascination with images meet each other. 
Companies and advertisers bend on selling any possible product while making 
desirable good looking an ultimate goal of one’s lifestyle. While there are views 
holding that metrosexuality is a naturally occurring phenomenon, at least partly, 
resembling the Aesthetic Movement of the 19
th
 century, and that the metrosexual is 
just a modern embodiment of a dandy, Simpson, however, strongly refutes such 
suggestion of metrosexual being “just a dandy”: 
A metrosexual wouldn’t be caught dead in a powdered wig – though he might 
be tempted by the stockings and buckled shoes. Sorry to be pedantic, but 
dandies were an 18
th
 century phenomenon. Metrosexuals belong to the 21 
century. Dandyism was the pursuit of an elite, mostly aristocratic, or want to be 
aristo group of men and was largely a way of advertising their wealth, idleness 
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and refined taste. Metrosexuality is a mainstream, mass-consumer phenomenon 
involving the complete commodification of the male body. It takes Hollywood, 
ads, sports and glossy magazines as its inspirational gallery, rather than high 
classicism. The metrosexual desires to be desired. The dandy aimed to be 
admired.                                                                           (“Metrodaddy Speaks!”) 
With the widespread phenomenon of male body on display, featuring handsome 
men with six or eight abdominal muscles in magazine cover, on poster advertisement, 
on television show, and in movies, either for homosexual desire or for female pleasure, 
is a commonplace in every developed city now. To give the example of eroticized 
male body here, however, is not intended to exemplify as consolation for the sexist 
representation of women that has been smothering for so long, nor as an 
counterbalancing gesture to “call it even”, but to draw attention to the expansion of 
look that is over gender
38
 and penetrates into every corner of everyday life, and to the 
proliferation of spectacles, be it a nude male body, a nude female body, or a giant 
bomb and tremendous mushroom cloud. As long as these spectacles catch attention, 
fit the eye, satisfy fascination, and finally sell, it is a matter of “who cares whether it 
is a man or a woman, or a tree”. That is what the depthless culture of late capitalism 
requires. 
In this discourse of objectifying everything for looking and for consumption, 
everything is thus commodified, and this everything even includes human subjects. 
                                                          
38 It is certainly not only over gender, but also across sexuality, race, class, and so on, only that the 
focus of discussion in this study is on the issues of gender in action-oriented cinema.   
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Just as what Simpson says, the metrosexuality is a commodification of male body. 
Being commodified, men are thus turned into objects, objects for sale in exchange of 
looking, objects for display as an image appearing exactly under the directions 
signaled by the advertisements, the magazine features, and the whole media. The wide 
range of products advertised to metrosexuals(-to-be), which include clothes, shoes, 
accessories, skin products, hair conditioner, or even make-up, intend to build a group 
of individuals into that specific image by making them purchase the products. To 
become a metrosexual is rather a consumer choice than an identity choice, because to 
appear in certain images needs to be dressed up in certain brands of commodities 
according to the only information telling about metrosexual – the advertisements or 
the fashion magazine recommendations. That is to say, rather than saying that there is 
a spontaneous urge in some men to use wax, and then the market reacts to such 
demand and begins to sell men’s wax, it is the opposite – that the media, 
overspreading advertisements in any form, constructs such a desirable image for men 
to pursue and purchase – a sign value that stands for one’s taste in fashion, one’s 
social status, and one’s desire to be desired. This is quite a reversed consumer 
marketing, in that it is no longer consumer demand instructs what is to be produced, 
but the commodities instruct needs. As Baudrillard says, “everything has to be 
sacrificed to the principle that things must have an operational genesis”, which means, 
consumption is no longer the simple enjoyment of goods; it is having (someone) 
enjoy something – an operation modeled on, and keyed to, the differential range of 
sign-objects (Transparency 45). In this case, “communication is a matter not of 
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speaking but of making people speak. Information involves not knowledge but 
making people know. The use of the construction “make” plus infinitive indicates that 
these are operations, not actions” (45). The point in advertising and propaganda is not 
to believe but to make people believe. “Participation is not an active or spontaneous 
social form, because it is always induced by some sort of machinery or machination – 
it is not acting so much as making people act” (46). The wanting, therefore, to be a 
metrosexual is thus always preceded by being made to want to be a metrosexual, as 
said by Baudrillard, 
These days even wanting is mediated by models of the will, by forms of making 
people want something – by persuasion or dissuasion. Even if such categories as 
wishing, being able, believing, knowing, acting, desiring and enjoying still 
retain some meaning, they have all been monopolized, as it were, by a simple 
auxiliary mode. Everywhere the active verb has given way to the factitive, and 
actions themselves have less importance than the fact that they are produced, 
induced,  solicited, media-ized or technicized.                         (Transparency 46) 
Therefore, in this age of the factitious, there is no more wanting, only getting 
people to want, getting people to want to condition hair, to use hair gel, to wear 
sunglasses, or to put on make-up. There is no more knowing, only letting know, 
which is the first step for advertisements in general. There is no more being worth 
something, merely getting something to be worth something, which is the ultimate 
goal of advertisements in general. And last but not least, there is not so much enjoying, 
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not so much taking pleasure, as getting people to enjoy, getting people to take 
pleasure – taking pleasure in being a metrosexual because the media tell you that it is 
pleasurable. It thus can no longer be said that the metrosexual is an identity as what a 
“hippie” could be. Hippie as identity is a movement and subculture that adopts a 
certain life attitude not specifically through consumer goods. The metrosexual, by 
contrast, is a look: it is oriented not towards a set of value systems that define their 
subjectivity (except for how they convey the sign value of the metrosexual), but 
towards the image’s (the image of metrosexual) “potentiality as a field of operations, 
as something that we cause to function because, just like any machine, it asks to be 
activated; because, just like any signal, it asks to be switched on” – that is, a field of 
consumer choices that must be made – “hence the deep vacuous-ness of the action’ 
content” (Baudrillard, Transparency 47). And through those numerous consumer 
choices which seem to be made on their own, but actually subject the operational 
genesis, the metrosexual finally achieve a perfect look, a status of object to be looked 
at – in other words, the consumers become the objects, the objects to be consumed 
through the mechanism of looking. 
And then, according to Baudrillard, what the compulsion to the operationalism 
gives rise to is an “operational paradox.” The order of the day is not only “making 
something worth something,” but also that if something is to be invested with value, it 
is better for it to have no value to begin with. 
225 
 
better to know nothing in order to have things known; better to produce nothing 
in order to have things produced; and better to have nothing to say if one seeks to 
communicate… The implications for communication and information networks 
are incontestable: in order for content to be conveyed as well and as quickly as 
possible, that content should come as close as possible to transparency and 
insignificance... Thus good communication – the foundation, today, of a good 
society – implies the annihilation of its own content … (and thus) good data-
handling implies a digital transparency of knowledge. Good advertising implies 
the nullity – or at least the neutralization – of the product being advertised, just as 
fashion implies the transparency of women and their bodies – and just as the 
exercise of power implies the insignificance of those who exercise it. 
                                                                                                   (Transparency 47)  
As what is theorized about the society of spectacle, the spectacle is considered 
to be a tool of pacification and depoliticization which “stupefies social subjects and 
distracts them from the most urgent task of real…” and “relegates subjects to the 
critical and creative margins of society and to obscure the nature and effects of its 
distorting power” (Best 47). The spectacle of male eroticization, thus, is not 
specifically to pacify women for making them sexual objects of men, but to pacify, to 
an overall effect, all individuals living in the society of late capitalism and thus 
subject to the living logic of such society. Spectacles are produced and reproduced to 
convey no message that is related to what is represented in that spectacle, but to 
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dedicate to one single effect of inculcating the consumption mechanism – indulge in 
the spectacular, look at the images, but never look into or look through them. 
Therefore, these films, being the vessel of depthless images when the “end of history 
and the end of social” prevails (Featherstone 98), have turned into something 
apolitical. The ideological implantation, if any, into these film texts is made invisible. 
According to Baudrillard, “representations, as a visible and intelligible mediation of 
the real, could refer to the depth of meaning” (“Simulacra and Simulation” 180). But 
here, these images of women are purely simulated images, i.e. simulacra, in which all 
sense of origin is lost in the play of endlessly replicating sign systems. For instance, 
the signs of Lara Croft are replicated into color print for hanging on the bedroom wall, 
into online graphics for downloading and remediation, into plastic action figure for 
fan collection, or into illustration in pamphlet for game walkthrough. Reality has 
entirely disappeared beneath the glossy, seductive, surfaces of simulation. These 
“representations” of women, not only conceal the fact that there is no such reality as 
what is represented (that women can be superheroes), but also blocking the possibility 
of finding out the real reality that women are actually exploited to boost box office. In 
this way, any feminist political engagement with the film texts is trivialized and 
invalidated. 
The second aspect about the contextualization of action heroine is the 
composition of the movies’ extra-textual environment – the sequels, prequels, spin-
offs, merchandising, and theme park ride, all that makes the title of each action 
heroine film a composite commodity that is elaborated in the first section of this 
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chapter. The process of moving the image of, for example, Lara Croft, from video 
game to cinema screen, then to printed posters, to action figure, to comic books has at 
the same time put her image in different shape, different scenario, different context, 
and different narrative, creating multiple signifiers of difference, which, however, 
point to nothing called the signified. In the movie, she is the attractive female lead 
played by Angelina Jolie; in the game, she is the voluptuous avatar for treasure 
hunting missions; in the poster, she is the pin-up babe for sexual fantasy; as action 
figure, she is the essential collectible for aficionados; in comic books, she is the two-
dimensional character in another story; in theme park ride, she is barely there except 
for some transient appearance to remind the theme of the ride. Each appearance 
constitutes a simulacrum resulting from endless copying and replication. The real one 
(or the signified, if there is any), which is initiated as a digital existence for large-
scale reproduction as discussed in the first section of this chapter, has long been 
inundated by the sea of images of Lara Croft.  
When the image we see is no longer a representation, but multiple vacuum 
simulacra, the subjectivity the female hero is supposed to earn is dissipated as such 
with each copy of her coming into being. She could be, at once, the game avatar that 
has been undergoing instant change in graphic design, the movie protagonist whose 
featuring star holds “the public image of instability” (Polsky 35), the pin-up babe that 
might be Angelina Jolie in costume or any other hot model playing her, and the plastic 





 of Lara Croft not only disintegrates her own subjectivity, but also 
makes it difficult for viewers to identify with her, no matter how fluid, complex and 
transient the identification might be. And such inability to identify is ascribed to, on 
one hand, the changing nature of the movie into composite commodity, which thus 
crumbles the wholeness of a certain identity, and on the other hand, to the ensuing 
changing nature of spectatorship as discussed before.  
From the traditional spectatorship (or more of a psychoanalytical spectatorship) 
dedicated to a dark theater with the machine projecting from behind onto the big 
screen in front of the viewers, contemporary hyper-spectatorship comes from a 
knowing audience with a more fragmented experience that transcend media, time, and 
text. Watching Tomb Raider movie on a computer screen or a DVD player, no matter 
how hard the viewer tries to imitate the cinema environment by dimming the light or 
upsizing the screen, is ultimately different from the two-hour long fixation in movie 
theater. The viewer could pause to make a tea or have a small chat with friend on 
Skype, could fast forward to skip boring part, replay the favorite part in slow motion, 
or even go online to search for the film reviews at any time in the middle of the movie 
as he wants. The viewing as such is an interrupted and casual process that summons 
little possibility of identification. Even when the viewer watches the movie physically 
in a movie theater, the knowing hyper-spectator, who lives in an age when any 
content and information is one click away for consumption, and is quite familiar with 
                                                          
39 The identity here is not a textual one defined by the narrative, such as where the protagonist comes 
from, what is the race, gender, class of that protagonist and so on, in which aspect, the movie actually 




the genre convention, the filmography of certain directors, actors, or actresses, could 
be engaged in a viewing process full of intertextual associations jumping from one 
scene in the present movie to that of another one, from the “real” Angelina Jolie to the 
character – Lara Croft – she plays, from the seeing Angelina Jolie to thinking of her 
other films or even the products, commercials, and gossips she is involved in. Based 
on the existent distractions from endless bombing and shooting spectacles within the 
movie text, the further distraction from this extra-textual reference reinforces the 
fragmentation of the viewing process and thus re-destabilizes the image of the action 
heroine. Given such fragmented references and chaotic contexts, the subjectivity of 
Lara Croft, however active in previous textual analysis, collapses into pieces. 
Identification on the part of viewers, consequently, has to become so weak that it will 
eventually be replaced by the sole mechanism of look. 
For Resident Evil series, the Baudrillardian simulation and simulacra is even 
more apparent. In addition to the routine reproduction practices as spin-off and 
merchandising, Alice, the recurring action heroine of all the existent five episodes, is 
not a character of the games series where the movie is adapted from. As a wholly 
fabricated but the leading figure in the movie, Alice has no background, no reference, 
and even no memory in the first episode. She is primarily portrayed in Apocalypse 
and Extinction as “a supremely efficient killing machine” and bio-weapon, while in 
the first film, she is shown first recognizing her abilities as a highly trained yet human 
security operative. Although the name Alice was given as the character’s name prior 
to Resident Evil’s release and is listed in the credits, her name is actually not spoken 
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in the first film (it is first spoken in Resident Evil: Apocalypse, the second film)
40
. 
What is also interesting to know is that from the third movie of Resident Evil, the 
story involves a literal reproduction of her – cloning of Alice in a mass production 
style for bio weapon experiment, which reveals that her lack of background is actually 
replaced by a background fabricated by clone technologies or the film technologies 
that is in line with the economy of reproduction. In the fifth episode, one of her clone 
used for disaster simulation is killed by zombie while the 6-year-old daughter of her 
clone is left alone. Alice, in the following happenings, takes the role of the little girl’s 
mother and brings her everywhere she goes, despite the fact that she is not her mother 
in any sense. This further confuses her identity in that it is not easy to answer the 
question of which is the true Alice, or whether her clone’s implanted memory could 
be considered as a part of her identity. After all, she is merely one of the objects for 
scientific experiment, which goes wrong. Although the only option for identification 
is Alice, the only survivor that fights steadfastly throughout the five movies, she is 
simply a killing machine just like any other characters, who, ironically, have their 
counterparts in the game, fighting against waves of zombies and monsters.  We do not 
know who she is in the movie narrative, nor can we find any clue from the extra-
textual source of the namesake video games. This is exactly how second-order and 
third-order simulacrum works – the image of Alice actually covers the absence of 
such existence of her as active agency wielding her subjectivity. Like any of her 
clones, she is only a shadow. In a similar manner, Aeon Flux, from the ever beginning, 
                                                          
40 From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resident_Evil_(film_series) 
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is already a clone of her former-life genes with barely any trace of memory about that 
life. In herself, she is a simulacrum that comes out of nowhere, covering the actual 
non-existence of this action woman with superb abilities. 
What is more, the fragmentation of the objects for viewers to look at and 
consume not only dissipates the subject position of the action heroine as character on 
screen, it also further crumbles the subjectivity of the viewers. Baudrillard argues in 
The System of Objects that in this postmodern consumer culture, “people define 
themselves in relation to objects” (16), but as objects lose their stable referent and 
take multiple forms, as perfectly exemplified by Lara Croft’s quilting and plural 
affordances in movies, in games, in prints, in polygons or in pixels. In Jameson’s view, 
“the loss of reality leads to reduction of the traditional autonomy of the self, since 
with postmodernism the individual subject is no longer able to define itself 
reciprocally against a reliable, exterior object” (qtd. in Easthope 22). Thus the self is 
“displaced in postmodern culture by ‘the fragmentation of subject’; there is no affect, 
no depth, because there is no longer a self present to do the feeling” (Easthope 23). As 
the totalizing consumerism and commodification together with multinational 
diversification corrode people’s awareness of reality through pastiche and endless 
copies, the individual subject thus disappears (23). The postmodern consumer is one 
that could be epitomized by television viewer, according to Baudrillard, sitting 




The archetypal decentered subject with a maximum attention span of three 
minutes. Living in a world of schizophrenically fragmented instants, she cruises 
the surfeit of channels available to her, zapping her remote control and hopping 
between channels and programs unconnected by time, space or genre. She is 
unconcerned with narrative, coherence or rational understanding; rather, she 
constructs a largely random bricolage out of bits and pieces of television, which 
she connects with only in a bored and distracted fashion. She is the viewer, 
figured in a cryptic and almost science-fictional way.                (qtd. in Sim 116) 
As decentered subjects, individuals could find their relationship with the on-
screen images that also lose the subjectivity quite tricky and perplexing. For one thing, 
the loss of subjectivity of on-screen heroines interrupts the spectatory alignment. For 
another, the fragmented subjectivity of individuals suffers a similar tendency of 
becoming objectified by means of various consumer “action.” As discussed earlier 
about how the operational genesis works to forge the metrosexual into commodified 
objects, such “operational genesis” has actually long been in practice before 
metrosexual – on women (and of course on all consuming individuals regardless of 
gender). The long, wide and elaborate range of female-oriented products and services: 
skin care products (for different types of skin), hair products (shampoo, conditioner, 
dye, gel, and also dedicated to specifications for different types of hair), make-up (for 
eye lids, eye lashes, eye lines, brows, face, cheek, lips and so on and on), body 
products (again, for washing, nourishing, and care), , accessories (earrings, necklaces, 
bracelets, hats, scarves, belts, purses…), clothes (skirts, dresses, blouses, straps, 
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strapless, underwear, stockings…), and shoes (for different colors, seasons, brands, 
types, materials, heels…), and dieting pills, slimming salons, spas, plastic surgery for 
any part of the body. This list can never go exhaustive, the above illustration of which 
only provides a glimpse of the iceberg tip. It seems that women are enjoying a high 
professional and specific line of products which are claimed to better their life, and 
that they have the freedom to choose any of the combination to enjoy their life and 
body to whatever degree they want (this is also one part of what postfeminism 
advocates, but postfeminist agenda is more than a consumerist feminism, which will 
be discussed in the next section).  
But the advertisements for all these products, and all related media images tell 
the otherwise – women are made to pay and to work on transforming themselves into 
a universal look of slim body with spotless skin, ample breasts and fair features, who 
would never appear in the same outfit (because that is not fashion). To achieve such 
goal pictured by media seems, ironically, to be the ultimate happy life women are 
supposed to enjoy, because that is the look by which women would find their 
confidence in work, in life, and in men. However, such a “perfect” image is imposed 
on the female consumers to turn them into pure “look” that is consumed by other 
lookers and looked. That is to say, through the seemingly “spontaneous action” on 
behalf of the female “subjects” to consume the intended commodities, the consuming 
women are actually making (or rather, made to make) themselves into objects to be 
looked at (be it male gaze, or female gaze). So the objectification not only exists in 
media representations as the action heroines, or advertisement they speak for, in 
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which certain stars or models are beatified into objects, but becomes generalized to 
the public who are instructed by the media representations to objectify themselves in a 
way that exactly looks like the media representations. So as Lara Croft/Angelina Jolie 
or Alice/Milla Jovovich, is objectified into all forms of images and commodities, the 
consumers follow the suit and scatter their subjectivity everywhere, and at the same 
time, the image of the action heroine provide a great example for female consumers to 
objectify themselves (for male consumers, their look is already an objectifying one): 
how to look as sexy as Angelina Jolie? Maybe a plastic surgery to make the lip look 
thicker and the breasts bigger; how to look as slim as Milla Jovovich? Maybe join a 
slimming salon and take some pills; how to look as young as Kate Beckinsale at her 
age? Maybe try the face-lifting cream she speaks for.  
Such process looks like identification where the human subjects align 
themselves with the image of Lara Croft/Alice/Selene and etc., but it is only an 
imitation that focus exclusively on the look, the appearance, the image that involves 
only the objectifying look and no sense of subjectivity, because both categories of 
subjectivity are lost in the endless play of sings and objectification. If such process 
must be named under a certain term, it is no more than an operationalized 
identification, in which people are made to identify with the image, while the 
identification itself involves no content.  The images on screen and the viewers sitting 
in front of the screen are engaged in, according to Baudrillard, a “performative 
interactivity” – “a set of objects makes the human individuals, who are also 
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objectified, to align, to identify, or to interact with them, the happening of which is 
only an operational performance” (Transparency 46). 
For any of the action heroine in discussion, be it Lara Croft, Alice, Selene, 
Elektra, or Aeon Flux, each step of reproduction of her image has fragmented her one 
step away, thus fragmenting her subject position further. Each step of moving the her 
image closer to the masses through close-up magazine shooting or through super high 
resolution Blu-Ray release has removed her one step away from her unique aura, and 
one step closer to the “phony spell of commodity.” Her image travels fast across one’s 
eyes, jumping around at different platform, but barely touching one’s consciousness 
or memory. Thus the identification process is similarly an interrupted and distracted 
one, scattered apart everywhere, with the one on cinema screen, on computer screen, 
in poster, or with the one that moves at the tempo of one’s console. Her central 
position of subjectivity, as much noticed in psychoanalytical terms as it is, only 
adopts a nominal existence, and would eventually collapse for those actual consumers 
who have seen so many forms of her reproduction. It is impossible to locate which is 
the real or what is real, because every image is a copy of copy of copy, which can go 
on forever, a simulacrum like a mirror image after endless times of reflection, and no 
longer a reflection.  
At times, with extremely incessant and highly tight-paced spectacles of action 
interlude by occasional showcase of female nude body for no narrative-wise “good 
reason”, and the no less spectacular reproduced games, spin-offs, posters, events, and 
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so on, the psychoanalytical configuration of the movie can be carried to an extreme 
extent that there is no subject in the movie but only numerous free-floating objects to 
consume, and that there is no identification occurring during viewing process, but 
only looking at the whole screenful of objects. The relationship between the viewers 
and the movie is now not revolving around the paradigm of identification, but 
mediated by the spectacles playing intertextually and extratextually. And moreover, as 
the human subjects lose their coherence as well, the relationship between the spectator 
and the image melts into a pool of objects, in a circle of confused look: it could be the 
spectator looking at the images, or it could also be the vice versa, the images looking 
at the consumers. This is a typical process of what Baudrillard calls implosion – “the 
proliferation of signs and information in the media obliterates meaning through 
neutralizing and dissolving all content… all distinctions between high and low culture, 
appearance and reality, and just about every other binary opposition maintained by 
traditional philosophy and social theory” (Kellner, “A New McLuhan”). If the 
classical analytical tool of film from the seventies of last century was largely 
characterized by semiotics and psychoanalysis, or, more specifically, by its 
exploration of the dichotomous relationship between subject and object, identification 
and look, the postmodern blockbuster cinema is, in contrast, marked by the collapse 
of distinction, the blurring of boundaries, and also what Jameson argues as the 
predicament of the postmodern schizophrenia – temporal disorder, pastiche, 
fragmentation, looseness of association. It announces the horizon where the dynamics 
of such binary opposition have reached their limits and began to draw inward and 
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absorb themselves due to the huge reproduction of spectacles and endless play of self-
referentiality. The psychoanalysis based on sane and organized categories is then 
replaced by schizophrenia, or maybe “schizoanalysis.”41 This results in an implosive 
process devouring all relational poles of subject and object, identification and look, 
and in this implosive mix, subject is absorbed into object, identification is replaced by 
looking, and images are everywhere.  
 
As the Idea of Feminism 
In spite of the overwhelming preoccupation with the pure spectacular images 
that manage to pull the audience out from deeper association with the images by 
means of distraction, fascination, and satisfaction of pleasure/sensation seeking, we 
cannot say that the audiences are unanimously mindless creatures that only fulfill 
sensual desires and do nothing but look at the images for visual pleasure, though the 
postmodern depthless culture tends to nurture such an audience. By this, I do not 
mean that part of the audiences do think about what the movie tells them, and the 
other part are not engaged in any kind of thinking at all, nor do I mean that the 
thinking viewers are more intelligent and sensible, and the non-thinking part are 
simply shallow and stupid. After all, saying that industrial practice to produce endless 
spectacles “conspires” with the postmodern consumer culture does not exclude the 
diversity and complexity of audiences’ reception and processing of these films, for 
each individual viewer has his or her own different social, cultural and economic 
                                                          
41 A form of antipsychoaalysis devised by Gilled Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their controversial study 
Anti-Oedipus (1972), based on the experience of the schizophrenic. The theory is that the schizophrenic 
provides a better model for resisting authority (as embedded in the procedures of psychoanalysis, for 
example), than such types as the neurotic. But schizoanalysis would not be the focus or the theoretical 
method of this study.  
238 
 
knowledge and different background in terms of gender, sexuality, age, class, race, 
education and all other demographic elements. In addition to an intertextual 
knowledge of the various media products, the contemporary knowing spectators as 
spoken before (which might be a specific group of people that are relatively young, 
have income affordable for movies and all other media products, have access to 
computer and internet, and receive a relatively high level of education), are social and 
historical beings as well, who have at least a basic knowingness of the movements, 
events, and ideas happening around, be it from the awareness through actual 
participation, or from media coverage – feminism would be one of them. Concerning 
the idea of feminism represented in films, the contemporary knowing spectators might 
have something to say, be it stereotypical or not. Therefore, they may make different 
or different degree of interpretation of the action heroine films while or after watching 
them. In terms of the gender issues, some might treat this type of films a pure image 
bomb and enjoy the spectacles of breathtaking actions and nudity of attractive 
actresses, some might deem that it is no big deal to see a super strong woman on 
screen and take it for granted that women can do everything now, some might find 
certain sense of female empowerment and simultaneously feeling offended (or 
perhaps also empowered) while seeing the unrobed female lead wielding her 
femininity and sexuality, and some might dismiss the films as total exploitation of 
sexy women but nevertheless watch them solely for entertainment. 
However, that being said, I do not intend to categorize or elaborate on the 
different reactions and interpretations the different viewers get from watching the 
same action heroine films, for this study’s focus is not on descriptive or empirical data 
of audience reception but on developing critical argument about how the social and 
cultural paradigm works within the viewing mechanism. Therefore, what I want to 
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start with for this section, in particular after what has been said before, is not an 
accusation that people do not think at all about any media messages and images, 
otherwise it would be illogical in view of the heated academic debates as well as the 
incalculable online user comments residing in various movie websites, and in view of 
myself also thinking it over. Instead, what I want to emphasize here is not specifically 
what they think, but how this thinking process takes place, not in the cognitive science 
terms, but from the perspective of the political economy of signs, that is, how their 
thinking, as diversified as it is, is affected and formed, again, by the cultural-
economic logic. So the further questions can be taken as what analogy could be used 
for this thinking process, and how this thinking is different from that of the older 
times before the postmodern turn takes place. And I would argue, in this scenario of 
watching these action heroine film texts, to think is, again, to consume. It is just that 
the object to be consumed is an idea. That is to say, if anything can be extracted from 
the action heroine film texts concerning the idea of feminism, this something is 
consumed, in a quite similar way to that of consuming a pure image.  
 
         After the Orgy 
When coming to the issues of feminism, it remounts to the debates between the 
second-wavers and the postfeminism concerning which is the “real” feminism, 
whether feminism has been the past as forgotten or as succeeded, and what feminism 
has become of. There is not a definite answer to such questions. But once again, it 
might be of use to disentangle the root of such insolvability by seeking from the 
inside to the outside, seeing from a detached but not irrelevant perspective, jumping 
out of the debate and relating to the larger contemporary cultural landscape pertinent 
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to what is after those vigorous liberations and movements back in the progressive 
ages of second wave. 
Baudrillard characterizes the present state of affairs as “after the orgy.” The orgy 
in his terms refers to 
the moment when modernity exploded upon us, the moment of liberation in 
every sphere. Political liberation, sexual liberation, liberation of the forces of 
production, liberation of the forces of destruction, women’s liberation, etc. This 
was a total orgy – an orgy of the real, the rational, the sexual, of criticism as of 
anti-criticism, of developments as of the crisis of development. We have 
pursued every avenue in the production and effective overproduction of objects, 
signs, messages, ideologies and satisfactions.                            (Transparency 3)  
Now that all movements are over, everything has been liberated, “the chips are down,” 
Baudrillard says in Transparency of Evil, “we find ourselves faced collectively with 
the big question: WHAT DO WE DO NOW THE ORGY IS OVER?” (3) That is the 
same big question for the ongoing of feminism, since women’s liberation used to be 
among “the orgy.” 
After the orgy, according to Baudrillard, we may pretend to carry on and 
accelerate in the same direction as how the liberation led us, but in reality we are 
accelerating in a void, “because all the goals of liberation are already behind us, and 
because what haunts and obsesses us is being thus ahead of all the results – the very 
availability of all the signs, all the forms, all the desires that we had been pursuing” 
(3-4). This goes back to what Baudrillard expounds as simulation –what all we can do 
is to simulate the orgy, to simulate liberation. What we are living in and for is the 
state of simulation:  
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a state in which we are obliged to replay all scenarios precisely because they 
have all taken place already, whether actually or potentially. The state of utopia 
realized, of all utopias realized, wherein paradoxically we must continue to live 
as though they had not been. But since they have, and since we can no longer, 
therefore, nourish the hope of realizing them, we can only “hyper-realize” them 
through interminable simulation. We live amid the interminable reproduction of 
ideals, phantasies, images and dreams which are now behind us, yet which we 
must continue to reproduce in a sort of inescapable indifference.  
                                                                                                    (Transparency 4) 
In the same utopian scenario, the liberation of women is assumed as already 
realized, the goals and ideals of which are taken as achieved. But in order to maintain 
the moment of the orgy, to hold the gesture of being progressive, and to “nourish the 
hope” that we are still fulfilling the ideal of empowered women that are equal to men, 
we keep pursuing the goal of the liberation as if it were not realized, and we 
reproduce what we had pictured about the liberation as a fuel to simulate that exultant 
orgy. Such simulation of the orgy takes many forms in multiple media to the vast 
masses. Hollywood cinema, in view of its global influence and tremendous output, is 
one of the most important machines capable of producing all kinds of simulacra of 
that feminist myth. The blockbuster-y representation of women as super strong action 
heroines would be a perfect venue to replay the scenario that re-collects the ideals, 
fantasies and dreams about the liberation. For one thing, the blockbuster-ing image 
per se ensures the widest dissemination of an image that is not only a cinematic one, 
but also a media image, a cultural icon through its “composite commodifying” of 
circulation and reproduction. On the other, it literally allows for a function of 
replaying by virtue of its digitality that is translatable into any form of product 
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clickable to any kind remediation – pause, slow motion, enlarge, replay, or print. With 
the highest level of filmmaking technology and the inexhaustible star system, 
Hollywood machine is more than capable to produce an image absorbing all kinds of 
utopia-style positivity by the colorful and fabulous maneuver of lens and computer 
technology. A movie like Tomb Raider: Lara Croft could do anything to simulate the 
“success of feminism” – building a beautifully athletic female hero, exacerbating the 
obstacles that she faces with, and exaggerating the smoothness with which the female 
hero overcomes it –  to hyperrealize the fierce spirit of the liberation through a famed 
actress’s fierce acting, and through the production staff’s gesture to simulate an active, 
strong, intelligent, and attractive woman (more specifically by the artificial 
mechanism of training, scripting, special effects, and make-up) to “represent” the icon 
of an ideal woman who is supposed to have achieved all feminist agendas. 
The glory of the orgy is amplified in the pavonine and luxurious motion pictures 
where a perfect female figure of “history” is “represented” (let us put aside the debate 
on the eroticization of her body first). But the question is “which history? And 
representation of what?” Is the cinematic image a true reflection of what was achieved 
back in the second or the first wave (or any form of movement at any time)? The 
young feminists (or they may prefer “postfeminists”) do not know for real, for they 
were not there personally and everything around them keeps “hyper-realizing” the so-
called feminist ideals. They acquire their answers only by watching television, going 
to the cinema, reading magazines, and surfing on the Internet – by consuming these 
media messages, the messages of simulation, of hyper-realization of feminism that 
insists on telling them what women have achieved, what women now deserve, and 
how a modern woman should enjoy her life through skin care products, hair-styling, 
cute dresses, and cute men, because those are exactly what they deserve after the orgy 
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of liberation – at least this is what the postfeminists generally believe in (Projansky; 
Helford). The answers sought here consist only of a media image of feminism, the 
media idea of feminism, and ultimately a simulation of the idea of feminism. Here I 
do not mean the media image is necessarily a false image, because false represents at 
least a hinge of the real; it is the opposite of the real. The media image now is a third-
order simulacrum of non-reality – hyper-reality. This is similar to the doubt 
Baudrillard raised about the Gulf War. There might be no doubt whether women’s 
liberation truly happens or not, for Baudrillard admits as he says, “the fact is that the 
revolution has well and truly happened, but not in the way we expected. Everywhere 
what has been liberated so that it can enter a state of pure circulation, so that it can go 
into orbit” (Transparency 4). We can only understand events in their lifetimes – “any 
attempt at later discussion only adds to the simulacra – adds to the uncertainty” (5). 
The question about feminism is a bigger one – even before we can be sure 
whether women’s liberation is over or not, and whether this “over” means completed 
and succeeded, or get rid of and forgotten, feminism is moved to the next step of 
“after the orgy.” So is it over? For postfeminists, they simply take it for granted that 
the feminist agenda has already been successful or outdated (no longer needed 
because of it is achieved) and assume women should be enjoying their life based on 
the empowerment and equality thus achieved. What the postfeminists are doing and 
the ways they are doing it is exactly, I would rather argue, the process of simulating 
the liberation, to move the feminism to the state of “after the orgy”, that is, 
postfeminism is a simulation of feminism. Postfeminism “takes advantage of” the fact 
that the feminist movement happened “not in the way we expected,” celebrates the 
demise (which they interpret as success) of feminism, and goes into the orbit of still 
and further fulfilling the idea and the title of “feminism”, because after all they have 
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far more means to circulate such idea of “feminism” with the thoroughness of 
contemporary media technologies. While seeing the attractive strong woman on 
screen as in action heroine movies, on magazines, or on any other media platform, 
and believing that women have done it, we keep carrying forward this belief, and 
creating and recreating more and more such images to further make us convinced of 
the realization of the liberation. In such a way, postfeminism keeps feminism both 
alive and dead, and that is how postfeminist discourse causes so much debate – which 
is the real feminism, is postfeminism a growing form of pro-feminism, or simply anti-
feminism – but the case is no longer a matter of reality, nor of distinctive “pro” or 
“anti.” “Post” as well as “feminism” as in postfeminism is only nominal markers to 
justify its paradoxical existence as a simulation of the success of feminism by 
carrying on its ideas in endless  uncertainty and indeterminacy (of whether it is 
successful or not, of how exactly feminism is conceptualized, and even these debates 
are also adding to circulation). 
So about the previous questions concerning the “historicity” and 
“representability” of action heroine figure, there is nothing about “history”, be it there 
a potential, and there is no more representation – the “history” is simulated, the 
“representation” is just a simulacrum. The rampant image of Lara Croft or Alice or 
any action heroine in question defeating the villainy is only a simulation of women as 
super strong in the “after-the-orgy” spirit of keeping the ideal running. This is even 
not a simulation of the feminism, but a simulation of the idea of feminism, for in such 
a chaotic and incessant simulation of it, there is no reality about it, and “the fate of the 
things liberated is an incessant commutation, and these things are thus subject to 
increasing indeterminacy, to the principle of uncertainty” (Baudrillard, Transparency 
6). It is only a vague idea “with the benefit of a little hindsight” of the liberation (4). 
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Such idea of feminism keeps circulating in every cultural sphere and industries, in 
women’s magazine, in television dramas, in reality shows, in film industry, in portal 
websites, in video games, in comics series, or even in the T-shirt designs, to pass 
around the idea of female getting toughened up, taking control of her life, doing what 
men can or cannot do, and to pass it over and over, again and again in whatever 
possible updates or sequels. So there is Alien with Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) and its 
three sequels from the late 1970s all over to the late 1990s, Terminator 2: Judgment 
Day with Sarah Connor (Linda Hamilton) in 1991, Tank Girl in 1995, and there is a 
number of television series also featuring action heroine, such as Xena: Warrior 
Princess (1995-2001)
42
, and the very popular Buffy the Vampire Slayer (1997-2003)
43
. 
Wrapped in different forms and appearances, these media images all seem to depict a 
female figure that is strong, independent, powerful, epitomizing the feminist ideal 
(suspiciously incomprehensive), though there are different interpretations of each 
action figure and different conceptualizations of feminism. The proliferation of these 
images formulates the circulatory networks fostered and provisioned by the 
“unavoidable goal of all liberation” (3). 
With the images floating around as a part of the networks, what seems like the 
“signified” of those images – the ideas of feminism – ends up rootless signifiers as 
well, because they are simply simulated segments of uncertainty to form the 
circulatory network of “after the orgy,” to keep going the liberation that is gone 
forever, to retrieve what is irretrievable out of total gesture, a gesture to simulate the 
orgy of liberation. The idea of feminism is what is simulated, a hollow existence to 
make the “network” appearing solid, thus floating together with the pure images 
                                                          
42 Xena: Warrior Princess is an American-New Zealand supernatural fantasy adventure series. Its 
narrative follows Xena (Played by Lucy Lawless), a warrior in q quest to seek redemption for her past 
sins as a ruthless warlord by using her formidable fighting skills to help people.  
43 Buffy the Vampire Slayer is an American television series. Its narrative follows Buffy Summers 
(played by Sarah Michelle Gellar), to battle against vampires, demons, and other forces of darkness.  
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freely to any possible sphere. The “idea” becomes a sign, too, another type of 
spectacle, as said by Baudrillard, which keeps coming at those who look. Raised in an 
age of computer technology and new media, women (and men) born after the 
vigorous 1970s second wave mostly get the general idea of “feminism” from all these 
images portrayed in media and cultural industries, which in turn, are mostly among 
their daily consuming products and activities. The whole idea of feminism, be it 
stereotypical or biased, when acquired through a process of consuming cultural 
products, has thus been closely linked with and entangled in the vast network and 
commutations of circulating consumer commodities. Ever since the 1990s, with the 
advance in filmmaking and reproduction technology and the tendency to sell 
spectacles pertinent to the postmodern culture, it becomes much easier and more 
profitable to proliferate action heroine genres (as after all, we have two kinds of 
spectacles to consume in action heroine movies!). That, in turn, makes the 
commodification of each image into a composite commodity become a prevailing 
practice, and the images like Lara Croft in movies or television series, or any media 
products, come to condensation and proliferate in recent decades. 
In the process of watching an increasing number of such audio-visual products, 
purchasing more and more spinoffs and merchandising goods, the acquisition of 
feminist ideas has thus become even more inevitably intertwined with reproduction 
and consumption. However, the question is that whether the proliferation of action 
heroine films, besides the technology facilitation, results from people’s needs to 
watch action heroines, to know about the idea of feminism, or to know anything at all? 
That is to ask –“do objects instruct needs and structure them in a new way? 
Conversely, do needs instruct new social structures through the mediation of objects 
and their production”? (Baudrillard, System of Objects 18). It is, again, a question of 
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the “operational genesis” (see Section 3, Chapter 4) in people’s consumption practice. 
Production of such movies and all the other ancillary commodities is not a response 
from people’s actual needs to watch such movies, but it is quite the opposite – the 
production instructs needs in people and constructs them as what people need and 
want. In other words, it is inevitable for such a process of “acquisition” of idea to fall 
into the operationalized action. It is not so much watching the cinema as making 
people watch; it is not so much acquiring as making people acquire, or rather, making 
people consume whatever product is there. The actions of watching action heroine 
films, or perhaps the action of actually thinking about them have less importance than 
the fact that such actions are operationalized, or the fact that the advertising of the 
film is so successful that it manages to get people to come to cinema. If “there is to be 
no knowledge save that which results from having (people) know; no speaking save 
that which results from having (people) speak,” (Baudrillard, Transparency 46) then 
there is no so-called acquisition of the idea of feminism in an operational to make 
people acquire. People watch, thus, for the sake of watching. People simulate the idea 
for the sake of simulating, nothing else happens – it “is operational or it is nothing” 
(46). The whole idea, the thinking of the idea, the thought about the idea, in this 
analysis, is nothing more than an operational consumption. 
Thus, the need for the revolution and liberation is alive, except for that it is 
behind the theater door or on the dining table – it is simulated. 
Only the idea is consumed. The revolutionary imperative is alive, but unable to 
realize itself in practice; it is consumed in the idea of Revolution. As idea, 
Revolution is in fact eternal, and will be eternally consumable in the same way 
as any other idea…All ideas, even the most contradictory, can coexist as signs 
within the idealist logic of consumption. Revolution is signified, then, in a 
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combinatorial terminology, in a lexicon of immediate terms, where it is 
presented as fulfilled, where it is “consumed.”  
                                                                         (Baudrillard, System of Objects 24) 
What happens then, according to Baudrillard, is that the simulation of liberations 
through incessant circulations and commutations leads to disappearance of “the 
unavoidable goal of all liberation.”  
Nothing (not even God) now disappears by coming to an end, by dying. Instead, 
things disappear through proliferation or contamination, by becoming saturated 
or transparent, because of extenuation or extermination, or as a result of the 
epidemic of simulation, as a result of their transfer into the secondary existence 
of simulation. Rather than a mortal mode of disappearance, then, a fractal mode 
of dispersal.                                                                                 (Transparency 5) 
So the liberation of women does not come to an end because it is in the past; 
feminism does not die because it is got over. Otherwise, all the debates on and 
complications of the prominent female figure in question would be groundless. But it 
disappears. It disappears by entering the lethal circle of simulation, by seamless 
penetration into every corner of everyday life. Feminism dies not because 
postfeminism replaces it, but because postfeminism popularizes it and simulates it 
with a commodity touch. It dies, ironically, with the rise in the number of action 
heroine films produced, with the expansion of the chain business encompassing video 
games, action figures, pin-up posters, and so on. The more we see the face of Croft-
like figures, the more rapidly the feminism dissipates. The proliferation is an epidemic 
that kills along every business chain, along every transfer into simulation. With each 
specific product consumed, with each spinoffs coming into people’s hands, the 
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simulated existence of feminism become further vague, unreal, vacuum, and finally 
hyperreal to keep circulating on this secondary existence. 
The representation of woman as either progressive or regressive as debated is 
not a representation at all in the first place. This is because such “representation” is a 
simulation of the idea of feminism. It simply simulates the idea of what we have once 
fought for and disperses it as much and widely as possible. What is “represented” to 
the audience is thus a hyperreal world composed of digital images. What is more 
important, “the logic of viral dispersal in networks is no longer a logic of value, 
neither, therefore, is it a logic of equivalence.” As Baudrillard says,  
there is no longer any such thing as a revolution of values – merely a 
circumvention or involution of values… A centripetal compulsion coexists with 
a decenteredness of all systems, an internal metastasis or fevered endogenic 
virulence which creates a tendency for systems to explode beyond their own 
limits, to override their own logic – not in the sense of creating sheer 
redundancy, but in the sense of an increase in power, a fantastic potentialization 
whereby their own very existence is put at risk. 
                                                                                                    (Transparency 4) 
All of this goes back to what Baudrillard terms as the fate of value. Baudrillard, 
mimicking the (social) science, once proposed a tripartite account of value in his 
famous “For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign”: a natural stage (use-
value), a commodity stage (exchange-value), and a structural stage (sign-value). 
Value thus had a natural aspect, a commodity aspect, and a structural aspect. These 
formal distinctions are reminiscent of the distinctions between the particles in physics, 
in which case, a new particle does not replace those already discovered – it simply 
joins their ranks, taking its place in a hypothetical series (Transparency 5). So 
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Baudrillard, in his later writing of The Transparency of Evil, introduces a new particle 
into the microphysics of simulacra. After the natural, commodity, and structural 
stages of value, there comes the fractal stage. The first stage had a natural referent, 
with value based on a natural use of the world. The second was on the basis of a 
general equivalence, with value developed by referring to a logic of the commodity. 
The third is governed by a code, and value develops here by reference to a set of 
models (5). At the fourth, the fractal (or viral, or radiant) stage of value, however, 
“there is no point of reference at all, and value radiates in all directions, occupying all 
interstices, without reference to anything whatsoever, by virtue of pure contiguity. At 
the fractal stage there is no longer any equivalence, whether natural or general” (5). 
So to speak, there is now no law of value, but only “a sort of epidemic of value, a sort 
of general metastasis of value, a haphazard proliferation and dispersal of value” (5). 
Indeed, as Baudrillard says,  
we should really no longer speak of “value” at all, for this kind of propagation 
or chain reaction makes all valuation impossible…Good is no longer the 
opposite of evil, nothing can now be plotted on a graph or analyzed in terms of 
abscissas and ordinates. Just as each particle follows its own trajectory, each 
value or fragment of value shines for a moment in the heavens of simulation, 
and then disappears into the void along a crooked path that only rarely happens 
to intersect with other such paths. This is the pattern of the fractal – and hence 
the current pattern of our culture.                                               (Transparency 5) 
In this analysis, what I expatiate before how in contemporary Hollywood 
blockbusters the sign value is not the opposite of the use value, but has become a 
replacement of the use value still stays at the third stage governed by the code. If the 
traditional apparatus theory requires the binary between denotations/signifiers and 
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connotations/signified to subject individuals to certain ideological positions by 
assimilating people into what is implied from the texts (for instance, either a sense of 
female empowerment or the quite opposite of exploitive sexism) and making them 
accept it as a natural, such binary disappears and is substituted by the visual pleasure 
and sensual satisfaction of obsessive look under the overall configuration of 
spectacles. However, when it comes to what Baudrillard terms as “after the orgy” and 
to what media products render as the simulation of feminism idea, the recurring ideals 
of past liberations belong to the fourth stage of fractal one, where values radiate in all 
directions in hazard proliferation, and where there is no speaking of value at all. The 
two arguments of mine respectively in the previous section talking about pure 
spectacle and this section about idea as a spectacle seem to contradict with each other, 
for one is refrained to the third stage of sign value (as if there were the opposite of use 
value), and the other goes on to the fractal stage of nullity – no value at all. However, 
this paradox, paradoxically, helps to move these two arguments one step further. For 
one thing, both repudiate the existence of use value in these movies. For the former, 
sign value overwhelms the so-called use value and become the defining feature of 
action heroine films as an object for display. My repeated use of the conditional 
clause, “if there is any (use value/deep meaning),” is not intended to indicate the 
affirmative possibility of “there is some (use value/deep meaning),” but is used for 
analyzing how the supposedly opposite poles of sign and use value actually implode 
into each other and ultimately replaced solely by the sign. And the latter completely 
entails no law of value by way of pure simulation, not only of images, but also of 
ideas, ideals, goals and fantasies, which, in Baudrillard’s analysis, also constitutes a 




         Metastasis and Trans-state 
It is what is said about the process of radical semiurgy all over again – when 
things (or signs) are liberated from their respective concepts, values, points of 
reference, origins and aims, they embark on an endless process of self-reproduction. 
This is where the order (or rather, disorder) of, Baudrillard uses another term, 
“metastasis” begins – the rule of cancerous proliferation – and the other point that 
pushes forward the seemingly paradoxical argument about the change in the stage of 
value. Baudrillard compares such an order to the immortal and asexual reproduction 
through code, and 
today’s technological beings – machiness , clones, replacement body parts – all 
tend towards this kind of reproduction, and little by little they are imparting the 
same process to those beings that are supposedly human, and sexed. The aim 
everywhere – not least at the leading edge of biological research – is to effect a 
genetic substitution of this kind, to achieve the linear and sequential 
reproduction, cloning or parthenogenesis of little celibate machines. 
                                                                                                    (Transparency 7) 
Baudrillard further compares the day when sexual liberation was the order and 
our present clone-loving society. The watchword for the former was “Maximize 
sexuality, minimize reproduction,” while that for the latter is just the opposite – “as 
much … reproduction and as little sex as possible” (7). “Body” as a metaphor also 
goes through tremendous changes, from the metaphor for the soul in the past, then to 
that for sex, and at present to that for nothing at all. As for now, body is merely the 
“locus of metastasis, of the machine-like connections between all its processes, of an 




This metastasis of proliferation and promiscuity is an aspect of a general 
tendency towards a state of transcendence which extends beyond any specificity and 
participates in a process of confusion and contagion by affecting all disciplines – “a 
viral loss of determinacy which is the prime event among all the new events that 
assail us” (Baudrillard, Transparency 7). In this way, economics becomes 
transeconomics, aesthetics transaesthetics, sex transsexuality – all categories converge 
in a universal process of the transversal in which no metaphorical relationship exists 
between any discourses (7). The possibility of metaphor is then disappearing in every 
sphere, because for there to be metaphor, differential fields and distinct objects must 
exist. Metaphor has its beauty as it plays with difference or the illusion of difference. 
“But they cannot exist where contamination is possible between any discipline and 
any other.” Instead, metonymy – “replacing the whole as well as the components, and 
occasioning a general commutability of terms” – has replaced the dis-illusion of 
metaphor today. Then total metonymy overrules and goes viral by definition or more 
by lack of definition (Baudrillard, Transparency 7-8). In such sense, Lara Croft, for 
instance, while being the “iconic figure” of action heroine, becomes the metonymy of 
ideal woman, the metonymy of feminism, or rather of postfeminism perhaps. As 
people take the media image as the “reality,” there is thus no difference between an 
on-screen ideal woman and an actual ideal woman – the on-screen one becomes the 
actual one. Similarly, as feminism enters a simulated existence of postfeminism, there 
is not a definite definition of feminism. The media image of Lara Croft thus plays the 
spokesman role for feminism, and with Lara Croft’s abstract and unstable form (as 
discussed in Section One, Chapter Four), all these floating and oscillatory categories 
are contaminating and contaminated by each other. It is just because of the lack of 
definition and lack of difference that the play of metonymy goes viral – Lara Croft 
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could be the metonymy of feminism, while feminism could also be the metonymy of 
Lara Croft. In the similar manner, film becomes the metonymy of the whole culture; 
the film spectacle becomes the metonymy of the whole film industry, and so on. As 
such universal transversal process infects every sphere in which there used to be 
distinction between objects, feminism, while originating as a political movement for 
women’s equal right, get contaminated when it enters the sphere of culture (which, in 
turn, incorporates everything else as capitalism, aesthetics, politics, sports, media, 
technologies etc., because “everything in our social life … can be said to have become 
‘cultural’”), and becomes the metonymy of many things. In the metastasis of senseless 
and seamless proliferation and multiplication, the original idea of feminism that 
frames the embryo of what women once fight so rigorously for, is lost in such a 
process. Feminism, for its simulated existence in metastasis, is contaminated by 
fashion, by advertisement, by television shows, by films and film merchandising and 
franchising, and overall, by the cultural-economic logic of postmodern consumption. 
As the confusion of types is total and everywhere, each individual category is 
subject to contamination and substitution is thus possible between any sphere and any 
other. “Sex is no longer located in sex itself, but elsewhere – everywhere else, in fact. 
Politics is no longer restricted to the political sphere, but infects every sphere – 
economics, science, art, sport ... Sport itself, meanwhile, is no longer located in sport 
as such, but instead in business, in sex, in politics, in the general style of performance” 
(Baudrillard Transparency 8). Thus, feminism is no longer located in women’s 
movement, but anywhere else, in sex, in body, in performance, in capitalism, in style, 
in aesthetics, in media. Each category thus passes through a phase transition during 
which its essence is diluted in homeopathic doses, infinitesimal relative to the total 
solution, until it finally disappears, leaving a trace so small as to be indiscernible, like 
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the “memory of water”. While the dose of feminism drops in solvents of trans-state 
for spreading the word, for promulgating the spirit, it turns out to find itself diluted, 
diffused and finally disappeared. In the case of action heroine movies, that potential 
dose of feminist strength is not consolidated by the presence, or rather, the intensive 
presences of female figure, but on the contrary, it is diluted by the fact these presences 
is put on this high-profile stage of multiple interests that will traverse to endless 
following or previous stops on the proliferative streamline. These presences come as 
and with highly seductive generic spectacles – intense action, amazing special effects, 
incredible scenarios, striving for a moment’s passion and roaring. These presences are 
simultaneously presented at terminals more than the dedicated dark theater, but 
immersing people’s living rooms, bedrooms, desktops, walls, coffee table, computers, 
DVD players, television set, or even fashion taste. So the image of Lara Croft holding 
guns is hung on the wall, confusing feminism with sexualized body; the magazine 
interview with Angelina Jolie about her performance lies on the dining table or under 
a sofa cushion, confusing Lara Croft the character with Angelina Jolie the star; The 
Lara Croft signature dressing style – simple, scanty, and tight – is seen everywhere on 
street, confusing the screen with everyday life. Her overwhelming presences and 
ubiquitous traces find themselves located in Sex as pin-up posters, in Performance as 
the action lead to accomplish impossible spectacles, in Economics as box office 
number and ancillary gross, in Style as magazine interviewee, in Media as Ms. 
Everywhere. And such presences subjugate us, the audiences and consumers, to a 
fluid world devoid of fixed categories, but replete of free-floating images. 
According to Baudrillard, our life is inflicted by the law of the confusion of 
categories. That is to say, everything is characterized by a multiple states of being all 
at once, while each state per se is subject to the confused categorization. So in 
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Baudrillard’s terms, everything is simultaneously political, sexual, and aesthetic, 
while there are not fixed boundaries within which the political, the sexual, or the 
aesthetic could be confined. Especially since the May 1968 protests in France, the 
spirit of revolution and liberation seems to become a political epidemic that infects 
every sphere of life (Transparency 10). So the cultural representations begin to carry 
political meanings, as exemplified by feminists bending on criticizing how certain 
media images of women are demeaning or empowering to women politically. 
However, if that were the end of story, it would be much easier to have a definite 
happy ending. The thing is that, on one hand, as the political is infecting everything 
else, everything else is infecting the political as well – that is to say, the political is 
not purely what the term look like, but a bit of this and a bit of that, without a clear-
cut definition and demarcation.  And on the other hand, the cinematic representation 
of a certain figure, for instance, is also not only pertinent to the aesthetic and carries a 
political meaning, but also, especially in contemporary ages, to many other spheres 
like the cultural, the economic, the sexual, the media (while the media and culture 
seem to encompass everything in a simulacrum mode, showing people a hyperreal 
world). As Baudrillard says, 
likewise everything has become sexual, anything can be an object of desire: 
power, knowledge – everything is interpreted in terms of phantasies, in terms of 
repression, and sexual stereotypy reigns in every last corner. Likewise, too, 
everything is now aestheticized: politics is aestheticized in the spectacle, sex in 
advertising and porn, and all kinds of activity in what is conventionally referred 
to as culture – a sort of all-pervasive media and advertising-led semiologization. 
                                                                                                  (Transparency 25) 
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In this sense, the image of action heroine could be sexual, political, economic, 
and aesthetical at the same time. As already elaborated in the first section of this 
chapter, the image of Lara Croft or Alice or any heroine concerned is the composite 
commodity that is located in multiple loci thus carrying multiple meanings through 
intertextuality and fragmentation. Therefore the image could be the products for sale 
(as DVDs, action figures, video games, and so on) and commercials promoting sale 
(as spokesman for skincare products or perfumes, and etc.), thus relating to the 
economic/capitalist sphere; while at the same time, the image could be aesthetical, as 
the dressing of heroines is affecting people’s sense of fashion, or the dark lighting of 
Underworld revives a trend of Gothic; and also, the numerous shots of the heroines in 
fierce action with perfect maneuver could be political in that it seems to  showcase a 
certain counterstrike to sexism. And most importantly, such image is all over the 
media – on one hand, it is ready for any kind of remediation or bricolage, which might 
leads to a more chaotic categorization, and on the other, the media is already using 
such image to simulate a world that acts as the non-signified “reality.” What makes 
things even more confusing and chaotic is that the capitalist economics, the aesthetics, 
or the political could be, at the same time, everything else in a never-ending circular 
cross-referentiality. “Each category is generalized to the greatest possible extent, so 
that it eventually loses all specificity and is reabsorbed by all the other categories” 
(Baudrillard, Transparency 9). So the political is involved with a little bit of 
commercial, a little bit of entertainment, sports, or tabloid gossips. Likewise, the 
aesthetics is mixed with economic, commercial profit, everyday life, the sexual mixed 
with desire, advertising, spectacle and so on. But when such confusion and mixing is 




When everything is political, nothing is political any more, the word itself is 
meaningless. When everything is sexual, nothing is sexual any more, and sex 
loses its determinants. When everything is aesthetic, nothing is beautiful or ugly 
any more, and art itself disappears. This paradoxical state of affairs, which is 
simultaneously the complete actualization of an idea, the perfect realization of 
the whole tendency of modernity, and the negation of that idea and that 
tendency, their annihilation by virtue of their very success, by virtue of their 
extension beyond their own bounds – this state of affairs is epitomized by a 
single figure: the transpolitical, the transsexual, the transaesthetic. 
                                                                                                    (Transparency 9) 
In this light, the seemingly potential of the image of action heroine to carry 
some “political” meaning, then, is cancelled by the image’s entering into so many 
other spheres of uncertainties. The image is thus transpolitical, transsexual, 
transeconomic and transaesthetical all at once. 
So here comes the furthered point of how the consumption of an idea must no 
longer base its analysis on Baudrillard’s third stage of sign value, how the sign value 
in relation to use value is not a binary, but a replacement, and thus how the traditional 
apparatus theory of film analysis loses its power in these blockbusters and an updated 
version of the apparatus theory is needed to dissect where and how the idea of 
feminism is located in such a metastasis. In addition to what has explained before that 
the severe distraction of endless spectacles instill in the audience the preference to 
dwelling comfortably on the surface of sensual enjoyment than thinking deep about 
the images, and that the mass reproduction of the female hero’s image undermines her 
subject position and identity and thus the spectatory identification, the further cause of 
introducing a different set of apparatus results from the current state of transcendence. 
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Apparatus theory of the 1970s entails and follows an institutionalized mode of 
spectatorship. It deals with how mechanics of representations convey ideological 
meanings. Cinema, as an important kind of Ideological State Apparatus, interpellates 
individuals into a subject position accepting a certain set of rules, or, the dominant 
ideologies. For it to start analysis, apparatus theory must be grounded on stable and 
distinct categories and concepts (though allowing for certain complication and 
fluctuation along its development). For instance, the debate on the identification 
process, despite its varied arguments of how such process could be fluid and complex, 
is still based on the clear distinction between categories like subject and object. 
However, in view of the chaotic state that anything could be political, aesthetical, 
economic and back forth, where confusion, contamination and indeterminacy of 
categories becomes the general ethos, how can a strongly institutionalized theory 
based on the stable be used to capture even the slightest grasp of fleeting and fractal 
ideas with no value at all?  Everything, once analyzable, has thus been in endless 
mutation and commutation now. There is no sexuality, but the transsexual, there is no 
politics, but the transpolitical, there is no aesthetics, but the transaesthetics, there is no 
feminism, but ideas of it that could be the metonymy of everything. In this trans-state, 
what we have might be a vague memory of feminism or more of a fragmented idea of 
it scraped together from all source of media, as Baudrillard says, 
Perhaps we still have a memory of sex, rather as water “remembers” molecules 
no matter how diluted. But that is the whole point: this is only a molecular 
memory, the corpuscular memory of an earlier life, and not a memory of forms 
or singularities (water, after all, can hardly retain the features of a face, or the 
color of someone’s eyes). So what we are left with is the simple imprint of a 
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faceless sexuality infinitely watered down in a broth of politics, media and 
communications, and eventually manifested in the viral explosion of AIDS. 
                                                                                                    (Transparency 9) 
So what we have remembered or understood is a molecular memory of the 
“water” in which feminism has been dropped. The “water” could be anything that 
seems to carry the idea of feminism – media, commercials, or communications – but 
actually only contribute to diluting it because the “water” dissolves the strong 
concentration of that drop of feminism with endless images, indeterminate categories, 
and inter-contamination. And the action heroine movies are one of the anything 
(“water”) with the molecular memory which, in the endless circle of reproduction and 
merchandising, becomes so diluted that it disappears and turns into a simulation. 
“Yet things continue to function long after their ideas have disappeared, and 
they do so in total indifference to their own content. The paradoxical fact is that they 
function even better under these circumstances” (Transparency 6). Baudrillard says, 
for instance, the idea of progress has disappeared, yet progress continues, and 
likewise, the idea of wealth once connoted by production has gone, yet production 
itself keeps moving even more vigorously. “Indeed, it picks up speed precisely in 
proportion to its increasing indifference to its original aims” (6), because it seems 
more free to go into any direction when everything around is simply free-floating 
signifiers rather than fixed boundaries of definition, and because “all individuals 
harbor a secret urge to be rid of their ideas, of their own essences, so as to be able to 
proliferate everywhere, to transport themselves simultaneously to every point of the 
compass” (Transparency 6). In terms of the political sphere, Baudrillard claims, the 
idea of politics has disappeared but “the game of politics continues in secret 
indifference to its own stakes” (6). When it comes to the women’s movement, the 
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ideal of what feminism sought for has disappeared, but the idea of feminism (the 
simulated ideal of feminism) continues, the games, the images of strong women 
continue to circulate regardless of the content, in indifference to whether the games 
and images “truly” convey it, or whether certain ways of playing the game is actually 
demeaning to women. This “sort of inescapable indifference” (Transparency 4) is, as 
incessantly and enthusiastically as the simulation of “the orgy” is going on, the key 
attitude we must adopt to keep this process of reproduction running with no stop, as 
well as the indispensable result of the endless reproduction. 
Such indifference is in proportion to the proliferation of images showing stylish 
women “kick ass” stylishly. Such “stylishness”, however, does not have anything to 
do with the “aura” in Benjamin’s terms; on the contrary, it is spectacular images 
repeated across different movies and platforms by the mechanization of technological 
reproduction. The reproduction, as the root cause of the new apparatus, submerges 
people into stylish images that work to distract and thus to build up the indifference to 
what is before or behind such stylishness (if there is any). Therefore, the more we see 
such images, the less we are thrilled at seeing it, the less we are concerned with 
women’s issues. It is not because we are convinced that we really did it 
(accomplishing the goal of feminism), nor because we are bored of such images. But 
since indifference replaces difference and the law of referentiality, we just follow and 
enjoy the ride of “free floating.” The logic goes like this, look at her, strong, 
intelligent, and beautiful, how much more perfect she could be? We are doing it 
(showing images of strong women regardless of whether it is a “reflection” or a 
“simulation”), what else could you ask? That is, as long as we are doing it, it does not 
matter if it is in line with the original stakes, it does not matter if it is in line with 
anything. This is a process resembling the situation where the more people see the 
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images of war in Afghanistan, the less they care about it; the more people see TV 
series about revolutionary valor back in the old days against oppression or foreign 
aggression, the less valorous they get when they really need a revolution. A thing 
which has lost its idea is like the man who has lost his soul, like a piece of artwork 
loses its aura through the technological reproduction in Benjamin’s terms. But the loss 
of idea, loss of soul, or loss of aura is exactly what is needed for and what facilitates 
its proliferation. 
As the days of that revolutionary movement are gone, the glorious march of 
modernity has not led to the transformation of all values as the revolution once aimed 
at, “but instead to a dispersal and involution of value whose upshot for us is total 
confusion – the impossibility of apprehending any determining principle, whether of 
an aesthetic, a sexual or a political kind” (Baudrillard, Transparency 10). The 
updating of the apparatus theory for contemporary action heroine films, or of any 
other theoretical critique involving a serious dedication to a singular sphere of 
certainty and determinacy, is therefore inevitably a consequence after what 
Baudrillard says about the “impossibility of radical critique,” as he says “the 
possibility of any radical critique – whether in the name of desire, of revolution, or of 
the liberation of forms – no longer exists” (Transparency 10) because there is no 
longer an avant-garde, political, sexual or artistic that embodies a capacity for 
anticipation. But Baudrillard himself is providing a radical critique – his simulation 
theories – which exactly deals with what he terms as the “impossibility of radical 
critique”, and this is how the traditional apparatus theory should be renewed by one 
that enables simulation. It is thus in vain to engage the action heroine films with 
feminist critiques because both the films and the theories are in a confusion of mixing 
and transcending categories, ready at any moment or any juncture to jump in total 
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indifference. For the films, they are generic mixtures of action, adventure, fantasy, 
science-fiction, horror and thriller, as well as commodity mixtures of DVDs, action 
figures, posters and T-shirt etc. For feminism, it is the circulating and dispersing ideas 
that could be and/or could not be sexual, political, aesthetical, cultural, 
communicational etc.; it could the metonymy of many things, and many things could 
be metonymy of it. What is left, then, is not to engage with the idea, but to consume 
the idea in all forms of commodity and in an act of keeping the simulation and 
reproduction going. But the confusion here seems to be “is it the product or the idea 
that we consume?” It is actually neither a question of “either-or,” nor of “first-second.” 
It is that the idea becomes a sign, a sign melting into the sea of spectacles to form a 
proper commodity. As Baudrillard says, “In order to become object of consumption, 
the object must become sign,” (System of Objects 22) thus a sign, or a spectacle is not 
restricted to the materiality as concrete lines, shape and color; it could be the spectacle 
of a thought, the spectacle of an idea. 
What we consume today, therefore, is a “fragmented, filtered world… 
industrially processed by the media into signs” (Merrin, Introduction 40). Our 
emotions and reactions to the thought and idea are “a luxury of our distance from the 
event and our consumption of the simulacrum” (Merrin, Introduction 59). All that is 
needed, in order to induce affective responses, is the right lighting, editing, soundtrack 
and encouraging ending. Just like the May 1968 event, which ended up a “symbolic 
explosion of student protest by a mortal dose of publicity”, an event, once publicized, 
shall become “fixed, rooted, and part of an ongoing mediated narrative that moves 
towards a regulated conclusion” (Merrin, Introduction 60). The media, by processing 
the raw event into a finished product prepared for consumption, impose a single 
pattern of reception on us. “As soon as an event becomes news – it starts to die – to 
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become a non-event” (Baudrillard, Terrorism 23). This is exactly the same pattern in 
which media does to feminism – processing the idea of it into a finished product for 
consumption, be it a movie, a television series, or an MTV album. And as soon as 
feminism becomes representation, it starts to die, and to become a non-representation, 
a simulacrum. So in watching these action heroine movies, thinking about the female 
lead, the narrative pusher, is no more than a flashing spectacle of the thought of a 
strong woman, of the idea of her taking control – “only the consumption of signs with 
the individual propelled from the comfort of the sofa into a succession of spectacular 
images” (Merrin, Introduction 39). 
This is also a process of what Baudrillard calls the aestheticization of everything. 
By the liberation of form, line, color, and aesthetic notions – as by its mixing up of all 
cultures, all styles – our society has given rise to a general aestheticization, beyond 
the materialist rule of the commodity, of everything by means of advertising, the 
media, or images. 
It is often said that the West’s great undertaking is the commercialization of the 
whole world, the hitching of the fate of everything to the fate of the commodity. 
That great undertaking will turn out rather to have been the aestheticization of 
the whole world - its cosmopolitan spectacularization, its transformation into 
images, its semiological organization.                                      (Transparency 16) 
 However marginal, or banal, or even obscene may it be, everything is subject to 
aestheticization and culturalization. “All the industrial machinery in the world has 
acquired an aesthetic dimension; all the world’s insignificance has been transfigured 
by the aestheticizing process” (Baudrillard, Transparency 16). Such dimension even 
gains its value, for “the system runs less on the surplus-value of the commodity than 
on the aesthetic surplus-value of the sign” (16). The undergoing with feminism in 
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current state of affairs is thus the aestheticization of its ideas into signs like Lara Croft, 
Alice, Selene, Aeon or Elektra, who not only kick and kill on the big screen, but also 
travel to other wrapping in commercials, in Vogue, or in Saturday Night Live
44
. 
If traditional art forms, for instance, paintings, keep their difference and distance 
to be a piece of art, to be of aesthetic value – its aura makes its beauty unique, what is 
tricky with the whole “after the orgy” simulation and reproduction must keep what is 
presented to us both indifferent and enticing. Being enticing, however, is not by the 
criteria of aesthetics (because such criteria are disappearing), or in the sense of 
uniqueness and singularity, but, to the exact opposite, by means of the unavoidable 
spectacular ubiquity. Therefore, the contemporary age is a moment when art, rather 
than being colligated into a transcendent ideality, has been liquefied within a general 
aestheticization of everyday life, yielding to a pure circulation of images, a 
transaesthetics of banality. 
We see Art proliferating wherever we turn… But the soul of Art – Art as 
adventure, Art with its power of illusion, its capacity for negating reality, for 
setting up an “other scene” in opposition to reality, where things obey a higher 
set of rules, a transcendent figure in which beings, like line and color on a 
canvas, are apt to lose their meaning, to extend themselves beyond their own 
raison d’etre, and, in an urgent process of seduction, to rediscover their ideal 
form (even though this form may be that of their own destruction) – in this sense, 
Art is gone. Art has disappeared as a symbolic pact, as something thus clearly 
distinct from that proliferation of signs ad infinitum, that recycling of past and 
present forms, which we call “culture.”                (Baudrillard, Transparency 14) 
                                                          
44 Saturday Night Live (SNL) is an American late-night live television sketch comedy and variety show. 
The show mainly parodies contemporary culture and politics, and are performed by a large and varying 
cast of repertory and newer cast members (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturday_Night_Live).  
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Movies, especially contemporary blockbusters, are the leading force among the 
so-called “culture,” or what is phrased as the “cultural-economic logic” here. Under 
the same renewed apparatus, people are reproducing the transaesthetics through 
technological means in multiple commodity circles. When there are no more 
fundamental rules or criteria of judgment of pleasure, Art must be in circulation too, 
and at top speed, which leads to the loss of Art. So it is impossible to exchange 
“works” of art, be it for each other or against a referential value, and as what 
Baudrillard says, “they no longer have that secret collusiveness which is the strength 
of a culture. We no longer read such works – we merely decode them according to 
ever more contradictory criteria” (Transparency 22). 
The days when films were appreciated from a perspective of aesthetics are, 
therefore, long gone (for Walter Benjamin, the aesthetic aura is lost even with the 
emergence of films). In the aesthetic realm of today there is no longer the gold 
standard of aesthetic judgment or pleasure. Streamlined movies compete on a basis of 
sped-up spectacularity. And such spectacularity is the whole cultural guidance that 
leads whatever signs (images, objects, ideas, thoughts) float away from a coherent 
benchmark; we are now lead to judge movies from the previewed hype, the pure 
spectacularity and the attached enthusiasm for franchise. The big-name directors was 
once the object for aesthetical evaluation of movies as in Auteur theory
45
, while now, 
personal styles are as museum collections as the Louvre paintings and names like 
George Lucas and Steven Spielberg become the synonyms for blockbusters, big 
productions, Star Wars and franchises. All we can say about the spectacular 
                                                          
45 In film criticism, Auteur theory holds that a director’s film reflects the director’s personal creative 
vision, as if they were the primary “auteur” (the French word for “author”). In spite of – and sometimes 
even because of – the production of the film as part of an industrial process, the auteur’s creative voice 
is distinct enough to shine through all kinds of studio interference and through the collective process. 
Although this way of analyzing films was subject many criticisms later and rarely used now, it indeed 
represents a way of looking at film as a piece of art whose aura comes from the director’s creativity, 
just like the painting and the painter (Thompson and Bordwell). 
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blockbusters is that at certain point of the movie, the stunts, the special effects are 
“nicely done,” but never “beautiful”; we can say that the Blu-Ray copy of Resident 
Evil: Apocalypse is much more HR (high resolution) than a regular DVD version, but 
this can never mean an improved “beauty” of movie, or that the movie becomes 
unique because the resolution becomes ridiculously high. All those changes are only a 
further improvement in reproduction technology. The fantastic graphic image is not 
from the creative brushes of a painter who could not even repeat one single touch 
even himself/herself, but from an ever more complicated composition of digital pixels 
that would duplicate with a mechanic click. 
In the so-called sphere of art, Baudrillard says, there are Neo-Geometrism, Neo-
Expressionism, New Abstraction, New Representationalism, and many others 
(Transparency 15). But nothing in this sphere conflicts with anything else, and “all 
coexist with a marvelous facility amid general indifference.” This is “because none of 
these tendencies has any soul of its own that they can all inhabit the same cultural 
space; because they arouse nothing but profound indifference in us that we can accept 
them all simultaneously” (Transparency 15). The recurring prefix of Neo or New is 
because Neo-Expressionism, for instance, is no longer Expressionism under its 
definition, because it is repeating and traversing Expressionism while unable to 
identify itself. The cultural sphere is inhabited by all such kinds of indifferent 
tendencies and “-isms” (in the case of action heroine films, there are capitalism, 
feminism, consumerism and more), each of which has a hard time being defined, so 
they become “post”feminism or “late” capitalism that might have something to do 
with time and phase, but more to do with their own confusion. Each of them is then 
co-inhabited by multiple categories as well. Thus, for feminism, as well as for 
capitalism and for consumerism, there are movies, TV series, DVDs, advertisings, 
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news event commentaries, talk shows, magazines, to name only a few. And even for a 
single movie, there is a co-existence of what is stated above and a generic mingling of 
action, adventure, fantasy, science-fiction, horror, thriller, and a gorgeous tough 
woman. The reason why we could accept simultaneously the whole package of 
myriad types, genres, objects – signs – is, like what Baudrillard says, that it arouses 
nothing but indifference, and accepting is nothing more than a gesture of consumption, 
we purchase tickets, we buy albums, we order DVDs, and we go into the cinema 
spending one and a half hours being tickled, coming out and throwing the tickets 
away. We cannot commemorate those spectacles, but only marvel at it for the time 
being, and at best reproduce it in follow-up purchasing. 
This is the Art entering the metastasis as everything else. It is first as if art or 
artistic inspiration had been stuck in such a stasis that everything which had 
developed “magnificently for centuries had suddenly been paralyzed by its own image 
and its own riches” (Baudrillard, Transparency 15). Likewise, Hollywood, the biggest 
industry in the world, seems to run dry and resort to the past for inspiration. That is 
the point when cinema takes a postmodern turn and play with pastiche, parody and 
intertextuality. “Behind the whole convulsive movement of modern art lies a kind of 
inertia, something that can no longer transcend itself and has therefore turned in upon 
itself, merely repeating itself at a faster and faster rate” (15). Then the situation goes 
like this, “on the one hand, a stasis of the living form of art, and at the same time a 
proliferative tendency, wild hyperbole, and endless variations on all earlier forms. All 
this is logical enough: where there is stasis, there is metastasis” (15). 
Such a situation describes how feminism and postfeminism meets, not in terms 
of art form, but in terms of transferring of state of being. As feminism comes to a 
stasis (be it over, perished, or successful), postfeminism turns up to act as a metastasis 
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to circulate the idea, and this is done also with the “wild hyperbole, and endless 
variations.” With “endless variations,” postfeminism keeps pursuing a keen emphasis 
on femininity and sexuality that could always constitute a spectacle. And through all 
kinds of proliferative media tools, the postfeminist return to femininity and sexuality 
becomes what circulates as an “improved” idea of feminism, a life enjoyment females 
deserve (Projansky; Helford). With “wild hyperbole,” postfeminism makes it a 
naturally happening process to “boldly” assume feminism as something successful 
and “got over” and “proudly” put female body on spectacular display. But what is in 
intense circulation and reproduction has absolutely nothing to do with feminism. No 
matter how repeated and indifferent the spectacle of the idea of feminism is, 
postfeminism just manages to pull it off as an enticing one, because the banality of 
images is always backed up by the luxurious spectacularity, because there will always 
be erotic scenes awaiting where the carrier of the feminist idea, Lara Croft, for 
instance, takes off her clothes to showcase her eroticized and thus spectacularized 
female body as if such showcase acquired some aesthetical dimension. This is 
situation resembling what Baudrillard says about how our images are like icons. For 
the action heroine films, the images of those super strong, intelligent, brave female 
leads are like icons – they allow us to go on believing in feminism while eluding the 
question of its existence. So, according to Baudrillard, perhaps we ought to treat all 
present-day cinema simulating the idea of feminism as a set of rituals, and for ritual 
use only, considering the idea of feminism solely from an anthropological standpoint, 
without reference to any political judgment whatsoever (Transparency 17). 
In this sense, in these action heroine films, we have no access to what is 
feminism or what is anti-feminism, “inasmuch as we have access to neither the 
beautiful nor the ugly, and are incapable of judging, we are condemned to 
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indifference” (Baudrillard, Transparency 18). Beyond this indifference, however, 
another kind of fascination emerges, a fascination which replaces aesthetic pleasure. 
“For, once liberated from their respective constraints, the beautiful and the ugly, in a 
sense, multiply: they become more beautiful than beautiful, more ugly than ugly” (18) 
– that is to say, to become spectacles. 
Thus painting currently cultivates, if not ugliness exactly – which remains an 
aesthetic value – then the uglier-than-ugly (the “bad”, the “worse”, kitsch), an 
ugliness raised to the second power because it is liberated from any relationship 
with its opposite: Once freed from the ‘true’ Mondrian, we are at liberty to ‘out-
Mondrian Mondrian’; freed from the true naifs, we can paint in a way that is 
‘more naif than naif’, and so on. And once freed from reality, we can produce 
the ‘realer than real’ – hyperrealism. It was in fact with hyperrealism and pop art 
that everything began, that everyday life was raised to the ironic power of 
photographic realism. Today this escalation has caught up every form of art, 
every style; and all, without discrimination, have entered the transaesthetic 
world of simulation.                                             (Baudrillard, Transparency 18)  
Similarly, there is a fascination going on with the sexual pleasure, and the 
hyperreality with sexual difference. According to Baudrillard, the sexual body has 
now been in an artificial state – transsexuality. It is not in the anatomical sense, but in 
a more general sense of playing with the commutability of sex signs, which is actually 
a play (rather than sexual difference) on sexual indifference – the lack of 
differentiation between sexual poles and sexual pleasure (Transparency 20). He sees 
the contrast between sexuality and transsexuality as essential: if sexuality is 
underpinned by pleasure, by jouissance (the leitmotiv of sexual liberation), then 
transsexuality is underpinned by artifice, no matter it is the artifice of surgically 
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changing sex or the one of the transvestism that plays with the sartorial or gestural 
signs of sex. But whether the operation in question is surgical involving organs or 
semiurgical involving signs, we are, nevertheless, concerned with parts of 
replacement, and the body is thus fated to become a prosthesis by such replacement. 
In the same way, our model of sexuality should have become transsexuality (20). 
Baudrillard then claims that we are all transsexuals symbolically, and we are all 
transvestites of art or of sex. We no longer have aesthetic or sexual convictions, 
though we all profess to have them (Transparency 21). Just as the criteria of beauty is 
gone, but we are still saying something is beautiful; the reality about feminism 
disappears, but we are still celebrating a cinematic image is a feminist icon in a 
simulative spirit. “The myth of sexual liberation is still alive and well under many 
forms in the real world, but at the level of the imaginary it is the transsexual myth, 
with its androgynous and hermaphroditic variants, that holds sway” (Baudrillard, 
Transparency 22). 
For the action heroine films, the same fascination with sexuality as that with 
transaesthetics is that, once liberated from their respective constraints, the feminine 
and the masculine also multiply: the female leads become more feminine than 
feminine, while more masculine than masculine. Is the over-sized masculinity 
pointing to something that the feminist ideal is eager to encompass, that women are 
presented to the masses as overwhelmingly strong, intelligent and independent?  If 
this is the case, isn’t it contradictory in that the simultaneous extravagant femininity 
just points to the exact opposite of sexism which feminists are so eager to get rid of? 
The fact is that the excessive femininity and masculinity embodied in one single body 
of the action heroine is transported over to a hyperreal level of existence. Thus the 
movies cultivates, if not masculinity exactly – which remains a sexual value – then 
272 
 
the more-masculine-than-masculine, a masculinity raised to the second power because 
it is liberated from any relationship with its opposite. When it has nothing do to with 
its opposite, how could the hyperrealized femininity or masculinity form anything for 
anyone to encompass or rid of? 
“This strategy for exorcizing the body by means of the signs of sex, for 
conjuring away desire through the overkill of its staging, is a good deal more efficient 
than good old repression founded on taboo” (Baudrillard, Transparency 23). But the 
way this new system really differs from the old is that, in Baudrillard’s opinion, one 
cannot see at all who stands to gain from it, because everyone suffers from it equally 
(23). “The rule of transvestitism has become the very basis of our behavior, even in 
our own search for identity and difference. We no longer have time to search for an 
identity for ourselves in the archives, in a memory, in a project or a future” (23). 
Instead, we are supposed to have an instant memory from which we can have 
immediate access to “a kind of public-relations identity” (23). So if in terms of body 
function, what we seek today is less about health – an organic equilibrium, but more 
about “an ephemeral, hygienic and promotional radiance from the body – much more 
a performance than an ideal state” (23). If in terms of fashion and appearances, what 
we seek is less beauty or attractiveness than the right LOOK. “Everyone seeks their 
look. Since it is no longer possible to base any claim on one’s own existence, there is 
nothing for it but to perform an appearing act without concerning oneself with 
being—or  even with being seen. So it is not: I exist, I am here! but rather: I am 
visible, I am an image—look! look!” (23). 
This is not even an act of narcissist, says Baudrillard, but merely, a sort of self-
promoting mechanism without depth, by which everyone becomes the manager of 
their own appearance (24), not only for women who are sexualized but also for men 
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who want to be metrosexual. That is to say, the excessive femininity and masculinity 
residing in the action heroine figure is not something founded on an interplay of 
differences, differences from each other, differences from the past, or from the 
concurrent others. It is no more than a look of the transsexual that plays at difference 
without believing in it – the total indifference. The extravagant signs of a voluptuous 
and tough body only work to epitomize her identity into a look, a spectacle, “a 
transient performance with no sequel, a disabused mannerism in a world without 
manners” (Baudrillard, Transparency 24). The promotional ignition of excessive 
sexuality found in action heroines is therefore directly connected to the impossibility 
of any sexual pleasure. Just as “in the absence of value judgments, value goes up in 
flames. And it goes up in a sort of ecstasy” (19), the action heroines ignite their 
ecstasy by exploding endless spectacles.  
Then how about the sexual liberation? As Baudrillard writes, the triumph of the 
transsexual over the sexual puts in an awkward situation the sexual liberation of the 
earlier generation. By its original discourse, this liberation should bring forth the 
body’s full erotic force, which is especially favorable to the principles of femininity 
and of sexual pleasure. But it now appears to “have been no more than an 
intermediate phase on the way to the confusion of categories” that has been discussed 
all along. “The sexual revolution may thus turn out to have been just a stage in the 
genesis of transsexuality” (Transparency 24). Baudrillard then conclude, the 
fundamental issue here is the problematic fate of all revolutions (24). 
So in the case of the cybernetic revolution, in view of the equivalence of brain 
and computer, as Baudrillard asks, humanity is faced with the crucial question “Am I 
a man or a machine?” The vigorously ongoing genetic revolution raises the question 
“Am I a man or just a potential clone?” Likewise, the sexual revolution, by liberating 
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all the potentialities of desire, raises another fundamental question, “Am I a man or a 
woman?” And as for the political and social revolution, “it will turn out to have led 
people by an implacable logic – having offered him his own freedom, his own free 
will – to ask himself where his own will lies, what he wants in his heart of hearts, and 
what he is entitled to expect from himself” (Transparency 24). However, there are no 
answers to these questions, which characterizes the paradox of every revolution 
concerning the outcome – revolution opens the door to indeterminacy, anxiety and 
confusion but there is not another door to get a closure. “Once the orgy was over,” 
according to Baudrillard, “liberation was seen to have left everyone looking for their 
generic and sexual identity – and with fewer and fewer answers available, in view of 
the traffic in signs and the multiplicity of pleasures on offer” (24). That is how we 
became transsexuals, just as how Lara Croft always remains an abstract and altering 
image that is more masculine than masculine and more feminine than feminine. And it 
is also a same process as we became transpoliticals, or, politically indifferent and 
undifferentiated beings – “for by this time we had embraced, digested and rejected the 
most contradictory ideologies, and were left wearing only their masks: we had 
become, in our own heads – and perhaps unbeknownst to ourselves – transvestites of 
the political realm” (Baudrillard, Transparency 25). 
So after the liberation, what is it exactly that feminists want as a perfect visual 
representation that fits its ideal, if here I can still use the term “feminists” or 
“feminism” to indicate a distinct group of people holding to a set of agenda and 
objective? Perhaps it is better to have no such perfect representation first to avoid an 
essentialist feminism that may exclude the considerations for different class, race, age, 
sexuality, nationality and so on. The absence of a perfect image also enables female 
representation to be open to criticism, and thus to the potential of change, which 
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seems to be the only way to prevent feminism from falling into stagnancy. But the 
problem is, in view of what has been said in this section, that feminism is not stuck by 
being stagnant, but by chaos, confusion, and the ever uncertain state of traversing 
back and forth between political, aesthetical, cultural and sexual. If feminism stayed 
in political sphere for its struggle, feminists would know who and what they are up 
against. To put it in simplified instance, if erotic objectification is an issue feminists 
want to get rid of through political means, no matter how difficult and impossible to 
achieve it, they at least know what they are striking is a hard rock – it hurts but it feels 
real, and the rock may be still there, but there is definitely changes to the rock because 
of the strikes, as small as might they be. But the current situation comes to that the 
issue is no longer solely a political issue, or solved through political means, but might 
be cultural, economic, aesthetic, and so on, and furthermore, there is no sphere 
distinctively called “political sphere” any more, but transpoitical, which can be at 
once cultural, economic, aesthetical…the confusion just goes on and there is no 
stability or certainty for any dedicated engagement. And now feminists raise up the 
issues of erotic objectification, they do not know where to engage – it is like punching 
water or air instead of rock, with too much fluidity to really engage with; they might 
not get seriously hurt, but the fluid water or air just resume the shape as how they 
were, and nothing might change at all. And what is worse, the water or air might be 
taken by them as essential to their living while themselves immersed in the water/air 
that erotic objectification is everywhere. As to the water/air, it is exactly what has 
been talked about throughout the whole study, the ubiquitous media, technology and 
signs, which make the trans-state an unavoidable chaotic situation feminism cannot 
help falling into. Therefore, it is actually too late to speak of “the perfect 
representation”, because the categories and the criteria to define perfect have gone, as 
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feminism is scattered all around in media images, in spectacular ideas, in 




Chapter 5 The “Logical” Predicament: Feminism and 
Postmodernism 
 
As action heroine cinema remains a heated subject for debate usually relegated 
to film studies, the issues involved have been inevitably expanded to a larger sphere 
by the changing structures of the social, the economic, and the cultural in 
contemporary age. The interrogation of this study, hence, goes beyond the dedicated 
textual analysis which feminist film study usually employ, to examine the contextual 
factors by looking towards the overall cultural-economic logic formed in the late 
capitalist society. Such a logic is characterized by the general mood of the postmodern 
consumer culture, where the image mechanism of the film industry is increasingly 
subjected to the configuration of technological reproduction. In the same vein, while 
action heroine cinema is figured out as a notable form of female representation in 
mainstream Hollywood, the object to examine cannot be restricted to the female 
character only. This is because what make these films stand out are not the heroines 
alone, but a combination of multiple processes and practices, which include 
franchising, merchandising, stars, special effects and most importantly, technologies – 
the whole media culture of today. While the feminist and postfeminist readings that 
solely concentrate on the textual depiction of women failed to see the whole picture, 
the examination of the cultural-economic logic is therefore key in pushing the 
entangled debates between feminists and postfeminists to another level. 
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Under the navigation of Jean Baudrillard’s theories about radical semiurgy, 
simulation, implosion, hyperreality and consumerism, which provide trenchant 
critiques of contemporary media culture, this thesis has analyzed the watching of 
contemporary action heroine cinema in terms of multiple consumptive processes, in 
which these films are consumed in four ways, namely, consumed as the composite 
commodity, as the spectacles of technology, as the spectacles of the heroines’ bodies, 
and as the idea of feminism. Through the serialization and merchandizing of the 
action heroine films into media franchises composed of commodities in multiple 
forms and providing multiple pleasures, these movies are, firstly, consumed as 
composite commodities. This leads to a viewing process that is highly fragmented and 
schizophrenic, travelling back and forth across endless play of free-floating signifiers 
and intertextuality. In the same way, the image of the action heroine is fragmented 
and reproduced across different media platforms, taking a plural, instable and abstract 
form. Secondly, the intensive uses of sophisticated filmmaking technologies to 
produce spectacular images, and the numerous scenes, shots and spectacles that 
directly represent the high technology make the movies consumed as highly seductive 
spectacles of technology. Swayed by their technological imaginary and a techno-
utopian mindset, people are not only consuming the technologies as a means to 
achieve certain cinematic effects, but are also consuming the technologies as an end to 
satisfy their fascination. Thirdly, as the major assets of these movies, the action 
heroines seem to act as both the subject to push forward narrative and the sexual 
object to be looked at. However, the potential of the image to become an empowering 
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representation for women is impaired by the cultural obsession with images, signs, 
spectacles, and the tendency to objectify everything. If the traditional apparatus 
subjugates individuals into dominant ideologies by interpellating them into a certain 
subject position, such a theory partly loses its power in face of a cultural-economic 
logic that crumbles its very foundation for analysis – the distinction between subject 
and object, between denotation and connotation implodes. Thus a new image 
apparatus comes into its place where signifiers are commuting in circular manner with 
no signified, the sign value becomes the overarching feature of contemporary 
consumer culture, and individuals are subjugated into endless play of images and 
simulacra. The action heroines lose their subjectivity and become pure objects for 
look, not only because they are sexualized, but also because the overwhelming 
objectifying look applies to everything. And as the images of action heroines travel 
across multiple platforms and take plural and unstable forms as the composite 
commodities, they are further fragmented and objectified. Likewise, the 
spectators/consumers, in the process of the mass consumption of images, fall into the 
“operational genesis” of consumption, and become objectified and commodified 
themselves. As the subject positions of the heroines and of the viewers both disappear, 
the identification process is thus replaced by a pure objectifying look.  Last but not 
least, the viewing process is also a consumption of the idea of feminism. In the age of 
what Baudrillard terms as “after the orgy”, people are now simulating the ideals and 
goals of the glorious liberations in a gesture to maintain the moment of orgy, to hold 
the spirit of being progressive. And the action heroine movies are the perfect 
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machines to produce and reproduce the simulacra of feminist myth. But what exactly 
is feminism and how exactly is feminism now operating is put behind, and what is left 
is a circular void of uncertainty in which the postfeminism steps on to simulate a 
hyperreality that all the feminist agenda is achieved and should be celebrated with 
such images of both strong and sexual women all over the media. This is the situation 
of metastasis where signs free of fixed reference and categorization enter an endless 
self-reproduction that are contaminating and contaminated by other spheres and 
categories which are also full of confusion and uncertainty. It, then, results in a 
ubiquitous trans-state of beings – transpolitical, transsexual, transeconomic, 
transaesthetics and so on – which embraces a world of confused and undetermined 
categories, spheres, signs, and images, and thus further invalidates the power of 
traditional apparatus theory in analyzing contemporary action heroine films. The 
feminist ideal, as it inevitably enters this same trans-state and takes the form of 
Hollywood movies, media franchise, and endless composite commodities and images, 
is then dissipated, diluted, and finally gone in simulation. What happens to the 
spectatory thinking process, which may not be an easy thing in front of the infinite 
and irresistible distractions of spectacles, is then assimilated to a similar consumptive 
pattern – the idea of feminism, as a sign, as a spectacular thought, is consumed just as 
any other spectacles. 
As to the debate between the feminist and postfeminist reading of these movies, 
it is now clear to see that the root and the implication of their oxymoronic 
interpretations lies in this cultural-economic logic of contemporary society. For 
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postfeminists, they easily assume that the active agency of the heroines constructed by 
narrative provides ample support for their contention that this represents the 
achievement of feminist ideals, but they fail to see that the narrative, though not 
wiped out completely, becomes more of an expedient and provisional locus where 
endless extravagant spectacles could be displayed than an essential entity to wield 
ideological meanings. More importantly, this active agency is subject to the overall 
objectifying culture and thus consumed just like and together with all the other 
flamboyant spectacles. The so-called representation is nothing but a simulation of 
powerful women. At the same time, the embracing of femininity and heterosexual 
desire to enjoy life, which, postfeminists claim, is what women now deserve, is 
actually strengthening and facilitating the objectifying consumer culture that shall 
continue treating women as sexual objects. As long as women are participating in this 
culture, the look as an “empowered postfeminist” will be appropriated as a rightful 
advertisement to better worsen the situation, no matter what empowerment the 
postfeminists claim to have felt. For feminist readings, they fail to realize that it is not 
only women that are objectified, also not only men, but everything – the actions, the 
technologies, the explosions are equally pleasurable spectacles to look at. So while 
women are indeed still under erotic objectification, which indicates the fight against 
patriarchy is to be continued, the bigger issue is to recognize what predicament the 
cultural-economic logic has put feminists in during their fight. For women to get a 
voice in the mainstream media representation, it is inevitably to resort to 
technological reproduction, to composite commodification, and thus become a sign, 
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spectacularized by means of sexualization. But as immersed in the mainstream, that 
voice, if there is still any, only ends up consumed, dispersed, diluted, and sucked into 
the black hole of postmodern chaotic, where no dedicated engagement is ever possible. 
And what consolidates this predicament is that it is maintained by the media 
simulacrum – a hyperreal world depicting a relieving and almost utopian situation 
where women enjoy equality and life, a gorgeous look posed by postfeminism in 
cinema, TV shows, magazines, and advertisements. 
This then leads to the relationship between feminism and postmodernism. This 
thesis suggests, by way of analyzing action heroine movies as exemplary of the 
cultural-economic logic, that there does exist common ground for feminism and 
postmodernism – both insist on the critique of the grand narrative and adhere to 
difference and incommensurability (Owens; Fraser and Nicholson). As an important 
anti-essentialist voice, Judith Butler contends that the very category of gender is 
simply a performance, the effect of repeated imitation of “a phantasmatic ideal of 
heterosexual identity” (qtd. in Thornham, “Postmodernism and Feminism” 28). But 
the question remains how powerful this abandonment and subversion is in pushing the 
feminist cause forward. As Tania Modleski points out, Butler’s strategy is an 
“extremely individualistic solution to the problem of women’s oppression” (13). And 
more importantly, despite the similarity between feminism and postmodernism, 
feminism, as emphasized by Thornham, is itself a “narrative of emancipation,” and 
“its political claims are made on behalf of a social group, women, who are seen to 
have an underlying community of interest, and of an embodied female subject whose 
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identity and experiences are necessarily different from those of men.” And “if we 
remove gender (or sexual difference) as a central organizing principle – how can a 
feminist political practice be any longer possible?” (“Postmodernism and Feminism” 
27) 
The conclusion here is not to choose a stand between essentialism and anti-
essentialism, but to caution what predicament there might be. While engaged with 
postmodernism thinking it as sort of therapeutic corrective to feminism’s 
universalizing tendency, feminists should be aware that the other aspects of 
postmodernism which form the contemporary cultural-economic logic – the 
technological reproduction, fragmentation, depthlessness of images, simulacrum, 
hyperreality, and the uncertainties of trans-state –  might (or already have) become the 
next totalizing master narrative. This new logic is not easy to deconstruct, because it 
always exists on the very surface level and takes a fluid shape, unavailable for serious 
engagement. That is to say, as Linda Hutcheon reminds us, the postmodern condition, 
unlike feminism, does not offer a politics: it complicates strategies of resistance and 
usurps social and political change (in Thornham, “Postmodernism and Feminism” 41). 
That is the dilemma faced by feminism in its engagement with postmodernism, a 
predicament caused by the cultural-economic logic – the “logical” predicament, and 
the same conundrum that persecutes female representation and traps the images of 
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Table 1: Genres and Stars of the 21
st –century Action Heroine Films 
(from www.imdb.com ) 
Title  Genres Involved  Stars in Casting  
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider 
(2001) 
action, adventure, fantasy Angelina Jolie 
Lara Croft Tomb Raider: 
The Cradle of Life (2003) 
action, adventure, fantasy, 
thriller 
Angelina Jolie 
Underworld (2003) action, fantasy, sci-fi, thriller Kate Beckinsale 
Underworld: Evolution 
(2006) 
action, fantasy, sci-fi, thriller Kate Beckinsale 
Underworld: Awakening 
(2012) 
action, fantasy, sci-fi, thriller Kate Beckinsale 
Resident Evil (2002) action, horror, sci-fi, thriller Milla Jovovich 
Michelle Rodriguez 
Resident Evil: Apocalypse 
(2004) 
action, horror, sci-fi Milla Jovovich 
Resident Evil: Extinction 
(2007)  
action, horror, Sci-fi, thriller Milla Jovovich 
Resident Evil: Afterlife 
(2010) 
action, horror, Sci-fi, thriller Milla Jovovich 
Resident Evil: Retribution 
(2012) 
action, horror, Sci-fi, thriller Milla Jovovich 
Aeon Flux (2005) action, adventure, sci-fi, 
thriller 
Charlize Theron 





Table 2a: Highest-Grossing Films in Recent Years 
(From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_films, retrieved in June, 2012) 
 
Year Movie Worldwide 
Gross 
Budget 
2000 Mission Impossible II $546,388,105 $125,000,000 
2001 Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s 
Stone 
$974,755,371 $125,000,000 
2002 The Lord of the Rings: The Two 
Towers 
$926,047,111 $94,000,000 
2003 The Lord of the Rings: The Return of 
the King 
$1,119,929,521 $94,000,000 
2004 Shrek 2 $919,838,758 $125,000,000 
2005 Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire $896,911,078 $150,000,000 
2006 Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead 
Man’s Chest 
$1,066,179,725 $225,000,000 
2007 Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s 
End 
$963,420,425 $300,000,000 
2008 The Dark Knight $1,001,921,825 $185,000,000 
2009 Avatar  $2,782,275,172 $237,000,000 
2010 Toy Story 3 $1,063,171,911 $200,000,000 
2011 Harry Potter and the Deathly 
Hollows Part II 
$1,328,111,219 $250,000,000 








Table 2b: List of Worldwide Highest-Grossing Films in History 
(From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_highest-grossing_films and 
http://www.imdb.com/,  retrieved in June, 2012) 
Rank Title Genre Worldwide 
gross 
Year 
1 Avatar Action, adventure, 
fantasy  
$2,782,275,172 2009 
2 Titanic  Adventure, drama, history  $2,185,372,302 1997 
3 The Avengers  Action, adventure, sci-fi $1,419,837,000 2012 
4 Harry Potter and the Deathly 




5 Transformers: Dark of the Moon Action, adventure, sci-fi $1,123,746,996 2011 
6 The Lord of the Rings: The 
Return of the King 
Action, adventure, drama $1,119,929,521 2003 





8 Toy Story 3 Animation, adventure, 
comedy 
$1,063,171,911 2010 










11 Alice in Wonderland Adventure, family, 
fantasy 
$1,024,299,904 2010 
12 The Dark Knight Action, crime, drama $1,001,921,825 2008 










15 Harry Potter and the Deathly 




16 The Lion King Animation, adventure, 
comedy 
$951,583,777 1994 















20 Shrek 2 Animation, adventure, 
comedy 
$919,838,758 2004 
21 Jurassic Park Adventure, family sci-fi $914,691,118 1993 
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23 Spider-Man 3 Action, fantasy $890,871,626 2007 
24 Ice Age: Dawn of the Dinosaurs Animation, action, 
adventure 
$886,686,817 2009 









List 1  Firearms used in the film Lara Croft: Tomb Raider (from 
http://www.imfdb.org/wiki/Lara_Croft:_Tomb_Raider) 
1 Handguns 
    1.1 Heckler & Koch USP Match 
    1.2 Walther P99 
    1.3 Smith & Wesson 5946 
    1.4 Smith & Wesson Model 10 
    1.5 Beretta 92FS 
2 Submachine Guns 
    2.1 Steyr TMP 
    2.2 Heckler & Koch MP5A2 
    2.3 Heckler & Koch MP5A3 
3 Rifles 
    3.1 AKS-74U 
    3.2 Heckler & Koch G36K 
4 Shotguns 
    4.1 Remington 870 Shotgun (Nickel-plated) 
5 Machine Guns 
    5.1 Browning M2HB 
6 Other 
    6.1 Lara's Manor Armory 







List 2  Firearms used in the film Lara Croft Tomb Raider: The Cradle of Life 
(from http://www.imfdb.org/wiki/Lara_Croft_Tomb_Raider:_The_Cradle_of_Life) 
1 Handguns 
1.1 Heckler & Koch USP Match 
1.2 Heckler & Koch P11 
1.3 Heckler & Koch USP Compact 
1.4 Browning BDA 
1.5 Glock 17 
1.6 Jericho 941 F 
1.7 NAA Mini Revolver 
1.8 SIG-Sauer P226 




2.3 Blaser R93 Sniper Rifle 
2.4 Galil MAR 
2.5 Heckler & Koch G36C 
2.6 Heckler & Koch G36K 
2.7 Heckler & Koch HK33 
2.8 Lee-Enfield No III* Mark I SMLE 
2.9 SAR-80 
2.10 Winchester Model 1892 Saddle Ring Carbine 
3 Submachine Guns 
3.1 Steyr MPi81 
3.2 Heckler & Koch UMP9 
4 Machine Guns (Imi Negev) 
